1. In Rubikâs cube discourse, why are the solutions called âgodâ algorithms or âgod-numbersâ
Within the Rubikâs Cube (and broader puzzle) community, âGodâs algorithmâ refers to an optimal solving methodâone that always produces the shortest possible solution from any given configuration. The idea is that an all-knowing entity (âGodâ) could see the perfect route to solve the puzzle in the minimum number of moves.
Historical Notes:The phrase gained popularity in discussions around âGodâs number,â which is the maximum number of moves needed to solve the cube from any position (20 moves in half-turn metric, 26 in quarter-turn metric). Once that number was proven, the algorithm that always hits that bound if necessary was called âGodâs algorithm.â
Informal Usage: Itâs not a formal or religious usage. The term is more of a playful nod to an omniscient perspectiveâan algorithm that âknowsâ the absolute optimal path.
2. Any relation to how Einstein (and others?) used âgodâ in connection with the laws of physics?
Einsteinâs âGodâ
When Einstein used phrases like âGod does not play dice,â he was typically referring to the underlying determinism or structure in the laws of physics, rather than a personal deity.âGodâ in this context alluded to the universeâs governing rules, which Einstein believed were elegantly consistent.
Comparing to âGodâs Algorithmâ
The Rubikâs Cube usage is much more informal. It hints at an ultimate principle (optimality), but it doesnât really draw from Einsteinâs philosophical or theological implications.Both usages share a metaphorical sense of an ultimate or perfect knowledge, but they operate in different domains: puzzle-solving vs. describing physical reality.
3. How is this related to whether the âgod-lawsâ are (a) empirical, as in science, or (b) formal, as in mathematics?
(a) Empirical Laws in Science
Physical laws are discovered through observation, experiment, and inference. For instance, Einsteinâs field equations in general relativity are tested against measurements of planetary orbits, gravitational lensing, etc.If they fail in experiments, scientists must refine or replace them.
(b) Formal Laws in Mathematics
Mathematical âlawsâ (theorems, proofs) are established through logical deduction within an axiomatic system. They donât depend on experiments; they rely on consistency with axioms.
Godâs Algorithm in the Rubikâs Cube falls into the category of formal problem-solving. Itâs grounded in group theory and combinatoricsâthe âlawsâ behind it arenât empirical but logical constraints of the cubeâs configuration space.So, âGodâs algorithmâ sits firmly in the âformalâ realm of mathematics and theoretical computer science
4. And is there any relation to the various foundational views of mathematicsâ(i) Platonism, (ii) Intuitionism, (iii) Constructionism, or (iv) other options?
(i) Platonism
Platonists see mathematical entities (like numbers or group structures) as existing in an abstract realm. âGodâs algorithmâ could be seen as discovered from this realm, a perfect solution that exists objectively
(ii) Intuitionism
Intuitionists argue that math is a creation of the human mind, focusing on constructive proofs. One might say that the âoptimal solutionâ is only meaningful insofar as we can construct it or approximate it with an algorithm.
(iii) Constructionism
Closely related to intuitionism, constructionism emphasizes building mathematical objects step by step. In that vein, the quest for âGodâs algorithmâ is a constructive process: we want an explicit procedure that yields the optimal path.
(iv) Other Views (e.g., Formalism)
Formalists see math as manipulations of symbols under given rules. The concept of âGodâs algorithmâ fits well here too: itâs a statement within the formal system describing the Rubikâs Cube group, and we seek a sequence of symbols (moves) that minimize the path.Overall, the concept of a âGodâs algorithmâ can be interpreted differently based on oneâs philosophical stance. Platonists might say it exists out there to be discovered, while intuitionists might say itâs only ârealâ once we construct it. Either way, the term âGodâ is more of a metaphor for perfect knowledge than a literal or religious reference.
5. Have there been interpretations of what Einstein meant by “god”?
Einsteinâs Own Statements
Spinozaâs God: Einstein often mentioned that he believed in the âGod of Spinoza.â Spinozaâs philosophical view is broadly taken as pantheistic, equating âGodâ with the totality of nature or the universeâs lawful harmony rather than a personal deity.Hence, for Einstein, âGodâ was a metaphor for the underlying rational structure, elegance, and consistency in the laws of the universe.
Non-Personal Deity: Einstein explicitly rejected the idea of a personal God who intervenes in daily human affairs.He wrote in letters that he did not believe in a God âwho concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings.âFamous Quotes and Their Context
âGod does not play diceâ This phrase was Einsteinâs way of expressing skepticism about the randomness and probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. He believed the universe had a more deterministic or at least deeper, as-yet-unknown, lawful structure.It did not imply a belief in a personal God but rather an insistence on an orderly universe.
Mixed Interpretations
Religious Interpretations: Some theologians and laypeople initially took Einsteinâs words about âGodâ as support for a traditional theistic stance. However, Einsteinâs later clarifications made clear he was not endorsing a personal, interventionist God.
Philosophical/Metaphorical Interpretations: Most modern scholars agree that Einsteinâs references to âGodâ were predominantly metaphors for natureâs laws and the deep sense of wonder he felt when studying the cosmos.
Einsteinâs Personal âReligiousnessâ
Awe and Wonder: While he did not follow an organized religion, Einstein described himself as feeling a âcosmic religious feelingââan awe at the grandeur and mystery of the universe.He used âGodâ as a shorthand for that awe-inspiring order, rather than a being with personality or will.
Key Takeaway
Einsteinâs âGodâ is best understood in the context of Spinozistic or pantheistic thought, focusing on the harmony and unity of nature. It was a poetic or metaphorical use of the word âGodââfar removed from the typical doctrinal or personal interpretations found in many religions.
Last question series: (1) The notion of “god” and “gods” originated (etymologically?) from supernatural and metaphysical beliefs — beliefs which non-religious people believe to be false. Why choose “god” as the metaphor for the discovered and empirically supported truths of physics? (2) Does it fit any better (or worse) to scientific findings than Dawkins’s “Flying Spaghetti Monster”, or, for that matter, “Beelzebub”? (3) Even if it is just a metaphor for the sense of awe at the universe and its laws, why call that “god”? (4) Doesn’t that make awe a metaphor for the notion of god? (5) Last: since the notion of god(s) in its origin anthropomorphic, hence personal, is it not a mark of an inapt trope if one then has to qualify it with “put I don’t mean a personal or supernatural deity”?Â
The term âgodâ has a deep cultural and linguistic resonance. When Einstein or others refer to âGod,â they tap into a well-known concept that suggests something ultimate, beyond ordinary human understanding.
Convenience and Cultural Familiarity: Even if non-religious thinkers reject supernatural claims, using âGodâ as shorthand for âultimate realityâ or âthe fundamental lawsâ can be a convenient metaphor because itâs already embedded in the vernacular.
Poetic or Emotional Connotation:Saying âGodâ can evoke awe, mystery, and reverenceâemotions that mirror how scientists might feel about the grandeur of nature and the cosmos.
The âFlying Spaghetti Monsterâ was coined satirically to highlight perceived absurdities in certain religious arguments. It deliberately underscores the idea that âany deity is as likely as another.âEinsteinâs usage of âGodâ has a more serious or reverential historical weight. Itâs less about satire and more about expressing awe or the sense of a grand underlying principle.
Cultural Reactions Differ:âGod,â in many societies, carries an air of solemnity; âBeelzebubâ or âFlying Spaghetti Monsterâ carry connotations either of the demonic or the absurd. So, in terms of widespread acceptance or emotional tenor, âGodâ remains a more common metaphor for grandeur and unity in the laws of physics.
Historically, philosophical and scientific writings have often co-opted religious or theistic language to express wonder. Itâs partly a carryover from periods when religion was the default lens of cultural interpretation.
Connotations of âUltimateâ or âAbsoluteâ: Calling it âGodâ connotes something all-encompassing, a concept that stands in for âthe ultimate nature of reality.
âEmotional Resonance: Words like âgodâ may resonate emotionally more than purely secular words (e.g., âthe laws of physicsâ), especially for expressing profound awe.
Inevitably Ambiguous: Indeed, calling it âGodâ invites confusion because most people associate âGodâ with a personal, intervening deity. Hence the repeated clarifications by figures like Einstein: âI donât mean a personal God.â
Metaphor vs. Literal Meaning:
Metaphors often extend words beyond their literal origins. Still, some argue that using âGodâ for an impersonal force is misleading if one must always add caveats.
Rhetorical Power vs. Precision:
Pro: Using âGodâ can evoke a stronger emotional or rhetorical impact.
Con: It risks conflation with traditional theism, requiring disclaimers (âGod but not personalâ), which some find contradictory or confusing.
Cultural Momentum: Despite these drawbacks, the cultural inertia behind âGodâ as a term of ultimate reference remains potent. So even if itâs not perfectly apt, it continues to be used, partly because no alternative metaphor carries the same widespread recognition.
Calling the laws of physics âGodâ (in Einsteinâs sense) is a metaphor that leverages cultural and emotional weightâyet it often necessitates disclaimers to avoid implying belief in a supernatural or personal deity. Whether itâs apt or inapt depends on oneâs communication goals: itâs evocative and poetic but can also be ambiguous or confusing.
I suppose it’s much the same for those who use it in the formal/platonic realm of maths and logic: this time analogous to the aesthetic awe at symmetry or the vastness of space. Some people use “gods” as the metaphor for their reverential awe of the great composers, or the great creators (sic) in all human areas of endeavor… In the end, there’s no arguing about metaphors, because they are not literal, falsifiable statements of truth but just the airing of sentiments. The anthropomorphic metaphors especially…
Thought about metaphors and reverence in science for a couple of seconds Indeedâmetaphors, especially those involving âgodâ or âgods,â tap into cultural and emotional resonance rather than strict, literal statements. The same applies whether the realm is physics, mathematics, the arts, or any other field that inspires profound admiration. Because metaphors are inherently symbolic (not falsifiable in the scientific sense), they serve more as expressions of sentimentâvehicles for conveying awe, reverence, or wonderâthan as precise definitions or doctrinal truths. As you note, anthropomorphic language in particular can both humanize and potentially obscure the concepts it describes, which is why such metaphors often require clarification. Ultimately, itâs a creative way of communicating emotion rather than making a claim about empirical reality.