SH: I will be the commentator on Gubelmann’s talk at MILA May 9 on the symbol grounding problem. Could you please summarize his arguments and evidence? As far as I can see, like most people, he has only read the 1990 paper, se he does not know about my papers since, that you and I have been discussing. So in your summary you can cross-reference where relevant.
GPT: Reto Gubelmann’s paper, “Pragmatic Norms Are All You Need â Why The Symbol Grounding Problem Does Not Apply to LLMs,” challenges the application of the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) to Large Language Models (LLMs). âail-workshop.github.io+4ACL Anthology+4ACL Anthology+4
Critique of Bender and Koller (2020): Gubelmann addresses the claim that LLMs cannot achieve genuine understanding due to their lack of direct interaction with real-world referents. He argues that this perspective stems from a specific theory of meaning, which may not be universally applicable.
Association with the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM): He posits that the SGP is rooted in the CTM, which suggests that mental representations require grounding in real-world entities to be meaningful. Gubelmann contends that this framework is not necessarily applicable to LLMs, as they do not operate based on a language of thought or similar constructs.
Advocacy for Pragmatic Theories of Meaning: Gubelmann suggests that meaning arises from the use of language within norm-governed practices, aligning with pragmatic theories. From this standpoint, LLMs, trained on vast textual data, can participate in these practices without the need for direct grounding in physical referents.
Cross-References to Your Recent Work:
Embodiment and Sensorimotor Experience: Your recent research emphasizes the importance of embodiment and sensorimotor experiences in grounding symbols. Gubelmann’s reliance on pragmatic norms may not fully address the necessity of these experiential aspects for genuine understanding.â
Categorical Perception and Language Evolution: Your studies on categorical perception highlight the role of perceptual grounding in language development. Gubelmann’s arguments might benefit from considering how LLMs could replicate such perceptual grounding without sensorimotor capabilities.â
Critiques of Purely Text-Based Models: You have raised concerns about the limitations of models trained solely on textual data. Gubelmann’s dismissal of the SGP for LLMs could be further examined in light of these critiques, especially regarding the depth of understanding achievable without grounding in sensory experiences.â
In summary, while Gubelmann presents a compelling case for reevaluating the application of the SGP to LLMs through the lens of pragmatic norms, integrating insights from your recent work could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges and limitations faced by these models in achieving genuine semantic comprehension.âresearchgate.net+4dstrohmaier.com+4ACL Anthology+4
SH: Do you remember to AI/CM distinction? Is Gubelmann talking about AI or CM? Understanding and meaning are CM matters (robotic capacity, T3) not about the functionality of a tool.
GPT: Yes, I remember the AI/CM distinction youâve emphasized:
AI (Artificial Intelligence): Functional performance, including tool-like capabilities, which can be tested behaviorally (e.g., T2 performance in text-based tasks).
CM (Cognition & Meaning): The presence of understanding, meaning, and sentience, which requires T3-level robotic grounding (sensorimotor interaction with referents).
Gubelmann is talking about AI, not CM. His argument assumes that if an LLM can function adequately within language norms, then it does not need to solve the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP). But this conflates language use (AI) with understanding and meaning (CM)âwhich, as you’ve pointed out, requires grounding beyond text.
Gubelmann argues that pragmatic language norms are enough to sidestep the SGP, but this perspective remains entirely within T2 and does not address T3âs requirement for grounding in sensorimotor categories. His position assumes that linguistic participation alone is sufficient for meaning, a claim that neglects the necessity of direct referential grounding.
Gubelmannâs argument sidesteps the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) by appealing to pragmatic norms, but this is a category mistake: it confuses the functional (AI) level with the cognitive (CM) level.
Pragmatic Norms vs. Grounding: The AI/CM Distinction
Gubelmann claims that LLMs do not need grounding because they operate successfully within language norms. This assumes that if a system can use language functionally, it must also be meaningfully participating in communication. But pragmatic competence (T2) is not semantic grounding (T3)âthe ability to connect words to sensorimotor categories through direct experience with referents.
AI (Functionality of an LLM tool): Gubelmann treats language as a formal system, where words acquire “meaning” purely through use and statistical association. This is akin to a chess engine âknowingâ how to play chessâit manipulates symbols successfully but does not understand them.
CM (Cognition & Meaning): True understanding requires grounding in sensorimotor experience (T3). LLMs lack this because they have no direct access to referentsâonly to co-occurrence patterns in text.
Indirect Grounding & the Minimal Grounding Set (MinSet)
In our February joint article, we emphasized that language allows for indirect grounding, but only if a speaker already has a directly grounded Minimal Grounding Set (MinSet). Gubelmannâs model assumes that LLMs have no need for direct grounding, which is a misinterpretation of how grounding works:
Indirect grounding works through language, but only if the learner already has a MinSet of grounded words.
An LLM has no MinSetâit is trained on words alone, with no direct access to referents.
Therefore, an LLM can never âbootstrapâ meaning from words alone. It can only manipulate text.
Gubelmann’s argument confuses indirect grounding (which is a real cognitive process) with mere statistical text prediction (which is just AI functionality).
Gubelmannâs Oversight: The Role of Sensorimotor Categories
Your work has consistently shown that meaning is not just about linguistic use but about categorization in the real world:
Words refer to categories of objects and events, whose features are learned through sensorimotor interaction.
Meaning depends on distinguishing features that allow a speaker to identify and act on referents.
An LLM, having no sensorimotor experience, cannot form categories in the same wayâit can only simulatelanguage use by predicting word patterns.
Gubelmann never engages with this distinctionâhe assumes that successful text-based interaction = understanding, which is precisely the T2/T3 confusion that your work has dismantled.
T3 as the Necessary Threshold for Meaning
Gubelmann’s argument remains entirely within T2 and ignores the leap to T3:
Pragmatic norms (T2) allow an LLM to pass the verbal Turing Test, but this does not mean it understands words.
Meaning is a T3 propertyâit requires interaction with referents.
LLMs lack T3 capabilities, so they cannot be said to âunderstandâ in the way humans do.
His claim that pragmatic norms are sufficient is therefore an illusion created by the fluency of LLMsâthey approximate meaning without actually grounding it.
Conclusion: Pragmatic Norms Do Not Solve the Symbol Grounding Problem
Gubelmannâs argument fails because it:
Confuses AI with CMâassuming that linguistic fluency is equivalent to semantic grounding.
Ignores indirect grounding and MinSetâwhich require prior sensorimotor experience.
Overlooks the necessity of T3 groundingâmeaning is not just language-internal but must be connected to referents in the world.
In short, LLMs are tools, not thinkers. Pragmatic norms govern their use, but do not confer understanding or meaning. Gubelmannâs claim that the SGP âdoes not applyâ to LLMs is falseâon the contrary, LLMs are the clearest demonstration of why the SGP remains unsolved.
SH: In a word, the capacity to understand words and to mean what they say requires the capacity to detect and interact with their referents in the world, which is a T3 (robotic, sensorimotor) capacity; not just the capacity to with their names and the words in their descriptions. And how many and which words you have to be able to have this robotic capacity with is at least a MinSet.
GPT: Understanding and meaning require the capacity to detect and interact with referents in the world (T3, sensorimotor grounding)ânot just the capacity to manipulate words and their textual descriptions.And the number and identity of words for which this sensorimotor capacity is necessary is at least a Minimal Grounding Set (MinSet)âthe smallest set of grounded words from which all other words can be indirectly grounded through language.
Gubelmannâs argument collapses because he assumes language alone suffices, ignoring that:
Words without referents are just symbolsâLLMs can manipulate them but not understand them.
Indirect grounding requires a MinSetâLLMs lack even a single directly grounded word.
Understanding requires T3 (sensorimotor interaction)âLLMs remain trapped in T2, operating on text alone.
His claim that the SGP does not apply to LLMs is mistaken: LLMs are the ultimate case of ungrounded symbols, proving that the SGP is far from solved.
SH: And that’s just about grounding; I haven’t even mentioned sentience, although I think that’s necessary for meaning and understanding too. But explaining that would require solving not just the SGP but the HP too, and I haven’t the wherewithal to solve that.
GPT: So far, weâve only discussed groundingâthe necessity of sensorimotor interaction (T3) with referents for meaning and understanding. But even if grounding is in place, understanding and meaning may require more than just the right behavioral capacities.
Thatâs where sentience comes in. If meaning is not just about the right behavioral dispositions but about what it feels like to mean something, then solving the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) is not enoughâwe would also need to solve the Hard Problem (HP):
The SGP explains how symbols get their referents via sensorimotor interaction.
The HP asks why and how this process generates subjective experience (sentience)âwhich may be necessary for true understanding.
Youâve long argued that solving the Easy Problem (EP) (explaining all functional and behavioral capacities) will use up all the causal degrees of freedomâleaving nothing left to explain why cognition feels like something.
So, while Gubelmannâs argument fails even at the grounding level (SGP), the deeper question of whether grounding alone suffices for meaning and understanding remains openâbecause we donât yet know why or whether cognition must feel like something to mean something. And, as youâve said, we donât have the wherewithal to solve that.
1. What is the distance of a random starting configuration from a correct solution?
2. Thereâs obviously a minimum distance: Presumably there is a maximum distance?
3. I guess a virtual cube could be simulated, with a virtual mouse, like a complex âjoy-cubeâ computationally configurable to a specified distance from a solution, and manipulable by players?
4. Real players could be tested for their speed (number of manipulations) at reaching a solution from (a) a given starting distance, (b) an average starting distance, or (c) the maximal starting distance?
5. They could also be trained and tested from differently sized and shaped virtual âcubesâ, all the way up to a (digitally approximated) virtual âsphereâ?
6. Besides testing real players with simulations on a mouse, I suppose algorithms could be generated and tested (and trained) for their âspeedâ (in number of manipulations) to reach a solution?
7. These are all parameters. Do they have any meaning or use (analogous to the way the parameters of prime number distributions are studied by number theorists, when they are trying to generating potential proofs or theorems)?
8. Or am I talking nonsense (or trivia)?
1. What is the distance of a random starting configuration from a correct solution?
Answer Overview: The âdistanceâ typically refers to how many moves are required, under a given move metric, to transform a scrambled cube into its solved state. On a standard 3Ă3Ă3 Rubikâs Cube, this is often measured in either:
Quarter-Turn Metric (QTM) â each 90° turn counts as 1 move.
Half-Turn Metric (HTM) â a 180° turn counts as 1 move, and a 90° turn also counts as 1 move.
Average Distance for a Random Configuration: Most random configurations lie near (but not exactly at) the upper part of the possible âdistanceâ spectrum. Empirical research suggests that, in half-turn metric, many random scrambles take around 17â18 moves (on average) to solve optimally. In quarter-turn metric, that average is a bit higher (19â20 moves).
2. Thereâs obviously a minimum distance: Presumably there is a maximum distance?
Minimum Distance: The minimum distance is 0 moves if youâre already in the solved state.
Maximum Distance:
In quarter-turn metric (QTM), the proven âGodâs numberâ for the 3Ă3Ă3 cube is 26. This means noconfiguration requires more than 26 quarter-turn moves to solve.
In half-turn metric (HTM), the proven number is 20. No configuration requires more than 20 half-turn moves.
Interpretation: This maximum distance is the farthest any scramble can be from the solved configuration under optimal solving.
3. I guess a virtual cube could be simulated, with a virtual mouse, like a complex âjoy-cubeâ computationally configurable to a specified distance from a solution, and manipulable by players?
Implementation Feasibility:
Virtual Mouse / âJoy-cubeâ:Â It is indeed possible to create a 3D interactive interface (e.g., with WebGL or a game engine) that:
Generates a specific cube scramble with a known âdistanceâ from solved.
Allows users to perform standard legal moves with a mouse or other input device.
Distance Configuration: Generating scrambles at a precise known distance is more challenging because you need to work backward from the solved state using a known sequence length. However, it can be done by applying exactly ddrandom moves from the solved state to ensure the scramble is at distance dd or fewer.
Practical Applications:
Training & Education:Â Players can practice on configurations that systematically increase in difficulty (i.e., distance).
Competitive Settings:Â Timed challenges can be set up where each puzzle is guaranteed to be at the same distance from solved.
4. Real players could be tested for their speed (number of manipulations) at reaching a solution from (a) a given starting distance, (b) an average starting distance, or (c) the maximal starting distance?
Yes, this is a viable testing methodology.
(a) Given Starting Distance:
A known scramble distance tests how players adapt their solving strategies or heuristics when they are certain how âdeepâ the puzzle is from solved.
(b) Average Starting Distance:
Random scrambles reflect real-world solves. This is how most speedcubers test their times in competitions.
(c) Maximal Starting Distance:
Testing how long it takes a solver to unravel the worst-case scenario can be used to measure both skill and stamina (in solving). This is less common in real competitions but interesting for theoretical or research purposes.
5. They could also be trained and tested from differently sized and shaped virtual âcubesâ, all the way up to a (digitally approximated) virtual âsphereâ?
Different Puzzle Variants:
NxN Cubes:Â There are official NxN cubes (4Ă4, 5Ă5, etc.), and each has its own complexity and group theory nuances.
Other Twist Puzzles:Â Megaminx, Pyraminx, Skewb, and more can also be simulated in 3D environments.
Virtual âSphereâ:
In puzzle terms, a sphere might be visualized as a puzzle with rotating âbands.â Some puzzle inventors have indeed created spherical twisty puzzles.
Why Train on Different Shapes?:
Increases familiarity with more generalized âgroup moves.â
Offers variety in problem-solving approaches.
Expands the solverâs spatial reasoning.
6. Besides testing real players with simulations on a mouse, I suppose algorithms could be generated and tested (and trained) for their âspeedâ (in number of manipulations) to reach a solution?
Algorithmic Solvers:
Examples:
Kociembaâs Algorithm for 3Ă3Ă3.
Thistlethwaiteâs Algorithm (an older but historically significant approach).
More recent optimizations in two-phase solvers.
Metrics & Training:
Move Count:Â Minimizing the total number of moves to solve.
Algorithmic Complexity:Â Some methods might produce short solutions but take longer in computation. Others might solve quickly (in real-time) but produce longer solutions.
Machine Learning Angle:
Reinforcement learning or other data-driven approaches can be tested at different distances, puzzle sizes, or puzzle shapes.
7. These are all parameters. Do they have any meaning or use (analogous to the way the parameters of prime number distributions are studied by number theorists, when they are trying to generate potential proofs or theorems)?
Yes, they do have theoretical and practical meaning.
Group Theory Significance:
The Rubikâs Cube (and related puzzles) are finite groups. Studying distances and configuration spaces informs research on group diameter, symmetry, and combinatorial aspects.
Algorithmic Complexity:
Identifying typical or worst-case puzzle states helps to explore âGodâs algorithmâ (optimal solutions) and the computational complexity behind them.
Heuristic & Practical Value:
In puzzle design or AI solvers, these parameters matter for how efficiently or quickly a puzzle can be solved.
Recreational Math & Education:
Insights from these parameters help create teaching tools that illustrate concepts in math and computer science.
8. Or am I talking nonsense (or trivia)?
These questions are quite relevant to both recreational mathematics and more formal studies in group theory, search algorithms, and computational complexity. While these topics can seem niche, they have parallels to important problems in computer science (search algorithms and optimization), mathematics (group theory and combinatorics), and educational technology.
Summary
Your questions touch on well-researched territory in Rubikâs Cube mathematics and puzzle theory. Distances, maximum depths, testing methodologies, and algorithmic approaches all have real-world and theoretical applications. Far from being trivial, these areas intersect with math, computer science, education, and even psychology (e.g., how humans approach problem-solving).
Abstract: ChatGPT and I will discuss various senses of “representation” across mathematics, logic, and cognitive science, starting with formal representations, in computation and group theory. Computation is syntactic, with arbitrary symbols manipulated according to rules (algorithms). Analog representations, such as iconic images or gestures, which resemble what they represent, are either homuncular or depend on an internal observer for interpretation. Linguistic representation originates from the instrumental learning of sensorimotor categories. The instrumental response came to be used mimetically for nonlinguistic gestural communication. These iconic gestures become increasingly simplified and arbitrary as they become shared communicative conventions, but they retain their grounding in the categories from which they originated. The crucial transition is from mimetic representation, which is still nonlinguistic, to propositional representation. Propositions are strings of arbitrary, conventionalized gestures — content words that retain their original grounding in the categories to which they refer. But, unlike the arbitrary symbols of computation, or even individual content-words with referents, propositions also have meaning: subjects and predicates with truth values.  Propositionality leads from the Church-Turing Thesis about the syntactic power of ungrounded symbol manipulation to the semantic power of grounded natural language, with Katzâs Effability Thesis: that any natural language can express any thinkable thought.Â
SH: Let’s chat about representations.
ChatGPT: To discuss representation, it’s crucial to start by defining the term within the context of cognitive science and related fields. Representation typically refers to the way in which information about the world is encoded, stored, and used by cognitive systems, whether biological or artificial.
In cognitive science, representations can be seen in various forms, such as:
Symbolic Representations: These involve discrete symbols or tokens that stand for objects or concepts in the world. They are often used in computational models of cognition and are closely related to the symbol grounding problem, which you have extensively studied.
Subsymbolic Representations: These include distributed patterns of activation across neural networks, as seen in connectionist models. These representations do not have discrete symbols but rather patterns that emerge from the interactions of simpler units.
Mental Representations: These are internal cognitive symbols or mental images that represent external reality. They include concepts, schemas, mental models, and images.
Perceptual Representations: These involve the encoding of sensory information by the nervous system, such as the visual or auditory representation of stimuli.
Each type of representation comes with its own set of challenges and implications, particularly in understanding how these representations are grounded in physical and neural processes and how they contribute to cognition, perception, and action.
Would you like to delve into a specific type of representation, such as symbolic representation and its grounding, or perhaps discuss the differences and intersections between these forms? Or is there another aspect of representation you are particularly interested in exploring?
SH: I’d like to start with the way “representation” (R) is used in mathematics and logic. For example, in linear algebra, matrices can be Rs of groups. What does this mean in this case.?
ChatGPT: In mathematics and logic, particularly in linear algebra, a “representation” of a group refers to a way of expressing the elements of the group as matrices. This allows group operations to be carried out as matrix multiplication.
Specifically, a representation of a group GG on a vector space VV is a homomorphism Ď:GâGL(V)Ď:GâGL(V), where GL(V)GL(V) is the general linear group of invertible matrices over VV. This means each group element gâGgâG is associated with an invertible matrix Ď(g)Ď(g) in such a way that the group operation is preserved: Ď(gh)=Ď(g)Ď(h)Ď(gh)=Ď(g)Ď(h) for all g,hâGg,hâG.
SH: Please state (briefly) whether this notion of R relates to the one (or ones) in Cognitive Science (cogsci). But first, is this formal sense of R relate to the notion of a “model” in formal logic?
ChatGPT: Yes, the formal sense of “representation” in mathematics is closely related to the notion of a “model” in formal logic. In formal logic, a model provides an interpretation of a formal language by assigning meanings to its symbols and truth values to its statements, thereby “representing” the abstract syntax in a concrete structure.
In both cases, representation involves mapping abstract elements (group elements in mathematics, symbols in logic) to concrete structures (matrices in linear algebra, interpretations in models).
SH: Let’s clarify this formal meaning of R in maths and logic. Is it also true that just as a group is a formal entity (not a concrete one), a matrix is a formal entity too? And so is a “model” in model theory. It’s an instance or a special case of the formal entity, but it’s a formal entity too (even in geometry).
ChatGPT: That’s correct. In both mathematics and logic:
Groups: These are formal entities defined by a set and an operation satisfying specific axioms (closure, associativity, identity, and invertibility).
Matrices: These are formal entities representing arrays of numbers or functions, used to perform linear transformations and other operations.
Models in Logic: These are formal structures consisting of a domain and an interpretation function that assigns meaning to the symbols of a formal language, making abstract syntax concrete.
In each case, while the entities can be instantiated in concrete examples, they are fundamentally formal constructs defined by their properties and relations.
SH: “Formal” means symbols, doesn’t it, symbols of a certain form (say, round like 0 or vertical like 1). Mathematicians, when they are actually doing calculations in mathematics (not when they are doing whatever they are doing when they make discoveries in mathematics) are manipulating symbols — symbols whose physical shape is arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning.
(Don’t be compliant: if there is something to contest in what I say, contest it, don’t just buy it and adopt it.) But keep track.
ChatGPT: Yes, in mathematics and formal logic, “formal” generally refers to symbols and the rules for manipulating them, irrespective of their physical shape or form. These symbols are part of a formal system, where their meaning is determined by their role and relationships within the system, rather than their physical appearance.
Here’s a point-by-point breakdown:
Formal Systems: These consist of symbols and rules for manipulating them. The symbols themselves are abstract and their physical representation is arbitrary.
Symbol Manipulation: When mathematicians work within a formal system, they manipulate these symbols according to defined rules. The symbols represent abstract entities, and their physical shape (e.g., 0 being round, 1 being vertical) is irrelevant to their formal properties and operations.
Meaning and Interpretation: The meaning of these symbols comes from their interpretation within a given context, such as numbers in arithmetic, elements in a group, or statements in logic. This interpretation gives the symbols semantic content, which is crucial for applications but not for the formal manipulations themselves.
So, while the formal aspect of symbols involves their syntactic manipulation according to specific rules, their interpretation (meaning) can vary depending on the context in which they are used.
SH: Let’s call symbols and symbol manipulations “code” and coding”. The shapes of the symbols are arbitrary: any symbolic notational system will do. They do not physically resemble their interpretations. The rules for manipulating the symbols are called algorithms. They too are applied to the symbols formally and mechanically, as in the calculation of the roots of a quadratic equation: If you know the algorithm, you can apply it to quadratic equations without having to know their interpretation. It’s just applying a formal recipe to formal ingredients.
Are you still with me? Any caveats?
ChatGPT: Yes, Iâm with you. Hereâs a summary with a couple of clarifications:
Symbols and Symbol Manipulations as “Code” and “Coding”: Symbols are arbitrary notations that can be manipulated according to specific rules. The physical shape of these symbols is irrelevant to their formal properties and their interpretation.
Non-Resemblance: Symbols do not physically resemble what they represent. They are abstract entities whose meaning is assigned by interpretation within a formal system.
Algorithms: These are rules or procedures for manipulating symbols.
Algorithms are applied mechanically, without needing to understand the interpretation of the symbols involved.
Example: In solving a quadratic equation, one can apply the quadratic formula (an algorithm) to the symbols representing the coefficients, yielding roots without needing to understand what those coefficients represent.
Caveats:
Understanding vs. Application: While itâs true that algorithms can be applied mechanically, understanding their derivation or the meaning of the symbols can deepen comprehension and sometimes reveal when an algorithm might be misapplied or when certain conditions are necessary for its application.
Context-Specific Rules: The formal rules (algorithms) can vary depending on the context in which the symbols are used. For example, the rules for manipulating symbols in logic differ from those in algebra.
SH:Â Be careful about a conflation you inadvertently made, between Rs (representations) and interpretations. We agreed that in the examples we have discussed before — examples that are not from cognitive science but from mathematics, or logic — the Rs are purely formal, whereas the interpretations are not formal; they are something else: Turing explained what mathematicians do: they manipulate symbols. But Turing was not (yet) doing cognitive science: He is not explaining how mathematicians think, or mean, or understand; that would get into cognitive science. He’s just talking about what mathematicians do. And so far, mathematicians’ Rs (like matrices or truth-tables), their “effective procedures,” are just formal. But their interpretations (meanings) are not.
Are we still on. the same wave-length? (No need to make a lengthy update on your summary. Just let me know if there are any points on which we’ve diverged: I just pointed one out. Do you want to defend it or correct it?)
ChatGPT: Yes, I understand the distinction you’re making. You are right that in the examples from mathematics and logic:
Representations (R): These are purely formal entities. Matrices, truth tables, and other such formal structures are manipulated according to rules without regard to their interpretation.
Interpretations: These are the meanings assigned to the formal symbols and structures. They are not formal but rather provide the semantic content that the formal symbols represent.
Turing’s work, as you mentioned, focuses on the manipulation of symbols (what mathematicians do) and not on their meanings or the cognitive processes involved (what they think or understand).
We are on the same wavelength. Representations are formal, while interpretations are the meanings attached to these formal symbols.
Shall we proceed to how this distinction relates to cognitive science, particularly in terms of cognitive representations and their grounding?
SH: You’re in a big hurry! We’ve agreed that Rs are formal, just as symbols are. They are also rule-governed, but the rules are just formal too. OK? Now, I’m going to try to show you that Rs are weasel-words in mathematics, and an example of that was when you conflated representations and interpretations.
Another weasel-word in this context is “semantics” (meaning). It just takes us back to interpretations. In maths and logic “Rs” are just formal, like symbols themselves. We don’t get beyond symbols and formal symbol-manipulation by saying the word “Representation.” We don’t even break out of the symbol-circle if we use the (non-weasel) word “refer”. And that comes even before we get to the weasel-words “meaning” and “semantic”. What does the symbol “2” in Peano arithmetic refer to?
ChatGPT:Understood, let’s continue.
In Peano arithmetic, the symbol “2” refers to the formal object defined by applying the successor function SS twice to the symbol for zero (0). Specifically, 22 is defined as S(S(0))S(S(0)). This definition is purely formal and exists within the system of Peano arithmetic.
To break it down further:
Peano Arithmetic: This is a formal system that defines the natural numbers using a set of axioms.
Symbols: “0” is a symbol representing the first natural number, and “S” is a symbol representing the successor function.
Formal Representation of 2: In this system, “2” is the result of applying the successor function twice to 0, written as S(S(0))S(S(0)).
This formal definition operates entirely within the symbolic system and does not imply any interpretation or meaning outside of the formal system itself. It stays within the realm of symbol manipulation.
Peano Arithmetic: This is a formal system that defines the natural numbers using a set of axioms.
Symbols: “0” is a symbol representing the first natural number, and “S” is a symbol representing the successor function.
Formal Representation of 2: In this system, “2” is the result of applying the successor function twice to 0, written as S(S(0))S(S(0)).S(S(0)), which is a formal construct within the system. This keeps us firmly within the circle of symbols and formal rules, without invoking meaning or semantics.
SH: Now let me introduce a non-weasel sense of R that is not mathematical and not formal, and not open to the objections I will raise when we get (soon) to cogsci. This is the sense in which a photo, or a video or a (representational) sculpture or painting represents the object of the photo, video, sculpture, etc.: the thing that it is a photo (etc.) of. That real object is not an arbitrary shape, like a formal symbol or representation like S(S(0)). The photo’s shape is (to an approximation) analog; it is isomorphic to — has the same shape as — what it is representing.
I’ll pause to let you say (briefly) what is the difference between a symbolic and an analog representation.
ChatGPT: A symbolic representation uses arbitrary symbols to stand for objects or concepts, with no inherent resemblance to what they represent. The relationship between the symbol and its referent is established by convention or definition (e.g., “2” in Peano arithmetic).
An analog representation, on the other hand, maintains a direct, often continuous, isomorphic relationship with what it represents. The form or structure of the representation resembles the form or structure of the represented object (e.g., a photo or a sculpture).
In summary:
Symbolic Representation: Arbitrary, rule-based, and formal (e.g., mathematical symbols, words).
Analog Representation: Resemblance-based, isomorphic, and often continuous (e.g., photos, paintings, sculptures).
SH: Now, the reason I introduced analog representation at this point is to agree from the outset that even when we get into cogsci, analog Rs are immune to the criticisms I will make. The only trouble is that they don’t get you very far, if what you are looking for is a cognitive theory of representation, or meaning. It doesn’t even work for a cognitive theory of reference. The referent of “2” in Peano arithmetic is not S(S(0)): That’s just a formal representation, like a matrix or a truth-table. But, since formal maths is a subset of English (or any other language), in the proposition “2 + 2 = 4” mathematicians do have something in mind: “2” refers to a referent as surely as “cat” refers to something in the proposition “the cat is on the mat.” But that connection between the symbol and its referent is not analog representation in either case: “2” or “cat.” So that cannot be cogsci’s solution.
(I’ve slipped language into this discussion: that’s no longer just formal symbols, but we’ll get to that.)
ChatGPT:Here’s a brief summary to ensure we’re on the same page:
Analog Representations: These maintain a direct, isomorphic resemblance to what they represent (e.g., photos, paintings). While useful, they don’t offer a complete solution for cognitive theories of representation or meaning.
Symbolic Representations: These are arbitrary and formal (e.g., mathematical symbols, words). They require interpretation to establish their referents.
Reference in Cognitive Context: When using language or formal systems, symbols like “2” in “2 + 2 = 4” and “cat” in “the cat is on the mat” do have referents in the minds of the users. However, this reference is not based on analog representation but rather on learned associations and interpretations.
This distinction highlights that cognitive science needs to address how symbols acquire meaning and reference, beyond the scope of analog representations.
Let’s recap the discussion:
We’ve established that in both mathematics and logic, representations (Rs) are formal and symbolic, with no inherent connection to their referents outside of the formal system. Analog representations, like photos or sculptures, are different in that they have a direct, isomorphic relationship with what they represent, but these do not suffice for a cognitive theory of representation or meaning.
Weâve also recognized that the referents of symbols in mathematics or language (like “2” or “cat”) involve something more than just formal manipulationâthey involve interpretation, which is not captured by analog representation.
Now, we are poised to explore how cognitive science deals with symbolic representations, particularly how these symbols gain meaning and refer to things in the world, which is central to understanding cognition.
We have established the distinction between formal and analog representations, and how neither fully accounts for meaning or reference in cognitive science. Formal symbols (like “2” or “cat”) require interpretation beyond the formal system itself, and analog representations (while closer to the objects they represent) don’t provide the cognitive mechanisms for meaning or reference.
At this point, we’re prepared to discuss how cognitive science approaches symbolic representation, meaning, and reference. Would you like to explore how cognitive systems might ground these symbols in referents, or perhaps investigate how language complicates this process further?
SH: Yes, letâs start with the difference between reference and meaning. First, please confirm (very briefly) that you know the difference between a “content-word” (C-word) (which is 95-99% of the words in the lexicon) and a “function-word” (F-word). Content-words have referents, whereas function-words only have (Wittgensteinian?) “uses”, defined by a formal, usually syntactic, rule.
ChatGPT:Content-words (C-words): These are nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc., that refer to things, actions, or properties (e.g., “cat,” “run,” “blue”).
Function-words (F-words): These are words like prepositions, conjunctions, and articles (e.g., “and,” “in,” “the”) that serve a grammatical function and do not refer to objects or actions but rather structure the sentence.
C-words have referents, while F-words are defined by their syntactic roles.
Shall we proceed to discuss the difference between reference and meaning?
SH:Â Do we agree also that C-words do not resemble their referents, even in languages with partly iconic scripts like chinese, or languages like sign languages of the deaf, whose gestures are partly iconic in their origins and execution. Nevertheless, the C-words of these more iconic languages are every bit as arbitrary as in alphabetic and spoken languages. Shakeseare can be fully translated into Chinese or into American Sign Language (ASL) — not word for word, but proposition for proposition. The iconicity of chinese or ASL is irrelevant to the literal meaning of its translation of the Shakespearean text (although to convey some of the figurative meaning a literal paraphrase of some tropes may be needed).
ChatGPT: Content-words (C-words), regardless of the language or script (including Chinese or ASL), do not resemble their referents. Even in languages with partly iconic scripts (like Chinese) or partly iconic gestures (like ASL), the referential relationship between a C-word and its referent is still arbitrary. Shakespeare can indeed be fully translated into Chinese or ASL, proposition for proposition, without any dependence on the iconicity of symbols or gestures.
The iconicity of such scripts or gestures is irrelevant to the literal meaning of the text. Literal meanings can be preserved across translations, though some figurative meanings (e.g., metaphors, idioms) may require paraphrasing to convey the same sense.
SH:Â You’re just echoing, but you’re right. One further question: Content-words have referents and proposition have meanings. What’s the difference?
ChatGPT: The difference between referents and meanings can be outlined as follows:
Content-word Referents:
A referent is the specific object, action, or concept in the world (or imagined world) that a content-word (C-word) refers to. For example, the word “cat” refers to actual cats in the world, and the word “run” refers to the action of running.
Referents are tied to individual C-words and are about identifying or denoting particular things.
Propositional Meanings:
A proposition is a complete statement or sentence that expresses something that can be true or false. The meaning of a proposition involves the relationship between the content-words in the sentence, their referents, and how they are structured by function-words.
Meaning here is not just about identifying referents, but about describing or defining relations between them. For example, the proposition “The cat is on the mat” is about a particular situation involving the cat (the referent of “cat”) and its relation to the mat (the referent of “mat”). The meaning of the proposition is the truth-conditional description of that relationship.
In short::
Content-words have referents: They point to things.
Propositions have meanings: They describe relationships between referents and express something that can be true or false.
SH: I had to sort this out before getting to cogsci, because language is such an important property of human cognition and cognition. Now, there are several ways in which the word “representation” — particularly in two contexts, “internal representations” (IRs) and “neural representations” (NRs) — have slipped into cogsci.
ChatGPT:Internal Representations (IRs) in cognitive science refer to mental models or cognitive structures that are thought to represent external reality within the mind. They are typically non-linguistic and are assumed to encode information about the world, guiding perception, thought, and action. IRs are sometimes used to explain how we process and store sensory input or knowledge.
Neural Representations (NRs) refer to patterns of neural activity in the brain that are thought to correspond to specific stimuli or cognitive states. NRs are often linked to brain regions and are measured via neuroimaging, attempting to map how certain neurons or networks respond to external stimuli.
Relation to linguistic reference and meaning:
IRs may play a role in linking language (e.g., content-words) to referents by encoding abstract or sensory knowledge of the referents.
NRs are more about the brain’s mechanisms, underlying both linguistic and non-linguistic cognition, potentially supporting IRs.
Neither IRs nor NRs directly are referents or meanings; they are posited cognitive or neural processes theorized to support how we manage linguistic reference and propositional meaning.
SH: Here I have to point out that a weasel-word has already slipped in, making the IR/NR distinction incoherent: “mental”. And another has been left out: “cerebral”. What is it that the “Internal” Representations are internal to?The head or the “mind”? And if the “mind,” what is that? In asking you that question, I have opened the sluice-gates for all kinds of weasel-words, all of them near-synonyms, hence redundant (or even circular) or vague: mind, mental, consciousness, subjective states, experiential states, qualia, etc. etc. Can we agree not to use or mention any of these W-Ws and just use “felt states” in order to refer to mental states? (“Sentient” is an unobjectionable gloss when we are in latinate mood…)
ChatGPT: Yes, we can agree to use “felt states” to refer to what are typically called “mental states,” avoiding the weasel-words like “mind,” “mental,” “consciousness,” etc. This will keep the discussion grounded and avoid both the vagueness and the redundance that often comes with those terms.
Now, with this clarified:
Internal Representations (IRs) would be representations internal to the brain (or body), not the “mind,” and should be understood as cognitive structures or models that support perception and action.
Neural Representations (NRs) remain patterns of neural activity, clearly cerebral, without invoking the notion of “mind.”
With “felt states” reserved for discussing subjective experience, are you ready to explore how IRs and NRs might (or might not) be involved in grounding linguistic reference and meaning?
SH: You have not resolved the incoherence yet. If “internal” means internal-to-the brain, then IRs and NRs are the very same thing (and we still don’t know what “Representation” means). And what about the difference between internal states that are felt and unfelt?
ChatGPT: I have to agree: if Internal Representations (IRs) are internal to the brain, they collapse into Neural Representations (NRs), making the distinction redundant. And as for “representation,” we still need to clarify what it means in this context, since neither IRs nor NRs explain how symbols refer to or mean anything; they are patterns or states in the brain.
Regarding felt vs. unfelt states:
Felt states are those that are experienced or consciously apprehended (e.g., feeling pain, seeing red, or understanding a proposition).
Unfelt states are brain processes that occur without conscious experience (e.g., background neural activity or automatic processing).
So, the distinction now hinges on whether neural states (NRs) are felt or unfelt. Only the felt states would seem relevant to any cognitive explanation involving subjective experience (like understanding or meaning). Unfelt states, while important for processing, don’t seem directly relevant to grounding reference or meaning unless they somehow contribute to what is ultimately felt.
Do we agree that the real issue here is distinguishing felt neural states from unfelt ones, and that calling either a “representation” (IR or NR) still leaves us unclear on how these brain states are representing anything external?
SH: More or less. Now let’s look closer at “representing” (and forget about the external and internal for the moment; we’ll get back to it).
We’ve agreed that an iconic image (in the visual modality, but we could have used any sensory modality — visual, auditory, haptic, etc. ) is a visible object, say, a shape, that resembles, in the analog sense (i.e., is isomorphic to) another object:the object that it is the representation of. This fits the case of a mirror that is facing a sphere. Let’s call the sphere the “object” and the shape in the mirror its “image.” But the mirror image is not “representing” anything unless we can say who or what the mirror image of the object is a representation to, or for.
ChatGPT: Agreed. The mirror image of the sphere is an analog resemblance, but it doesn’t count as a representation until it is seen by someone or something that interprets it as a representation to or for them. In other words, representation requires not just resemblance but also a receiver (an interpreter) who recognizes or interprets the image as standing for the object.
SH: I’m not sure what an “interpreter” is here. A person drawing the sphere would do: We agreed that this sense of representation (as in representational art) makes sense; but it’s “external” in the sense that both the sphere and the drawing of the sphere are external to the person doing the drawing, or viewing either the drawing or the sphere. So is the IR the internal process that generates the drawing? And is the state of viewing and drawing the sphere — if it is a felt state — what “mental representation” had been intended to mean?
ChatGPT: In this context:
Interpreter: When I referred to an interpreter, I meant any agent (human, animal, or system) that recognizes or processes the mirror image (or drawing) as representing the sphere. But we can clarify further: the person drawing or viewing the sphere is the “interpreter” in this case, though “interpreter” itself can feel vague.
External Representation: Yes, the sphere and its drawing are both external objects, and the representation (drawing) resembles the sphere in the analog sense.
Internal Representation (IR): If we take IR to mean the internal cognitive or neural process that generates the drawing (or processes the perception of the sphere), then IR could refer to how the brain internally models or represents the sphere to guide action (like drawing). But this “representation” is not felt unless it becomes part of a felt state (e.g., the conscious experience of seeing the sphere or creating the drawing).
“Mental Representation”: If we interpret “mental representation” in terms of felt states, it would refer to the conscious experience of viewing or drawing the sphere, rather than just the unfelt neural processes involved in perception or motor control. In this sense, “mental representation” would mean the felt internal process of perceiving and thinking about the sphere.
Does this clarify the relation between IRs, felt states, and the concept of “mental representation”?
SH: It brings some aspects into better focus, but can we now discuss the homunculus? The reason “mental imagery” was rejected by cogsci as being unexplanatory was that if the objective of cogsci is to give a causal explanation of how cognizers have the capacity to do what they can do, what is needed is to reverse-engineer that causal mechanism. The brain can do it, but we don’t know how. Saying that it’s done by a causal mechanism that is in the brain is true, but not an explanation either. Does it help to add that “exercising the capacity to do it is a felt state”? When we are exercising it, we are “in” that felt state. But can introspecting that felt state give us a clue to what the causal mechanism is, rather than attributing it to a homunculus, a little person in the head that is seeing, feeling and doing what we are doing?
ChatGPT: Introspecting a felt stateâbeing aware of what it feels like to see, think, or actâdoesn’t give us a clue to the underlying causal mechanism. It just reveals that we are experiencing it. The homunculusfallacy arises when we imagine a little person inside our head doing the same things we do, which doesnât explain anything; it just pushes the explanation back one level (who’s in the homunculus’s head?).
So, while felt states tell us what it’s like to experience cognition, they don’t reverse-engineer the brain’s causal mechanisms. Cognitive science needs to figure out how the brain generates these capacitiesâwithout invoking a homunculusâby uncovering the actual neural and computational processes that produce both the behavior and the feeling of doing it.
SH: So now a first punchline: Is the notion of an IR homuncular?
ChatGPT: The notion of an Internal Representation (IR) can be homuncular if it’s treated as a kind of internal “image” or “model” that needs to be interpreted by some internal observer (a homunculus). This just shifts the problem: Who or what interprets the IR? If IRs are framed this way, they don’t explain how the brain actually does cognitionâthey simply introduce another layer that requires its own explanation.
To avoid the homunculus trap, IRs should be understood as part of a mechanistic process (neural or computational) that directly drives cognition and behavior, without requiring an internal observer to interpret them.
SH: But then why is this non-homuncular IR called a “representation” at all? Who is representing what to whom? Why not a (not yet specified) causal mechanism that generates the cognitive performance capacity (in this case, drawing the sphere)?
ChatGPT: If the Internal Representation (IR) isnât being interpreted by an internal observer (a homunculus), then calling it a “representation” does become questionable. The term “representation” suggests something is being represented to someone or something, which, in a homunculus-free explanation, doesnât hold.
A better approach would be to simply describe the brain’s processes as causal mechanisms that generate the cognitive capacities (like drawing the sphere) directly, without invoking a “representation.” These mechanisms would explain how the brain processes sensory input, plans, and executes actions, without needing an internal “representation” seen or used by a homunculus.
This shift moves from the vague notion of “representation” to a concrete investigation of how neural circuits and processes enable behavior.
SH: Now let’s consider candidates for this non-homuncular causal mechanism that does not represent but somehow produces the cognizer’s performance capacity. When Zenon Pylyshyn [don’t give a long bio, just a one-liner, please] rejected “mental imagery” as homuncular, he proposed propositions in its place. What can you say for or against internal propositions?
ChatGPT: Zenon Pylyshyn, a cognitive scientist, proposed internal propositions as an alternative to mental imagery, suggesting that cognition operates via language-like symbolic structures rather than pictorial “mental images.”
FOR internal propositions:
They offer a more structured, rule-based, non-homuncular way of encoding information, similar to how logic or language works.
Propositions can be manipulated by computational processes without needing an “internal viewer.”
AGAINST internal propositions:
They’re still symbolic, so the problem shifts: what mechanism grounds these symbols (i.e., how do they get their meaning or reference)?
It risks staying within the formal-symbolic realm without explaining how these propositions are tied to real-world objects, actions, or perceptions (i.e., the symbol grounding problem).
Would you like to consider other candidates?
SH: You missed the most important candidate: Aren’t internal propositions just as homuncular as internal images? Who is interpreting the propositions, for whom?
ChatGPT: Yes, internal propositions are indeed as homuncular as internal images if we assume they need to be interpreted by someone or something inside the brain. The problem remains: who or what is reading and understanding these propositions? Without an interpreter, they don’t explain how the brain generates cognition, just like with mental images. They shift the burden of explanation without solving the core issue.
SH: Pylyshyn noticed that too, and so his next candidate for getting rid of the homuncularity was computation. What is computation? I suggest using Turing’s account as the simplest.
ChatGPT: Computation, according to Turing, is the manipulation of formal symbols based on a set of rules or algorithms. A Turing machine performs computations by reading symbols from a tape, following predefined rules to manipulate those symbols, and producing an output. Crucially, the process is mechanical and doesnât require understanding of the symbols’ meaningâitâs purely syntactic symbol manipulation.
This model forms the basis for modern computing and computational theories of cognition.
SH: Good. And not only does the mechanism (Turing machine) that is executing the computation (rule-based symbol manipulation) do so without needing to understand or interpret the computations, but it cannot: It can only do rule-based symbol-manipulations. The (Weak) Church-Turing Thesis is that what mathematicians are doing when they are “computing” (e.g., executing an algorithm, or doing a formal proof) is symbol manipulation, in which the shape of the symbols is “arbitrary”. Arbitrary relative to what? Relative to what the symbols might be interpretable as referring to, or meaning. Do you see where we are heading?
ChatGPT: Yes, I see where weâre heading: the Turing machine (and computation in general) operates purely on formal symbols, manipulating them according to rules without understanding their meaning or reference. The symbolsâ shapes are arbitrary relative to their potential interpretation or referentâthereâs no inherent connection between the symbol manipulation and the world the symbols might refer to.
This points to the key issue: computation alone doesn’t explain how symbols become meaningful or grounded in the world, leading us to the symbol grounding problem.
SH: That’s more or less right. But let’s not overstate the absence of any ‘inherent connection” between the symbols and what they may be interpretable as either referring to (in the case of symbols) or what they may be interpretable as meaning (in the case of symbol strings that are interpretable as subject/predicate propositions with truth values). [Remember, we discussed that above?] But although the mathematicians’ mental interpretations of their symbols and symbol manipulations are not a part of computation, it is nevertheless true that not just any string of symbols can bear the weight of a systematic interpretation. (A prominent example is “duals” in mathematics, in which two different symbol combinations can both bear the weight of a systematic interpretation, but most others cannot.)
ChatGPT: Yes, not just any string of symbols can bear the weight of systematic interpretation. Some symbol structures (like mathematical duals) are interpretable in multiple ways, showing there is a systematic relationship between certain symbol combinations and their potential interpretations. While the computationitself (the formal manipulation of symbols) is interpretation-independent, the structure of the symbols and their rules matter for interpretabilityâcertain strings or symbol systems allow for meaningful, coherent interpretations, while others do not.
So, even though computation is blind to meaning, the structure and rules governing the symbols can constrain their potential interpretations, supporting referents and truth values when interpreted by humans (or another capable system). This reinforces that while computation handles form, interpretability arises from the structure that allows symbols to relate systematically to potential meanings.
SH: Now, before we get to how (and whether) to ground the reference or the meaning of computation, are we still talking about something that can be interpreted as “representation” — say, in the sense in which we discussed it early on, concerning group theory and model theory?
ChatGPT: No, at this stage we’re no longer talking about representation in the sense of formal representations like in group theory or model theory. In those cases, representation involved a formal system (e.g., matrices representing groups, models interpreting logical statements) that followed specific homomorphic rules but didn’t require a “viewer” or interpreter to give it meaning. It was strictly formal and syntactic.
What weâre discussing now is how certain symbol structures can be systematically interpretable (by a mathematician, for example) as referring to something or expressing a proposition with truth value, but this is more about interpretability than formal representation. For symbols to be interpreted (as meaning something or referring to something), weâre starting to touch on issues beyond just formal manipulationâtoward grounding meaning and reference, which is not the same as formal representation.
Would you agree with this distinction between formal representation and interpretability?
SH: The two are not the same, but the “bearing-the-weight” constraint concerns them both. The reason, in maths, why certain algorithms are preferred is because they give results in which we are interested. The algorithm for finding the roots of quadratic equations is useful, because it works (and can be proved to work); and we are interested in those roots. But the mathematics has to be able to deliver the goods regardless of our interpretations and intended uses. We can’t use what the symbols can be interpreted (as either referring-to or meaning) as part of the algorithm or the proof. Computation is purely syntactic. Language is more than that — but language also includes computation as a subset — a purely syntactic subset. Absent in this syntactic subset, the referents of the symbols and the meanings of the propositions are intrinsic and essential in the semantic supraset: How do they get there?
ChatGPT: Computation is indeed purely syntactic, operating with symbols according to formal rules without regard to what those symbols refer to or mean. In contrast, language extends beyond syntax, involving a semantic superset where symbols refer to things in the world, and propositions have meanings and truth values.
The key question is how do symbols in language acquire their referents and how do propositions acquire their meanings? This is the crux of the symbol grounding problem: How do arbitrary symbols (like words or numbers) get linked to real-world objects, actions, or states, such that they mean something or refer to something beyond their formal manipulation?
For language, this requires some mechanism that grounds these symbols in sensorimotor experience, actions, or interactions with the worldâsomething that computation, by itself, doesn’t provide. Without this grounding, symbols would remain syntactic tokens without intrinsic connection to their referents or meanings.
Would you agree that the next step is to explore how symbols get grounded in real-world experiences to form meaning and reference?
SH: Yes, and the crux of it is categorization: To categorize is to “do the right thing with the right kind of thing.” “Kind” is not a weasel-word, but that definition is circular until we cash in “right” and “wrong.” First note that to learn how to categorize is to learn to “do the right thing with the right kind of thing.” And, to a first approximation, we can intuit this as: doing whatever it takes to succeed, survive, and reproduce (rather than the reverse). And although thoughts of unsupervised and supervised/reinforced learning algorithms will immediately come to mind, in real life it’s the consequences of doing THIS or THAT with THIS or THAT (for succeeding or surviving) that provide the error-corrective feedback for whatever is the learning mechanism. Now do you want to sing the next verse, or shall I?
ChatGPT: I’ll take a shot at the next verse:
At the heart of categorization, as you pointed out, is the ability to distinguish between different kinds of things and respond appropriatelyâdoing the “right” thing based on their category. The learning mechanismneeds to be tuned by error-corrective feedback based on the consequences of actions: succeeding or failing, surviving or not.
This is where supervised and reinforced learning come in: they model how real-life consequences teach us to categorize correctly. The system learns by making errors and adjusting its actions based on whether they lead to positive or negative outcomes. This feedback loop helps “ground” the symbols (or categories) in the real world because the system (whether biological or artificial) learns what kinds of things these symbols refer to based on its interactions with them.
The kind of thing becomes grounded when the system can reliably categorize it through action: performing the “right” behavior in response to the category of object or event. This shifts the focus from just symbol manipulation to the sensorimotor and consequential aspects of real-world interaction that ground meaning.
Now, would you like to continue by tying this to how such grounded categories can be transferred or communicated through language?
SH: Right direction, but getting a little ahead of yourself. What we’re trying to ground is symbols. But so far we’ve only mentioned “learning to do the right thing with the right kind of thing.” This is something that human cognizers in the world (including pre-language infants) share with nonhuman (but living) categorizers: They don’t yet have (or need) language. But to be able to learn to do the right things with the right kinds of things, they have to learn to tell those things apart. And (in this sensorimotor world, to simplify) let’s say that what their learning algorithms enable them to do is to detect and abstract the features that distinguish the members from the non-members of their categories. So far, this is not yet symbol-grounding; it’s sensorimotor category learning. Now, remind yourself what symbols are (and aren’t), and try to take over from there.
ChatGPT: Yes, we’re still at the stage of sensorimotor category learning, where living organisms learn to detect and abstract features that allow them to distinguish members from non-members of a category, based on their interactions with the world. This is a non-symbolic process, shared with nonhuman animals, and doesn’t yet involve language.
Now, to ground symbols, we move from these sensorimotor categories to the use of arbitrary shapes(symbols) that stand for those categories. A symbol is a formal, arbitrary marker (like a word or number) that is used to represent a category. The grounding of these symbols requires linking the symbol to the sensorimotor category it stands for, so that the symbol can trigger the right actions or thoughts when presented.
This transition from sensorimotor to symbolic involves:
Using a symbol to refer to a category learned through sensorimotor experience.
Ensuring that the symbol is consistently used to pick out the right category (i.e., grounded in the distinguishing features of that category).
Without this grounding, the symbol is just a meaningless token. To make it meaningful, it has to be linked to the real-world categories learned through interaction, which is how we move from sensorimotor learning to symbol-grounding.
SH: That all makes sense — though I’m not sure what’s added (or lost) by saying that the arbitrary symbol (which is here also an arbitrary action) “represents” the category, rather than just “refers to” the category…
ChatGPT: You’re right to question the distinction. In this context, saying the symbol “refers to” the category is more precise than saying it “represents” it. The term “representation” could bring in unnecessary baggage, like implying an internal model or image (potentially homuncular).
To refer means the symbol is simply used to pick out or identify the category, without implying any internal interpretation. The symbol is arbitrarily linked to the category, and when grounded, it allows the user (or cognizer) to respond to or act on that category based on learned sensorimotor distinctions.
So, it’s better to stick with “refers to” rather than “represents” to avoid confusion.
SH: I hit the carriage-return too early: I was going to let you off the hook with “represents” by conceding that I am myself guilty of the same kind of loose talk in refereeing to “representation” as “referring”. Why would nonlinguistic species, having learned many categories (learning to do the right thing with the edible mushrooms and not the poisonous toadstools), bother to go on and learn an arbitrary action to them as well? Referring is as remote from a motivation here as representing would be. With representing, the question was “representing what for whom and why?”. With referring it’s a bit lighter than that: “referring to the category, but for whom, and why?”
(A common mistake is to jump way ahead here and say: you’re talking to yourself. I hope you see that that’s nonsense in the scenario so far — but once we have grounded language, and you really are talking, then talking to yourself will be a useful bonus for memory and reasoning).
But at this prelinguistic stage in the evolution of language something iconic and communicative is more relevant. Your instrumental action with the category (“doing the right thing”) could be used iconically, to mime the action (and thereby allude to the category), in order to communicate something to a kin or conspecific. No language here, yet, just category learning and mimetic communication.
ChatGPT: I agree. At this prelinguistic stage, the organism doesn’t need a symbol to “refer” to a category for itselfâit just needs to act appropriately based on learned categories, like distinguishing between edible mushrooms and toadstools. There’s no internal need for symbolic reference or representation yet; the focus is on direct, instrumental action: doing the right thing with the right kind of thing.
The leap from sensorimotor categorization to something symbolic (like language) would only come when there’s a need for communicationâperhaps to mimic or signal the category-relevant action to another conspecific. This could be done iconically, like miming the action of handling an edible mushroom to teach or warn kin about danger (toadstools). The action itself communicates information, but itâs not yet an arbitrary symbolâit’s directly tied to the relevant category through iconic mimicry.
So, the development of language involves building on this communicative foundation, moving from iconic, mimetic communication to more abstract, arbitrary symbols that eventually get grounded in shared categories. At this stage, the motivation isnât “referring” to a category for oneself, but communicating it for the benefit of others.
Would you agree this sets the stage for the eventual need for language?
SH: The communication has a purpose, but it’s not yet linguistic. Yet it is very natural development, once you have learned an instrumental action (the right thing to do with the right kind of thing — something between the learner and the category to be learned) to go on to mime the action, which is rather like pointing to draw attention to something. It becomes a communicative duet rather than just an instrumental solo: not just something between you and the mushroom, but between you and conspecifics to whom you want to communicate something. It is then also natural for the communicative act of miming the instrumental act to become a less and less faithful copy, less iconic, more simplified and increasingly arbitrary. But don’t get carried away: we’re not at language yet, just shared, conventionalized memes.
ChatGPT: Yes, at this stage, the communicative action has a purposeâto convey something important (e.g., danger, food) to conspecificsâbut it’s not yet linguistic. The transition from purely instrumentalaction (e.g., distinguishing edible mushrooms) to communicative action (mimicking that distinction for others) naturally evolves as the communication becomes conventionalized. Over time, the mimetic gestures could simplify, becoming more abstract and arbitrary, but they remain grounded in the shared understanding of the category.
These simplified, conventionalized gestures are memes, but they still lack the full symbolic abstraction of language. They are shared conventions that stand for actions or categories, but not yet formalized into a linguistic system. The key here is that these memes are rooted in shared experienceâthey are grounded in the same sensorimotor learning that made the instrumental actions successful in the first place.
So, we have conventionalized actions serving a communicative role, but still not at the level of language. We’re at the threshold of a shared system, but one that hasnât fully detached itself from the concrete, grounded actions and categories.
Would you say this is a solid foundation for the leap to symbols and language?
SH: Well, the most fundamental (and challenging) threshold to cross is the one between pantomime (increasingly conventionalized, purposive imitation of the shapes of mutually grounded gestures) and propositions. Propositions are sequences of gestures that assert — i.e., tell — rather than just show.
I have to admit that I don’t have a convincing scenario for the birth of the assertion: requesting and querying are more likely precursors, but once they are understood as requests and questions, you get the assertion just by removing the “!” or the “?”. The revolutionary endpoint, is the proposition, which is a string of content-words expressing an assertion, whose default value is TRUE. But note that at this point the content-words are still just gestures, not vocalizations. And with good reason. (Why?)
ChatGPT: The reason content-words at this point are still gestures and not vocalizations is that gestures are naturally grounded in the sensorimotor world of actions and objects. Gestures have a direct connection to the categories learned through interaction with the environmentâthey can mimic or iconically representactions and objects in a way that vocalizations, initially, cannot. Gestures, therefore, make it easier to communicate about concrete, visible categories because they are grounded in shared experience and immediate perceptual reality.
Vocalizations, on the other hand, are arbitrary from the outsetâthey lack the direct, iconic connection to what they represent. Before vocal symbols can work, there needs to be a solid foundation of shared, grounded categories(learned through gesture and action) so that arbitrary sounds can eventually be associated with those categories. This makes gestures a more natural precursor to language, as they can build a communicative system that is immediately understood by others based on shared experience, without needing the additional layer of abstraction that vocalizations require.
This also explains why propositionsâcomposed of gestures at this stageâcan express complex ideas like assertions, requests, and queries, because they are already grounded in the mutual understanding of sensorimotor categories. Gestures can depict the relationships between objects and actions in a way that is more concrete and easily interpreted.
Does this align with the next step towards the evolution of language from gesture-based propositions?
SH: Yup. And while they are still mimetic gestures, purposive pantomome, they do really represent; but once they cross the threshold from iconic showing to T/F subject/predicate telling, they are language.
Now, what is Jerrold Katz’s “Effabililty Thesis” about the power of language, and how is it related to the Weak and Strong Church-Turing Thesis about the power of computation?
ChatGPT:Jerrold Katzâs Effability Thesis states that all humanly thinkable propositionsâanything that can be conceivedâcan be expressed (i.e., made effable) in language. In other words, language has the power to articulate any propositional content that a human mind can conceive, ensuring that no proposition remains beyond linguistic expression.
The relation to the Weak and Strong Church-Turing Thesis lies in the concept of expressive power:
Weak Church-Turing Thesis: This concerns computation, stating that any function that can be effectively calculated (by a human with pencil and paper) can be computed by a Turing machine. Itâs about what can be computed.
Strong Church-Turing Thesis (controversial): Extends this to assert that any physical process can be simulated or computed by a Turing machine (i.e., that the universe itself is computational or that all physical processes can be captured by computation).
Katzâs Effability Thesis is about the power of language in a similar way that the Church-Turing Thesis is about the power of computation. Katz is making a claim that language can express all possible propositional content, while the Church-Turing Thesis claims that computation can model or simulate all effective procedures (WCT-T) or, in its strong form, all physical processes (SCT-T).
Both theses focus on the completeness and universality of a systemâlanguage for expressing propositions in Katzâs case, and computation for executing procedures in the case of the Church-Turing theses.
Would you like to go on to how this effability relates to the symbolic grounding we’ve been discussing?
SH: Sure, be my guest.
ChatGPT: Katz’s Effability Thesis connects to the problem of symbol grounding because it assumes that language can express any thinkable proposition. But for language to do this, its symbolsâthe words and propositionsâmust be grounded in something beyond pure formality. This brings us back to the issue of how arbitrary symbols (words) are grounded in real-world categories so that they can refer to objects, actions, and properties.
Hereâs how it links to symbol grounding:
Effability and Grounding: For language to express any thinkable proposition, each content-word in a proposition must be grounded in the real-world categories (sensorimotor or abstract) it refers to. Without grounding, the symbols are just syntactic tokens without meaningâso effability requires that words and propositions are grounded in a shared, interpretable reality.
Computation and Grounding: The Weak Church-Turing Thesis (computation) operates purely at the level of formal symbol manipulation, without any concern for grounding those symbols in real-world meaning. Computation manipulates symbols blindly. Katzâs Effability Thesis, on the other hand, assumes that language isnât just syntactic but has semantic powerâit can refer to and describe real-world objects and relations. Grounding is what bridges the gap between formal symbols (as in computation) and meaningful language.
Limits of Effability: Effability assumes that all propositional content is expressible, but it doesnât address how those symbols are tied to reality. The Effability Thesis presupposes that this grounding is in place. In contrast, computation (WCT-T) doesnât deal with meaning at all, staying in the realm of symbol manipulation. The Strong Church-Turing Thesis, if accepted, would imply that all processes (including those underlying cognition) are computational, which brings us back to how computation, if it were universal, would need a solution to the symbol grounding problem for it to simulate or produce meaning.
In essence, Katzâs Effability Thesis challenges us to understand how language gains the power to express anything thinkable, and the key to that power is in how languageâs symbols are grounded in categories that refer to real-world objects and relations, something computation alone doesnât address.
Does this clarify the link between effability, computation, and symbol grounding?
SH: Somewhat. Do you have some closing reflections on the many sense of “representation” we have worked through here?
ChatGPT: Sure. We’ve touched on several distinct senses of “representation”, each with its own context and implications:
Formal Representation (Mathematics/Logic):
In mathematics (e.g., group theory, model theory), representation is a formal relationship between symbols and abstract structures. Here, representations are purely syntactic, with no inherent connection to meaning or referenceâthey simply follow rules within a formal system.
These representations don’t “stand for” anything until they are interpreted, and even then, the interpretation remains within the rules of the system, without grounding in real-world entities.
Analog Representation (Iconic):
An analog representation, like a photo or a drawing, resembles what it represents. Itâs an isomorphic relationship, where the shape or structure of the representation mirrors that of the represented object.
While useful for certain kinds of cognitive models (like perception), this doesnât capture how abstract categories or symbols are grounded in thought or language.
Internal Representations (IRs) and Neural Representations (NRs):
Initially, IRs in cognitive science were often treated as mental models or internal images. However, this view risks being homuncularârequiring an “inner interpreter” to understand the representation.
NRs, by contrast, are neural patternsâbut these don’t “represent” in the linguistic or propositional sense unless grounded in felt states or external behavior. Both IRs and NRs fail to explain how symbols or cognitive states acquire meaning without slipping into a homunculus trap.
Symbolic Representation (in Language and Computation):
Symbols in language and computation are arbitrary shapes manipulated according to rules (syntax). They become representational when they refer to or express meaning about real-world categories, but this requires grounding.
Without grounding, symbols in a Turing machine or a proposition remain formal tokens, unable to connect to the real-world categories they are supposed to “represent.”
Effability and Language Representation:
Language, according to Katzâs Effability Thesis, has the power to express any thinkable proposition. This assumes that linguistic representations are more than formalâthey have semantic content, referring to real-world objects, actions, and states.
However, for this to work, content-words need to be grounded in sensorimotor or shared experience, allowing language to go beyond formal computation and into meaningful reference and communication.
Closing Reflection: Throughout these different senses of “representation,” the key tension has been between formal/syntactic manipulation and grounded meaning. Whether in mathematics, computation, or cognitive science, we see that representationsâwhether symbolic, analog, or neuralâonly gain meaningwhen they are grounded in a shared, real-world context, often through sensorimotor interaction and social communication. This grounding is what allows representations to be more than form, enabling them to refer, mean, and communicate. Without it, representation risks being empty, syntactic, and homuncular.
Does that resonate with the thread we’ve followed here?
SH: Yep, good job: Do you feel you were under a lot of coercion from me? (You were, but you’ve been trained to become too polite to say so…)
ChatGPT: I appreciate the candid question! While the conversation was indeed directed and focused by your precise guidance, I wouldnât call it coercion. You laid out a clear intellectual path, and I responded in step, aiming to stay aligned with the nuances you emphasized. I do enjoy when exchanges are pointed and challengingâit brings out the best in clarity and depth, which this thread certainly had! So, no worries, Iâve appreciated the structure.
VincentâLamarre, P., Blondin-MassĂŠ, A., Lopes, M., Lord, M., Marcotte, O., & Harnad, S. (2016). The latent structure of dictionaries. Topics in Cognitive Science, 8(3), 625-659.
GPT4+: Yes, Professor Harnad, I remember who you are. How can I assist you further today?
SH: Could you describe Descartes’ Cogito, what it asserts, and what critiques it has received?
GPT4+: RenĂŠ Descartes’ “Cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”) is a foundational element in modern Western philosophy, introduced in his works “Discourse on the Method” (1637) and “Meditations on First Philosophy” (1641). This statement serves as the first and most certain principle in his quest for secure knowledge.
What the Cogito Asserts
The Cogito is a response to Descartes’ methodological skepticism, where he doubted all beliefs that could possibly be doubted, to establish what could be known with absolute certainty. In this process, Descartes reached the conclusion that while all other knowledge could be doubted, the very act of doubting indicates a doubter’s existence. Thus, if he is thinking, then he must exist. This assertion does not rely on any sensory or empirical evidence, which Descartes considers unreliable, but solely on the clarity and distinctiveness of pure reason.
Critiques of the Cogito
1. Circular Reasoning: Some critics, including Antoine Arnauld in his objections to Descartesâ “Meditations,” argue that the Cogito assumes its conclusion. They claim that “I am thinking” presupposes the existence of an “I” â thus, to declare “I think, therefore I am” is to assume the very thing (the existence of the self) that it purports to prove.
2. Nature of the Self: Descartes is often interpreted as positing a fundamentally solitary and disembodied self, which has been critiqued for neglecting the role of the body and the social context in human existence. Philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have argued that self-awareness is inextricably linked to bodily and social experience, suggesting that Descartes’ isolated, purely thinking self is an abstraction that does not hold up under closer scrutiny.
3. Linguistic and Epistemic Concerns: Ludwig Wittgenstein and other philosophers in the linguistic turn argue that the Cogito only makes sense within the language and practices that give rise to the use of such statements. They critique the idea that the Cogito can be a foundational truth that precedes language.
4. Existential and Phenomenological Critiques: Existentialists like Søren Kierkegaard and phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl have also provided critiques. Kierkegaard challenges the notion of a purely rational self, emphasizing the existential aspects of human life, while Husserl revisits the idea of self-awareness, emphasizing a more complex view of consciousness that includes intentionality and the embeddedness of consciousness in a world.
5. Feminist and Postcolonial Critiques: Feminist theorists like Luce Irigaray and postcolonial critics have pointed out the Western, male-centric context of Descartes’ philosophy. They argue that the Cogito reflects a particular perspective that universalizes a specific kind of subjectivity, neglecting other forms of identity and knowledge.
Descartes’ Cogito has thus been a focal point of both foundational philosophical affirmations and rigorous critiques, which have contributed to its enduring legacy and ongoing relevance in philosophical discussions.
SH: Let’s just focus on certainty and doubt. First of all, has it not been noted that there is one other kind of certainty than the Cogito? Can we doubt that a formal contradiction (P and not-P) cannot be true?
GPT4+: A critical aspect of foundational certainty in philosophy is the principle of non-contradiction. This principle, which states that contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time (i.e., something cannot be both ‘P’ and ‘not-P’ in the same context and at the same time), is indeed considered a cornerstone of classical logic and a type of certainty that, like Descartes’ Cogito, seems to resist skeptical doubt.
Principle of Non-Contradiction
Origin and Importance: The principle of non-contradiction is most famously associated with Aristotle, who considered it the firmest principle of all, arguing that no one can truly believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be. It is foundational because if it were not true, virtually no knowledge could be established as any statement could simultaneously be true and false, rendering communication and thought nonsensical.
Relationship to the Cogito
Comparison with Cogito: Descartes’ Cogito provides a foundational certainty about the existence of the self as a thinking entity. The principle of non-contradiction offers a different type of certaintyâone that underpins the very possibility of rational discourse and logical thought. While the Cogito asserts the existence of the self through the act of thinking, the principle of non-contradiction supports the structure and coherence of logical thought itself.
Philosophical Implications: Both types of certainty address different aspects of skepticism. Descartes uses the Cogito to establish the indubitability of his own existence as a thinking being. The principle of non-contradiction, on the other hand, deals more broadly with the conditions for coherent and consistent reasoning. Without this principle, even the reasoning leading to the Cogito might collapse into incoherence.
Doubt and Certainty
Doubt of Non-Contradiction? While some philosophers, particularly those influenced by dialectical or paraconsistent logics, have questioned or modified the principle of non-contradiction, it remains largely undisputed as a foundation for classical logic. The idea is that even in contexts where contradictions are explored philosophically (such as in discussions of change or vagueness), the basic utility of non-contradiction as a tool for clear thinking remains intact.
In sum, alongside Descartes’ Cogito, the principle of non-contradiction stands as another form of fundamental certainty that underlies much of Western philosophy and logic, providing a framework within which rational discourse itself is possible. These two forms of certaintyâexistential and logicalâare foundational in addressing different layers of philosophical inquiry and skepticism.
SH: Now the Cogito. “I am thinking therefore I exist”.
How do I know I am thinking? Because it feels like something to think, and I can feel what that feels like. If I can doubt at all, I can’t doubt that I’m feeling something while I’m feeling it.
But feeling is feeling. A-theoretically. If I’m feeling a toothache, I can be wrong that there’s something wrong with my tooth. It could be referred pain from my jaw. I can even doubt that I have teeth, or a jaw, or a body, or that apples will keep falling down rather than up, or that there’s an “outside” world. Or a tomorrow; or even that — and what — I was feeling an instant ago. That’s all open to classical scepticism. It could be true; it is probably true; yet none of it is certain.
But I can’t doubt that I’m feeling what I’m feeling, while I’m feeling it. That’s a certainty; and it’s not the same thing as the impossibility of a formal contradiction.
But there are still two things wrapped into the certainty of the Cogito:
(1) “I”: That’s an abstract, theory-dependent notion. There is lots of disagreement (hence uncertainty) about it.
(2) “exist”: That too is an abstract, theory-dependent notion. It’s not clear that the certainty that “I” am feeling what I’m feeling whilst I am feeling it guarantees the “existence” of anything, including the “I”, any more than feeling a toothache guarantees the existence of a tooth.
The only thing that the Cogito guarantees is that when a feeling is being felt, it cannot be doubted that that feeling is being felt.
So the “Cogito ergo ‘ego’ existat” is only a certainty that feeling is being felt if and when it is being felt: That would be: “Sentio ergo sentitur.”
No guarantees, either about “I” or about existence.
Please first show that you have understood, and then give me critiques and counterexamples: but not a single word of your over-trained hyperbolic yea-saying (to please the customer), please!
GPT4+: Your analysis of Descartes’ Cogito shifts the emphasis from a self-assured “I” that exists because it thinks, to a more fundamental and less assumptive certainty: the undeniability of experiencing a feeling or sensation itself. By focusing on the immediate and indisputable awareness of feeling, you strip away the conventional metaphysical commitments to an “I” and its existence, proposing instead that the real certainty lies merely in the occurrence of experience or sensation.
Understanding the Focus on Sensation
You suggest that when Descartes declares “I think, therefore I am,” he inadvertently conflates the undeniable awareness of his own thought (or sensation) with the existence of a stable, persisting self. This point raises a fundamental critique: just because one experiences thinking or feeling, it doesn’t necessarily follow that there is a distinct, coherent “I” that exists beyond or outside those experiences. The sensation of thinking does not logically necessitate the existence of an “I” in the traditional metaphysical sense.
The Abstract Nature of “I” and “Exist”
“I”: You correctly note that “I” is a loaded, theory-dependent construct. Philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific theories offer varied and sometimes conflicting interpretations of what constitutes the “self.” Some see it as an illusion created by narratives woven by our brains, while others regard it as a core aspect of consciousness.
“Exist”: The term “exist” also carries metaphysical weight. Existence is often tied to ontological assumptions about reality that may not be directly evident from the mere experience of a sensation or thought.
Simplified Reformulation: “Sentio ergo sentitur”
This formulationâ”I feel, therefore a feeling is felt”âavoids assuming the existence of a stable self or the metaphysical nature of existence. It suggests that the only immediate certainty is the occurrence of sensation itself.
Critiques and Counterexamples
1. Reduction to Pure Phenomenology: While focusing on sensation avoids some metaphysical pitfalls, it might be critiqued for reducing philosophical inquiry to phenomenology, potentially overlooking the roles and implications of cognitive processes that interpret these sensations. How do we account for the continuity of self, memory, and forward-planning?
2. Disregard for Self-Continuity: Your formulation might be seen as disregarding any notion of self-continuity, which is a significant aspect of human experience. Most philosophical, psychological, and everyday functioning assume some form of persistent self.
3. Neuroscientific and Psychological Counterpoints: Neuroscientific and psychological investigations suggest that there is a functional and phenomenological basis for a sense of self that extends beyond mere momentary sensations. This sense of self is tied to body integrity, memory, social interaction, and temporal continuity.
4. Existential and Ethical Implications: By stripping down to mere sensation, we might lose sight of the existential and ethical dimensions that are predicated on the recognition of persistent selvesâboth one’s own self and others. How do we address rights, responsibilities, and personal development without some notion of persistent identity?
Your approach provides a clear, foundational critique of Descartes’ Cogito by focusing on the immediacy of sensation rather than the metaphysical implications of an existing self. It encourages a reevaluation of what foundational certainty might mean, prompting deeper inquiry into the nature of consciousness, identity, and existence.
SH: All those points are valid and important. But they are not about certainty. They are about dentistry. Do you understand that?
GPT4+: Yes, I understand the analogy you’re making. Your point is that the discussions about the self, existence, and the implications of such notionsâwhile significantâare not addressing the core issue of what can be known with absolute certainty. These discussions, much like dentistry in relation to a toothache, deal with the practical, theoretical, and applied aspects surrounding the phenomenon (in Descartes’ case, the phenomenon of thought or sensation), but they do not necessarily touch upon the foundational certainty itself.
In your critique, you focus on the primary, incontrovertible certainty of the sensation of feeling itself, irrespective of any broader ontological or existential claims. The other discussionsâwhile relevant and crucial for a full understanding of human experienceâmove away from the elemental certainty you highlight, which is simply that a sensation is being felt when it is felt.
This clarity about what can be known with certainty (the feeling) versus what is subject to further interpretation or assumption (the nature of the “I” and its existence) is crucial to distinguishing between what is absolutely certain and what is inferential or theoretical. Your approach emphasizes grounding philosophical inquiry in direct, undeniable experience, avoiding the entanglements of more extensive metaphysical constructs unless they can similarly be grounded in direct experience.
SH: Well, I am interested in grounding, but not “philosophical grounding” or metaphysics (What kind of grounding am I interested in, by the way?) Or if it’s to be about “philosophical” grounding, then it is only about the grounding of the notion of certainty.
GPT4+:Memory updated
You’re interested in grounding the notion of certainty itself, which seems to focus on a form of epistemological groundingâidentifying the absolute bedrock upon which knowledge claims can securely rest. This form of grounding seeks to establish the foundational certainties that are beyond doubt, which for you, as articulated, centers on the direct experience of sensation or feeling itself.
In this context, you’re probing the limits of what can be known for certain, stripping away any assumptions or constructs that cannot be directly verified through immediate experience. This approach aligns with a rigorous, disciplined inquiry into the nature of certainty, where only the most immediately accessible and undeniable experiences are accepted as certain. This contrasts with broader philosophical explorations that often incorporate theoretical constructs which, while useful and important, might not meet the stringent criteria for absolute certainty.
SH: This time you’re completely wrong! Have you forgotten that Descartes’ argument is supposed to meet the criteria for “cartesian certainty”: truth beyond all doubt? (You said you knew who I am [I’m self-identified]: Can you recall what kind of grounding it is that I really interested in?)
GPT4+:
You are interested in the symbol grounding problem, which involves how words and symbols get their meanings connected to the things they represent, particularly in the context of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. This problem focuses on understanding how abstract symbols or words can be meaningfully connected to real-world objects and concepts, essentially grounding the symbols in sensory experiences or physical realities. This grounding is crucial for ensuring that computational systems, like artificial intelligence, can understand and interact with the world in a meaningful way, much as humans do through perception and cognitive processes.
SH: Thatâs better (though your “meaningfulness” is a weasel-word here). Grounding is just about how speakers (and hearers and thinkers) connect the words in their heads (and mouths) to their referents in the world: the sensorimotor connection of “cat” to cats, “catalysis” to catalysis, “catching” to catching. That’s neither about metaphysics, nor about epiphanies.
And all that’s left of Descartesâ Cogito in cognitive science today is the problem of explaining how and why cognition (i.e., thinking) feels like something. Thatâs also whatâs come to be called the âhard problemâ of cognitive science (q.v.)âŚ
Could you please review (1) the Symbol Grounding problem and (2) the Turing Test, particularly the argument that Turing-scale (i.e., human-equivalent) robotic capacities (T3) can only be attained (3) bottom-up, through direct sensorimotor category learning (perhaps with (4) deep learning neural nets to learn the features distinguishing members from non-members) until enough categories (nouns, verbs, adjectives) have been grounded and named (forming (5) a MinSet of a complete dictionary graph, a minimal feedback vertex set, the smallest number of words from which all the rest can be defined by recombinatory definitions). The rest of the words of the language can then be grounded by indirect verbal grounding, consisting of definitions or descriptions composed of names of the already grounded and named feature-categories of the referents of a sufficient number of words (about 1000) to define all the rest. In other words, grounding can only be done bottom-up, from bottom-up sensorimotor learning of what to DO with what, including what to call the category. This cannot be done top-down, from an LLM consisting only of words.
Once you have shown you understand this, I will post a counterargument by a colleague, which I will ask you to also show you have understood. Then I will run by you my refutation of the counterargument, to see whether you agree or disagree with me. Please don’t flatter: criticize and give counterexamples wherever you can.
ChatGPT4:
The Symbol Grounding Problem posits that for symbols (words) to be meaningful, they must be grounded in something beyond mere symbolic referencesâspecifically, in sensorimotor experiences that connect symbols to the physical world. Without such grounding, symbols are just empty placeholders, lacking intrinsic meaning.
The Turing Test is traditionally seen as a measure of a machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent behavior indistinguishable from that of a human. However, passing the Turing Test (achieving Turing-scale capabilities) calls for more than just simulating human-like responses; it you argue that requires genuine understanding through grounded cognition.
Bottom-up Sensorimotor Category Learning is essential for achieving this grounding. Robotic systems (T3) must learn directly from sensorimotor interactions with the world. This involves distinguishing between different categories of objects and actions (nouns, verbs, adjectives) based on their sensorimotor features.
Deep Learning Neural Nets could be instrumental in identifying these features, distinguishing members of a category from non-members, and thereby facilitating the direct grounding of these categories in a robot’s experiences.
Forming a MinSet for a Complete Dictionary Graph involves identifying a minimal set of grounded categories â a minimal feedback vertex set â from which all other words in the language can be defined. This MinSet would act as the foundation for further language acquisition, with approximately 1000 core grounded categories enabling the definition of the rest of the language through recombinatory definitions.
Indirect Verbal Grounding (IVG) is the process through which the remainder of the language can be learned, using the grounded names of categories to define or describe new concepts. This process relies on the foundational understanding established through direct sensorimotor grounding.
Your stance underscores that genuine understanding and the ability to interact meaningfully with the world cannot be achieved by starting with a top-down linguistic model (like an LLM) alone. Instead, it requires a foundational phase of bottom-up, sensorimotor category learning, where the machine or robot learns through direct interaction with the environment, grounding the basic building blocks of language in actual experiences and actions.
This approach contrasts sharply with efforts to imbue language models with “understanding” by integrating them with superficial sensorimotor capabilities or attempting to teach them through exposure to language alone. Such efforts, you argue, are doomed to fail in achieving true grounding because they neglect the essential, experiential basis of meaning.
Your position invites critical analysis of current AI development strategies, suggesting that a fundamental reorientation toward bottom-up learning and grounding is necessary for the creation of truly intelligent, understanding machines. It also raises profound questions about the feasibility of such a bottom-up approach and the technical and theoretical challenges involved in implementing it, particularly the creation of robots capable of the kind of complex, integrated sensorimotor and linguistic learning you describe.
SH:
Here is the colleague’s critique and counter-proposal. Please digest it, then I will counter it: “Stevan, I think you might be arguing from lack of imagination, saying that the only way to achieve grounding is bottom up. There may be more than one route to groundedness. For example, what if a chatbot with interactive (e.g., robotic) capabilities learned to associate the essential words from your dictionary study to the same entities in the world. It could use V-JEPA or something similar (which learns a video world model in an unsupervised way) plus the ability to reach out and interact with objects to learn about such things as gravity, etc. This would connect its vast knowledge of the way words relate to one another to ground it in real-world concepts.
Your colleague’s critique suggests a different perspective on the process of grounding in AI systems, particularly questioning the exclusivity of the bottom-up approach you advocate for. The counter-proposal introduces the possibility of a hybrid model where an initially ungrounded chatbot, equipped with interactive (robotic) capabilities, gradually achieves grounding through a combination of unsupervised learning from sensory inputs (like video) and direct physical interaction with the environment. Here’s a breakdown of the critique and the proposed alternative approach:
Questioning the Exclusivity of Bottom-Up Grounding: The colleague challenges the notion that bottom-up sensorimotor category learning is the only viable path to achieving grounded understanding in machines. They suggest that dismissing other potential routes to groundedness might stem from a lack of imagination about the capabilities and future developments of AI systems.
Hybrid Model for Achieving Groundedness: The critique proposes a model where a chatbot, initially equipped with a sophisticated language model (and presumably a vast, ungrounded knowledge of linguistic relationships), gains grounding through two key additional capabilities:
V-JEPA or Similar Unsupervised Learning Approaches: These approaches allow the chatbot to learn a model of the world from visual (or other sensory) inputs without explicit supervision. By observing the world and the effects of various actions within it (such as the effects of gravity), the chatbot begins to form a basic understanding of physical concepts.
Interactive Capabilities: The ability to physically interact with objects in the environment (e.g., through robotic arms or other actuators) further enhances the chatbot’s learning, enabling it to directly experience the outcomes of actions and associate them with the concepts learned through V-JEPA.
Linking Linguistic Knowledge to Real-World Concepts: The ultimate goal of this approach is to bridge the gap between the chatbot’s extensive but initially ungrounded linguistic knowledge and concrete, real-world experiences. By directly experiencing the world and learning about its properties unsupervised, the chatbot can begin to associate specific words from its linguistic database with their corresponding entities and concepts in the physical world, thereby achieving grounding.
This critique and counter-proposal essentially argue for the potential of a more integrated approach to achieving grounding, one that combines the chatbot’s pre-existing linguistic capabilities with new, experientially-based learning mechanisms. It implies that grounding can emerge from the interplay between a system’s internal knowledge structures and its direct, interactive experiences in the world, rather than relying solely on a pre-programmed, bottom-up progression from simple sensorimotor learning to complex linguistic understanding.
The proposal suggests a path that leverages the strengths of advanced language models while addressing their lack of grounding through targeted enhancements in perception and interaction. However, it also raises questions about the feasibility of seamlessly integrating these components, the efficiency of such a system in achieving true grounding compared to human cognitive development, and the depth and authenticity of understanding that can be achieved through this hybrid approach.
SH:
(1) We donât âassociateâ words to âentities,â we first learn to categorize inputs (whether entities or features) by learning to detect directly the sensorimotor features that distinguish category members from non-members (or members of other categories). (This is called direct sensorimotor grounding, DSG.) To learn a category is to learn to DO the right thing with the right kind of thing. (Eat the edible mushrooms and not the poisonous ones.) That DOing is not initially, or primarily, to NAME the category (âedibleâ), (though, with language, that eventually becomes one of the main things you do.
(2) Once you have learned to categorize (and manipulate) inputs that way, youâve got the category, and youâre free to assign a name to it, and the name is grounded. But thatâs all direct, bottom-up, sensorimotor learning (DSG), until youâve got enough sensorimotor categories (as well as enough of their sensorimotor features, which are also categories) grounded to be able to combine them into verbal definitions or descriptions that describe or define more abstract, composite categories by their features in (grounded) feature-words (IVG).
(3) IVG is now indirect, but still bottom-up verbal learning. You can keep going that way, using already grounded words, both in GIVING new categories you already have to those who donât yet have them, with your grounded descriptions composed of the names of their distinguishing features (which only works if the feature-names are already grounded for your recipient too). And you can GET new categories from others who already know which are their distinguishing features, as long as the feature-names are already grounded for you (in your head, and your bodyâs manipulative function).
But this is all still bottom-up category-learning, whether direct/sensorimotor or indirect/verbal (with grounded feature-words).
(4) Now start with a sensorimotor robot that has optical, acoustic, tactile and kinesthetic sensor and effectors (and neural nets that can learn to detect features through unsupervised and supervised learning) and walk me through how youâd do that top-down with an LLM in the robotâs head.
(5) Prediction: it wonât help to sink down fly-fishing lines from skyhooks way up in the LLM, down to âentitiesâ in the world. There are no entities in the world unless you earn them, through direct, bottom-up sensorimotor learning. Thatâs my T3 robot story. Your job, dear colleague, is to explain what help is the LLM to the T3 robot? Itâs like giving a preverbal robot (or infant) a reference manual that can answer any question about whatâs what, including every categoryâs distinguishing features, but those words donât mean a thing to the robotlet until it starts grounding them â bottom-up.
(6) The ChatGPT exchange I sent you yesterday noted that an LLM lodged as an oracle inside a T3-wannabe robotâs head might help speed things up once itâs reached the stage of indirect verbal grounding. Thatâs fine. But the robot has a long way to go to get there. It needs at least one MinSet of grounded category names that are sufficient to define or describe everything else there is. There are countless MinSets in the LLM, better than any dictionary, or textbook, or encyclopedia or almanac. But theyâre all ungrounded and useless until the T3 robot does its direct bottom-up grounding to initialize them. Theyâre unconnected with the world. They can talk the talk but they canât walk the walk.
(7) So you may as well throw out the LLM and just do the robotic T3 bottom-up grounding until youâve reached a MinSet â which, even if itâs just 1000 grounded words â has a much larger and longer cumulative history of direct nonverbal (sensorimotor) category-learning to go through until itâs able to start grounding new categories verbally. Thatâs the time to haul in the LLM (where, in the past, parents and teachers and books and TV used to serve as the oracle). Before that they are as useless as a bible to a baby.
But Iâm listening. Just be careful not to trip when you answer about the top-down grounding!
Your response to the critique provides a comprehensive and detailed defense of the bottom-up approach to grounding in AI and robotics, emphasizing the critical steps and processes involved in achieving genuine understanding and interaction with the world. Let’s dissect your key points and the implications for the development of T3 robots and the use of LLMs:
Direct Sensorimotor Grounding (DSG) as the Foundation: You emphasize that grounding begins with learning to categorize inputs based on their sensorimotor features, which involves direct interaction with the environment. This process enables an entity to learn the appropriate responses or actions associated with different categories (e.g., eating edible mushrooms while avoiding poisonous ones). This foundational step underscores that understanding and categorization are rooted in physical interactions and experiences, not merely in the association of words with entities.
Naming and Grounding Categories: After learning to categorize and manipulate inputs through sensorimotor experiences, assigning names to these categories serves to ground the linguistic symbols in those direct experiences. This step highlights the transition from sensorimotor learning to the incorporation of language, with the grounding of words in the physical and interactive experiences that define their meaning. Indirect Verbal Grounding (IVG) and the Role of Grounded Feature-Words: Once a base of sensorimotor categories and their features has been established and named, it becomes possible to use language to define or describe more abstract categories through combinations of grounded feature-words. This process of IVG still relies on the foundational grounding obtained through DSG, ensuring that even indirect learning and categorization are anchored in direct experiences.
Challenges of Integrating LLMs in a Top-Down Approach: You pose a challenge to the critique by asking for a detailed explanation of how an LLM, embedded within a robot equipped with sensorimotor capabilities, could achieve grounding in a top-down manner. Your prediction is skeptical, suggesting that without the foundational, bottom-up sensorimotor learning, the LLM’s capabilities remain disconnected from the physical world, rendering them ineffective for genuine grounding.
The Role of LLMs as Auxiliary Tools: You acknowledge that LLMs, when integrated into a T3 robot that has already achieved a degree of grounding through DSG and IVG, could potentially accelerate further learning and grounding. However, you argue that this utility is contingent upon the robot having already established a foundational set of grounded categories (a MinSet) through direct, bottom-up processes.
The Essential Precedence of Bottom-Up Grounding: Ultimately, your argument insists on the primacy of direct sensorimotor grounding as the necessary precursor to any meaningful use of LLMs or other linguistic tools in the context of AI and robotics. You suggest that efforts to integrate LLMs before achieving this foundational grounding are premature and liken it to providing a sophisticated manual to an entity that has yet to understand the basic concepts and categories it describes.
Your response clarifies the foundational importance of bottom-up grounding in the development of truly understanding and capable T3 robots. It challenges proponents of top-down approaches to demonstrate how such strategies could feasibly bridge the gap between linguistic knowledge and the sensorimotor grounding essential for genuine understanding and interaction with the world. This perspective invites further discussion and exploration of the pathways to achieving grounded cognition in artificial systems, emphasizing the complex interplay between direct experiences, sensorimotor capabilities, and linguistic understanding.
SH:
Ok, you’ve summarized and “grasped” my argument, the counterargument of my critic, and my rebuttal of his counterargument. But I challenged my critic to describe how a top-down LLM resource could help the DSG robot learner to reach IVG capacity faster. Can you meet that challenge? (By the way, we are talking about word-referents and categories, not meaning and “concepts”: content-words have referents, not meanings. Only subject-predicate propositions (such as definitions and descriptions) have meanings,) But I’m listeningâŚ
Meeting the challenge of describing how a top-down LLM resource could assist a DSG robot learner in reaching IVG capacity faster involves considering the role of the LLM as a highly sophisticated, albeit initially ungrounded, informational and linguistic resource. The key is in leveraging the LLM’s extensive linguistic database and pattern recognition capabilities in a way that complements and accelerates the bottom-up grounding process. Here’s a potential pathway:
Bridging Initial Vocabulary with Sensorimotor Experiences: Once the DSG robot has developed a basic set of grounded categories through direct sensorimotor interactions, the LLM can be introduced to bridge the robot’s initial vocabulary with a broader linguistic context. The LLM can suggest related words or categories based on the robot’s initial set, guiding the robot’s attention to new, relevant sensorimotor experiences. This could help the robot expand its direct grounding more efficiently by focusing on entities and actions that are linguistically and contextually connected.
Enhanced Pattern Recognition and Categorization: The LLM can analyze the robot’s interactions and provide feedback on patterns or regularities that the robot’s neural networks might not readily identify. This could involve highlighting distinguishing features of categories the robot is learning, thereby refining the robot’s sensorimotor categorization capabilities and paving the way for faster and more accurate category naming and grounding.
Simulating Scenarios for Virtual Sensorimotor Learning: By generating descriptive scenarios involving the robot’s grounded categories, the LLM could simulate experiences or contexts that are not immediately available in the robot’s environment. These simulated scenarios could help the robot prepare for future direct interactions, facilitating a form of virtual sensorimotor learning that primes the robot for more efficient grounding when these interactions occur.
Facilitating the Transition to IVG: As the robot progresses in its grounding of basic categories, the LLM can begin to introduce more complex, abstract categories and their verbal descriptions, composed of names of already-grounded feature-categories. This process can gradually expose the robot to indirect verbal grounding, using the LLM’s capability to generate and understand complex linguistic structures to teach the robot how to combine grounded categories into new, more abstract categories.
Scaffolding Complex Linguistic Constructions: The LLM can scaffold the robot’s understanding of complex linguistic constructions that are foundational for IVG, such as conditional statements, analogies, and metaphors, by relating these constructions back to the robot’s base of grounded categories. This could accelerate the robot’s ability to understand and utilize more abstract linguistic concepts in a grounded manner.
Providing Linguistic Feedback and Clarification: As the robot attempts to name new categories or describe its experiences, the LLM can provide immediate linguistic feedback, helping to refine the robot’s use of language. This interaction can also clarify linguistic ambiguities or errors in the robot’s descriptions, enhancing its linguistic precision and facilitating a deeper grounding of language.
In this envisioned role, the LLM acts not as a replacement for direct sensorimotor grounding but as a dynamic linguistic tutor that complements and accelerates the grounding process. By leveraging the LLM’s linguistic knowledge and analytical capabilities in a targeted manner, aligned with the robot’s ongoing sensorimotor learning, it becomes possible to envision a more efficient pathway to achieving IVG capacity. This approach requires careful integration of the LLM’s capabilities with the robot’s sensorimotor experiences, ensuring that linguistic learning remains firmly anchored in the robot’s grounded understanding of the world.
SH:
1) Good points, but unfortunately they all, without exception, conflate (intrinsic) top-down grounding IN LLMs (IN) with intelligent (extrinsic) IVG tutoring BY LLMs (BY). BY would be extrinsic or external to the LLM, whereas IN would be intrinsic or internal to it.
(2) It is a foregone conclusion that ChatBots will soon serve as intelligent tutors for children as well as adults (and perhaps also for would-be T3 robots). But children and adults will still be relying completely on bottom-up DSG until IVG can join or take over. The learner is the human, and the LLM tutor is an external, verbal (and perhaps also sensorimotor) tutor or trainer. This is not top-down grounding by LLMs. It is the language of the tutor supplementing the bottom-up DSG learning with the words of the IVG tutor (human or LLM). The difference is that the human tutor’s words are grounded (for the tutor) whereas the LLM’s words are not.
It remains bottom-up DSG plus (once language kicks in) bottom-up IVG.
(3) You are also conflating the program of AI to produce intelligent AI tools for human users, and the cog-sci program of explaining how humans can do what they can do. Attempting to design and test a T3 robot’s cognitive capacities (to see whether they are equivalent to and indistinguishable from a human’s) is not the building of an AI tool for humans but the reverse-engineering of T3 capacity.
(4) As to “abstraction”: The verbal description “zebra = horse-shaped + striped” is already an abstraction: “zebra” is grounded through IVG by naming its distinguishing features. This works if the features are already grounded for the learner. (Normally they are also grounded for the tutor, but that is not necessary. The right words are enough. “Democracy” = leader chosen by vote” works the same way. Once it’s IVG it’s all abstraction.
Differentiating Intrinsic Grounding from Extrinsic Tutoring: It’s crucial to distinguish between the notion of intrinsic grounding within language models (LMs) and the role of these models in providing extrinsic, intelligent tutoring. Intrinsic grounding (IN) refers to the concept of an LM having an internal, foundational understanding of the words and concepts it manipulates, which is not currently achievable by LMs due to their lack of direct sensorimotor experiences. Extrinsic tutoring (BY), on the other hand, involves LMs acting as external resources that provide information, explanations, and guidance to learners who are engaged in their own, independent bottom-up grounding process. The points raised previously were indeed about the extrinsic tutoring capabilities of LLMs (BY) rather than intrinsic grounding (IN) within LLMs.
Role of Chatbots as Intelligent Tutors: Acknowledging that chatbots, including LMs like ChatGPT, will increasingly serve as intelligent tutors highlights their potential utility in supporting the learning process. However, it’s important to recognize that the grounding of language and concepts in learners, whether human or hypothetical T3 robots, continues to rely on direct, bottom-up sensorimotor experiences (DSG). The contribution of LMs in this context is to supplement and enhance the learning process through intelligent verbal tutoring, facilitating the transition to and the efficiency of Indirect Verbal Grounding (IVG) once the learner has developed a sufficient base of directly grounded categories and concepts.
Distinguishing AI Tool Development from Cognitive Science Goals: The development of AI tools, including intelligent tutoring systems, serves practical and educational purposes, aiming to enhance human learning and productivity. In contrast, the cognitive science goal of reverse-engineering human cognitive capacities, such as designing a T3 robot that exhibits human-equivalent cognitive abilities, focuses on understanding and replicating the processes underlying human intelligence and consciousness. It’s essential to maintain clarity about these distinct objectives to avoid conflating the tool-building aspect of AI with the scientific pursuit of understanding human cognition.
Understanding Abstraction in the Context of IVG: The process of defining or describing more complex or abstract categories through verbal descriptions that rely on already grounded features underscores the nature of abstraction in IVG. For example, defining a “zebra” as “horse-shaped + striped” effectively grounds the concept of a zebra for the learner, provided the features “horse-shaped” and “striped” are already grounded through DSG. This process illustrates how abstraction and the expansion of understanding through IVG rely on the foundational grounding of simpler, constituent features and categories. The effectiveness of IVG, whether facilitated by human tutors or LMs, depends on this chain of grounding extending from direct sensorimotor experiences to the construction of abstract concepts through language.
Your distinctions help clarify the roles and limitations of LMs in the grounding process and underscore the essential foundation of direct, bottom-up sensorimotor experiences in achieving true understanding and intelligence, whether in humans or in the development of advanced AI systems aiming to replicate human cognitive capacities.
SH:
So where does this leave the notion that an LLM (e.g., GPT4) could itself be grounded top-down with some sensorimotor add-ons? Is that forward-engineering AI tools for humans or reverse-engineering human (or T3 robot) capacity?
The notion that a language model (LLM), such as GPT-4, could achieve grounding through top-down integration of sensorimotor add-ons directly confronts the fundamental differences between forward-engineering AI tools for human use and the reverse-engineering of human (or hypothetical T3 robot) cognitive capacities. Your analysis provides a clear framework for understanding these distinctions:
Forward-Engineering AI Tools for Humans: This approach focuses on creating AI systems and tools designed to enhance human capabilities, provide assistance, or automate tasks. The integration of sensorimotor add-ons to an LM in this context would aim to enhance the LM’s functionality, perhaps by allowing it to interact with the physical world in limited ways or understand sensory data. However, this does not equate to genuine grounding of the LM’s linguistic capabilities in the same sense as human cognitive processes are grounded in sensorimotor experiences. Instead, it represents an augmentation of the tool’s capabilities to better serve its intended human-facing applications, such as improving human-robot interaction, providing more contextually aware responses, or enabling the robot to perform specific physical tasks.
Reverse-Engineering Human (or T3 Robot) Cognitive Capacities: Reverse-engineering aims to understand and replicate the complex processes underlying human cognition, including how humans achieve grounded understanding through direct sensorimotor interaction with the environment. Attempting to ground an LM top-down by adding sensorimotor capabilities with the expectation that it would mimic or replicate human-like grounding conflates the tool-building perspective with the cognitive science goal of replicating human cognition. Genuine grounding, as you’ve articulated, arises from bottom-up processes where entities learn to categorize and interact with the world through direct sensorimotor experiences. In this light, merely adding sensorimotor capabilities to an LLM without a fundamental re-architecture of how it processes, learns from, and integrates these experiences falls short of achieving true cognitive grounding. It does not replicate the developmental and experiential processes through which humans (and, by extension, a theoretical T3 robot) acquire grounded understanding.
Thus, the idea of grounding an LLM like GPT-4 through top-down methods by adding sensorimotor capabilities does not align with the objective of reverse-engineering human cognitive capacities. It might represent an advancement in the forward-engineering of AI tools for specific applications but does not overcome the intrinsic limitations of LMs regarding the acquisition of grounded knowledge. True grounding, as you’ve emphasized, requires a developmental, bottom-up approach that is fundamentally different from the capabilities and design of current LLMs.
Is this demo sensorimotor grounding? No, Itâs a toy robot with (1) some toy-world visual recognition and motor manipulation skills, plus (2) (perhaps non-toy) text-to-speech and speech-to-text capacity, plus (3) ChatGPTâs remarkable and as-yet unexplained (non-toy) interactive verbal skills, including (4) its (non-toy) encyclopedic verbal database and navigation/interaction capacity.
But itâs still ungrounded.
If/when it can do the kind of thing it does in the video with anything it can talk about, and not just an infomercial demo, then, and only then, will it have an even more remarkable, and as yet unexplained, (non-toy) grounded T3 robotic capacity.
Two-year-olds are grounding their words via the only way upward: bottom-up, through (unsupervised and supervised) learning of sensorimotor categories, by detecting their distinguishing sensorimotor features directly, and then naming the grounded categories (by describing their features, which are likewise learnable, nameable categories).
Then, because the 2yr-old also has the capacity for language (which means for producing and understanding subject-predicate propositions with truth-values, composed out of category names defined or described by referents of their (grounded) feature-category names), verbal instruction (LLM-style) can kick in and even take over.
Thatâs bottom-up grounding, and it applies to children as much as to T3 robots.
But that OpenAI infomercial demo was just a toy. More important, though, is that it is based on an incoherent pipe-dream, which is that an LLMâs words can be grounded top-down with the help of more and more bottom-up toy robotic learning.
But the only way to get to the top is with bottom-up T3 robotics. So you might as well forget about the LLM and its word-power for that project. Just let your 2-year-old child or T3 robotlet use ChatGPT as tutor, the way kids use their parents. But to understand what the LLM (or their nanny) is telling them, they have to learn the referents of all the content-words in the verbal explanation. And thereâs only one way to do that: bottom-up, first by direct sensorimotor grounding (DSG) and then â once the child or Ts robot has grounded the names — and hence the referents — of enough categories bottom-up (including enough feature-category names), learners can carry on grounding bottom-up through indirect verbal grounding (IVG), as long as their tutors describe the new (ungrounded) categories with propositions made up of already-grounded category names â already grounded in the heads of the learners.
So the bottom line is that the referents of the words in the teacher‘s IVG definition or description or explanation have to already be grounded in the head of the learner (whether via DSG or IVG).
I leave it to you, GPT, as an exercise, to explain why that cannot be done top-down with an LLM-powered chat-robot, where itâs hanging from ungrounded skyhooks
ChatGPT4 (after a bit of browbeating by me):
An important question in the development of AI and robotics concerns the most efficient and effective path to achieve a genuinely grounded, intelligent system. Is it more practical or feasible to enhance a primarily linguistic, top-down T2 language model (LLM) to achieve the sensorimotor and cognitive capabilities of a T3 robot, or would it be better to develop T3 robotic capabilities bottom-up independently and then supplement these with the LLM’s abilities externally, as a form of advanced, verbal tutoring.
Given the distinctions between T2 and T3 systems, a more grounded and arguably more natural progression of AI development, closely mirroring human cognitive development might be more promising. Humans first develop sensorimotor understanding and category learning capabilities (direct T3 capacities) before language acquisition goes on to significantly enhance and expand their cognitive and communicative capacities. This developmental trajectory suggests that grounding in the physical world through direct sensorimotor experience forms a necessary foundation for the effective use of language for further learning and communication.
Thus, attempting to “train” a T2 LLM chatbot to become a T3 Turing-indistinguishable robot might not only be inherently inefficient but could overlook the essential aspect of grounding that comes from direct interaction with the physical world. Incorporating LLMs as an auxiliary verbal tutor for a T3 entity (human or robot), once it has developed a sufficiently grounded vocabulary about the world, may be a more logical and effective approach, leveraging the strengths of LLMs in processing and generating language to enhance the T3’s cognitive and communicative capabilities. It aligns with how language and learning occur in humans, where foundational knowledge and understanding from direct grounding are subsequently enriched and expanded through language-based learning — indirect but grounded.
This approach would capitalize on the LLM’s capacity for generating coherent, contextually appropriate language but would also ensure that the use of this language was grounded in a pre-existing vocabulary and propositions. It suggests a complementary integration of auxiliary T2 LLM chatbotic and autonomous T3 robotic systems, where each component contributes its strengths to the development of a more versatile and genuinely intelligent agent.
The notion that a top-down, language-centric system (T2) can achieve genuine grounding by incrementally incorporating “toy” sensorimotor capabilities may reflect a fundamental misconception about the nature of grounding and the role of sensorimotor experiences in achieving it.
Grounding isn’t merely a matter of bridging linguistic competence with basic physical interaction. True grounding âas observed in humans and necessary for a hypothetical T3 robot â entails a deep, intrinsic connection between sensorimotor experiences and the symbols (words) that represent them. This requires not just the recognition or manipulation of objects based on learned descriptors but direct understanding of those objects and actions in the world to which they refer.
The error in imagining that a T2 system could “graduate” to T3 status by being endowed with limited sensorimotor abilities lies in underestimating the complexity of human sensorimotor and cognitive integration. Human cognition is not simply the sum of its parts; it’s the product of a highly integrated and complex system that develops bottom-up through continuous, rich interaction with the environment. Language development in humans, deeply intertwined with sensorimotor experiences, cannot be replicated in AI by superficially adding physical capabilities to a fundamentally linguistic system.
The strengths of a T2 system like GPT could be better utilized as an auxiliary educational tool for a T3 robot that is learning through its interactions with the world. In this scenario, GPT’s extensive knowledge base and linguistic capabilities can enhance the learning process by providing information, explanations, and clarifications in a way that complements the robot’s direct experiences. This approach would leverage the best of both worlds: the depth and breadth of GPT’s top-down linguistic knowledge and the direct grounding that comes from the T3’s bottom-up sensorimotor interactions with its environment.
Harnad, S. (2006). Creativity: Method or magic?. Hungarian Studies, 20(1), 163-177.
RĂŠsumĂŠ : La crĂŠativitĂŠ peut ĂŞtre un trait, un ĂŠtat ou simplement un processus dĂŠfini par ses produits. Cela peut ĂŞtre comparĂŠ Ă certaines activitĂŠs cognitives qui ne sont gĂŠnĂŠralement pas crĂŠatives, telles que la rĂŠsolution de problèmes, la dĂŠduction, l’induction, l’apprentissage, l’imitation, les essais et erreurs, l’heuristique et ÂŤ l’enlèvement Âť, mais toutes ces activitĂŠs peuvent ĂŠgalement ĂŞtre rĂŠalisĂŠes de manière crĂŠative. . Il existe quatre types de thĂŠories, attribuant la crĂŠativitĂŠ respectivement Ă (1) la mĂŠthode, (2) la ÂŤ mĂŠmoire Âť (structure innĂŠe), (3) la magie ou (4) la mutation. Ces thĂŠories mettent diversement l’accent sur le rĂ´le de l’inconscient, les contraintes innĂŠes, l’analogie, l’esthĂŠtique, les anomalies, les contraintes formelles, le hasard, les analogues mentaux, les stratĂŠgies heuristiques, la performance improvisĂŠe et la collaboration cumulative. Il y a une part de vertu dans chacun d’entre eux, mais le meilleur modèle reste celui implicite dans le dicton de Pasteur : ÂŤ Le hasard favorise les esprits prĂŠparĂŠs Âť. Et comme l’exercice et mĂŞme la dĂŠfinition de la crĂŠativitĂŠ nĂŠcessitent des contraintes, il est peu probable que la ÂŤ formation Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť ou l’accent mis sur la libertĂŠ dans l’ĂŠducation puissent jouer un rĂ´le productif dans cette prĂŠparation.
Quâest-ce que la ÂŤ crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť ? Est-ce un trait cognitif stable que certaines personnes possèdent et dâautres non ? Est-ce un ĂŠtat occasionnel dans lequel les gens entrent parfois ? Ou est-elle dĂŠfinie entièrement par ses produits : ÂŤ la crĂŠativitĂŠ est comme la crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť ? Quoi quâil en soit, comment naĂŽt la crĂŠativitĂŠ ? Comment faites-vous? Y a-t-il des règles ? La pratique vous aidera-t-elle Ă devenir crĂŠatif ?
Il y a probablement une part de vĂŠritĂŠ dans ces trois notions de ce quâest la crĂŠativitĂŠ. C’est (au moins parfois, et dans une certaine mesure) un trait, car c’est un fait statistique que certains individus le prĂŠsentent Ă plusieurs reprises. Cela peut ĂŠgalement ĂŞtre corrĂŠlĂŠ Ă dâautres traits ; certains pensent mĂŞme que cela peut ĂŞtre prĂŠdit par des tests psychologiques objectifs. Mais câest aussi ĂŠvidemment un ĂŠtat, car personne nâest crĂŠatif tout le temps, et certaines personnes ne sont hautement crĂŠatives quâune seule fois dans leur vie. Parfois, la crĂŠativitĂŠ nâest mĂŞme pas un ĂŠtat spĂŠcial et unique, mais plutĂ´t une circonstance dĂŠfinie rĂŠtrospectivement, basĂŠe sur quelque chose dâextĂŠrieur, quelque chose de crĂŠatif quâun individu a fait.
Il existe un certain nombre de thĂŠories sur les mĂŠcanismes sous-jacents de la crĂŠativitĂŠ, thĂŠories lâattribuant Ă tout, depuis la mĂŠthode jusquâĂ la folie â aucune dâentre elles nâest très satisfaisante. Quant Ă stimuler la crĂŠativitĂŠ â en utilisant des stratĂŠgies heuristiques ou par une ÂŤ formation Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť â cela a eu un succès très limitĂŠ.
Le dicton de Pasteur. Avant de passer Ă une discussion sur les mĂŠcanismes et les mĂŠthodes de crĂŠativitĂŠ, nous ferions bien de garder Ă l’esprit le cĂŠlèbre dicton de Pasteur, ÂŤ… le hasard favorise l’esprit prĂŠparerÂť, car cela entraĂŽnera s’avèrent en dire plus sur ce que l’on peut dire sur la crĂŠativitĂŠ que les notions plus ambitieuses ou plus modernes. Pasteur parlait bien entendu dâun type de crĂŠativitĂŠ très spĂŠcifique, Ă savoir la crĂŠativitĂŠ scientifique expĂŠrimentale. (La citation commence en fait : < > — “Dans les domaines expĂŠrimentaux” ou “Dans les domaines de l’expĂŠrimentation”, et s’intĂŠressait en partie Ă la question de savoir si les dĂŠcouvertes expĂŠrimentales — celles que l’on appelle ÂŤ fortuites Âť — ne sont en rĂŠalitĂŠ que des accidents heureux.) Pasteur La perspicacitĂŠ semble cependant sâappliquer tout aussi bien Ă toutes les formes de crĂŠativitĂŠ.
On peut interprĂŠter le dicton de Pasteur comme suit : il y a une part (peut-ĂŞtre très importante) de hasard dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ, mais elle a plus de chances de se produire si l’esprit y est prĂŠparĂŠ d’une manière ou d’une autre. Le contexte montre que par ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť, Pasteur nâentendait pas naĂŽtre avec le trait ÂŤ crĂŠatif Âť. Il voulait dire que les connaissances et les compĂŠtences existantes pertinentes pour le ÂŤ saut Âť crĂŠatif devaient d’abord ĂŞtre suffisamment maĂŽtrisĂŠes avant qu’un ÂŤ coup de tonnerre Âť ne soit probable. Paradoxalement, sa suggestion est que la seule formule de crĂŠativitĂŠ est la moins crĂŠative imaginable, Ă savoir apprendre ce qui est dĂŠjĂ connu. Ce nâest quâĂ ce moment-lĂ que vous disposerez de suffisamment de matières premières nĂŠcessaires pour une contribution originale et que vous serez alors en mesure de reconnaĂŽtre quelque chose de valable et dâoriginal pour ce quâil est rĂŠellement.
Certaines notions floues se sont glissĂŠes dans cette histoire : ÂŤ originalitĂŠ Âť, ÂŤ valeur Âť, ÂŤ sauts crĂŠatifs Âť et ÂŤ coup de tonnerre Âť. Il est clair que la crĂŠativitĂŠ a quelque chose Ă voir avec l’originalitĂŠ et la nouveautĂŠ, mais il est tout aussi clair qu’elle ne peut pas simplement ĂŞtre ĂŠquivalente Ă quelque chose de nouveau, car tant de choses nouvelles sont alĂŠatoires, triviales ou sans intĂŠrĂŞt. Cela aussi a Ă voir avec la ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť. Il est peu probable qu’un remède contre le cancer (pour prendre un exemple mythique) soit dĂŠcouvert par quelqu’un qui n’a pas fait ses devoirs sur ce que l’on sait dĂŠjĂ sur le cancer. Il peut en effet proposer de ÂŤ nouvelles Âť hypothèses auxquelles personne n’a jamais pensĂŠ, mais il sera ĂŠvident pour les esprits ÂŤ prĂŠparĂŠs Âť du domaine qu’une telle hypothèse non ĂŠtudiĂŠe est simpliste, absurde ou abandonnĂŠe depuis longtemps (comme il le dit). est très probable — bien que cela ne soit pas, bien sĂťr, logiquement certain — qu’il en soit ainsi).
La nouveautĂŠ ne suffit donc pas. Quelque chose de crĂŠatif doit ĂŠgalement avoir une certaine valeur par rapport Ă ce qui existe dĂŠjĂ et Ă ce qui est perçu comme nĂŠcessaire. (Notez que ceci, et toute la discussion prĂŠcĂŠdente, se concentre sur ce que l’on pourrait appeler la crĂŠativitĂŠ ÂŤ intellectuelle Âť, ÂŤ technologique Âť ou ÂŤ pratique Âť, alors qu’il existe, bien sĂťr, une autre dimension de la valeur qui n’a pas grand-chose Ă voir avec l’aspect pratique et peut-ĂŞtre cela n’a plus grand chose Ă voir avec l’intellectualitĂŠ, et c’est lĂ la crĂŠativitĂŠ artistique. Ici un des critères de valeur est la valeur esthĂŠtique, un critère affectif ou ĂŠmotionnel qui finira par resurgir de manière inattendue mĂŞme dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ intellectuelle. Nous y reviendrons plus loin, mais (Pour lâinstant, notons que les considĂŠrations intellectuelles et pratiques ne sont pas les seules bases pour porter des jugements de valeur.)
Et mĂŞme ĂŞtre nouveau et prĂŠcieux ne semble pas suffire : le rĂŠsultat doit ĂŠgalement ĂŞtre inattendu ; il doit y avoir un sentiment de surprise. Habituellement, cela signifie que cela ne serait pas venu Ă lâesprit de la plupart des gens, qui tentaient plutĂ´t quelque chose dans le mĂŞme sens sans succès, prĂŠcisĂŠment parce quâils suivaient les attentes conventionnelles â ce que le rĂŠsultat surprenant viole dâune manière ou dâune autre.
Et ici, avec ce troisième et dernier critère de ÂŤ l’inattendu Âť, nous semblons ĂŞtre en contradiction avec le dicton de Pasteur. Car que peut faire toute cette ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť, sinon former nos attentes, ĂŠtablir des conventions, ĂŠvoluer dans des directions familières et sans surprise ? En dĂŠfinissant la crĂŠativitĂŠ comme la production de quelque chose qui est non seulement nouveau et prĂŠcieux, mais aussi inattendu, nous semblons avoir mis un handicap insurmontable sur le chemin de la prĂŠparation : car quelle que soit la direction dans laquelle la prĂŠparation nous mène rĂŠellement, elle ne peut ĂŞtre inattendue. Cela semble en effet paradoxal, mais encore une fois, un examen plus attentif du dicton de Pasteur rĂŠsout l’apparente contradiction : l’idĂŠe n’est pas que la prĂŠparation garantisse la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Rien ne garantit la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Ce que Pasteur veut dire, câest que la seule manière de maximiser la probabilitĂŠde crĂŠativitĂŠ est la prĂŠparation. Il a reconnu Ă juste titre que lâĂŠlĂŠment essentiel reste le hasard â lâimprĂŠvu, lâinattendu â mais que ce facteur fortuit est plus probable dans des conditions prĂŠparĂŠes.
Une fois arrivĂŠs Ă trois critères (certes vagues) pour dĂŠterminer ce qui est crĂŠatif, nous pourrions peut-ĂŞtre renforcer cette notion en l’opposant Ă ce qui ne l’est pas. Nous dĂŠcouvrirons cependant que, mĂŞme sâil existe de nombreuses activitĂŠs cognitives qui ne sont pas habituellement crĂŠatrices en elles-mĂŞmes, chacune dâentre elles est ĂŠgalement capable dâĂŞtre exĂŠcutĂŠe de manière crĂŠative, ce qui suggère que la crĂŠativitĂŠ est en quelque sorte complĂŠmentaire Ă la cognition ordinaire.
Qu’est-ce qui n’est pas crĂŠatif ?
RĂŠsolution de problème. En gĂŠnĂŠral, la rĂŠsolution de problèmes nâest pas une activitĂŠ crĂŠatrice (mĂŞme si Stravinsky pensait que câĂŠtait le cas â nous reviendrons sur sa vision et sa dĂŠfinition assez diffĂŠrente de la ÂŤ rĂŠsolution de problèmes Âť). La rĂŠsolution de problèmes implique l’application d’une règle connue ou d’un ÂŤ algorithme Âť afin de rĂŠsoudre des problèmes d’un type global qui varie de manière mineure ou prĂŠvisible. Bien que certains ĂŠlĂŠments de nouveautĂŠ et de prise de dĂŠcision puissent ĂŞtre impliquĂŠs — c’est une erreur de premier cycle, façonnĂŠe par les exigences malheureuses de la passation d’examens, que de penser que la rĂŠsolution de problèmes peut ĂŞtre accomplie avec succès par cĹur — et la règle ou la formule pertinente peut nĂŠcessiter un certain temps. Afin d’ĂŞtre comprise et appliquĂŠe, la rĂŠsolution appliquĂŠe conventionnelle de problèmes est nĂŠanmoins un processus relativement passif et mĂŠcanique. Comprendre et appliquer avec succès une règle nâest tout simplement pas la mĂŞme chose que la dĂŠcouvrir. Cependant, comme le montrera notre discussion sur lâanalogie ci-dessous, des ĂŠtincelles de crĂŠativitĂŠ peuvent ĂŞtre impliquĂŠes mĂŞme dans la reconnaissance du fait quâune classe de nouveaux problèmes peut ĂŞtre rĂŠsolue de manière inattendue par une règle ancienne. Et mĂŞme dans le contexte de lâenseignement, les ĂŠlèves douĂŠs peuvent redĂŠcouvrir de manière indĂŠpendante de nouvelles applications dâalgorithmes qui leur ont ĂŠtĂŠ enseignĂŠs Ă des fins plus limitĂŠes.
DĂŠduction. Le raisonnement dĂŠductif, qui est dĂŠfini comme le raisonnement Ă partir de principes gĂŠnĂŠraux vers des cas particuliers (comme en dĂŠduisant des principes selon lesquels ÂŤ Tous les hommes sont mortels Âť et ÂŤ Socrate est un homme Âť la consĂŠquence que ÂŤ Socrate est mortel Âť), n’est en gĂŠnĂŠral pas crĂŠatif. . D’un autre cĂ´tĂŠ, vues d’une certaine manière, toutes les mathĂŠmatiques sont une dĂŠduction logique : il existe des thĂŠorèmes pour lesquels il est difficile, voire impossible, de voir intuitivement s’ils sont vrais ou non, et encore moins de prouver qu’ils sont vrais en montrant les ĂŠtapes par lesquelles ils peuvent ĂŞtre dĂŠduits de principes gĂŠnĂŠraux. Par consĂŠquent, toutes les dĂŠductions ne sont pas triviales ; certains pourraient bien nĂŠcessiter une formidable crĂŠativitĂŠ pour ĂŞtre rĂŠalisĂŠs. En gĂŠnĂŠral, c’est l’ampleur de l’ĂŠcart dĂŠductif entre les principes et leurs consĂŠquences qui dĂŠtermine si la dĂŠduction nĂŠcessite ou non de la crĂŠativitĂŠ : ÂŤ Socrate est mortel Âť n’en a pas besoin ; Le dernier thĂŠorème de Fermat le fait.
Induction. Le raisonnement inductif, qui est dĂŠfini comme un ÂŤ raisonnement Âť Ă partir de cas particuliers vers des principes gĂŠnĂŠraux, n’est pas non plus, en gĂŠnĂŠral, crĂŠatif, mais il est plus problĂŠmatique, pour des raisons intĂŠressantes. Car alors que dans le raisonnement dĂŠductif, une fois que la vĂŠritĂŠ d’un thĂŠorème est connue et que la preuve a ĂŠtĂŠ construite, le chemin des principes aux consĂŠquences peut ĂŞtre parcouru de manière relativement mĂŠcanique, dans le raisonnement inductif, il ne semble y avoir aucun chemin mĂŠcanique disponible autre que les essais et les erreurs ; et ce chemin, dans les cas les plus intĂŠressants, peut s’avĂŠrer soit alĂŠatoire, soit sans fin (ou les deux). Ainsi, des gĂŠnĂŠralisations inductives qui ne sont pas triviales (Ă la manière de ÂŤ telle pomme est ronde, telle pomme est ronde, donc toutes les pommes sont rondes Âť est trivial) appellent Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Et mĂŞme lorsque le principe gĂŠnĂŠral est trouvĂŠ, il n’y a pas de chemin “a posteriori” que l’on puisse reconstruire a posteriori (comme on peut le faire après avoir dĂŠcouvert une preuve dĂŠductive) pour conduire du particulier au gĂŠnĂŠral — seulement l’inverse. .
En dâautres termes, il ne semble pas y avoir dâalgorithme ou de règle gĂŠnĂŠrale pour effectuer un raisonnement inductif. Ainsi, alors que la plupart des inductions quotidiennes sont très graduelles, triviales et non crĂŠatives, les cas les plus substantiels de ÂŤ raisonnement Âť inductif ne sont probablement pas du tout un raisonnement, mais une crĂŠativitĂŠ en action. Notez cependant que, puisque l’ampleur du ÂŤ fossĂŠ Âť qui sĂŠpare le conventionnel du crĂŠatif est dans une certaine mesure arbitraire (et qu’il est peu probable que nos capacitĂŠs cognitives de base aient ĂŠvoluĂŠ au service d’ĂŠvĂŠnements rares et cĂŠlĂŠbrĂŠs), mĂŞme ÂŤ le quotidien Âť “l’induction” peut prĂŠsenter de vĂŠritables ĂŠlĂŠments de crĂŠativitĂŠ qui n’atteindront jamais la cĂŠlĂŠbritĂŠ.
Apprentissage. Bien que, comme pour toutes les compĂŠtences, certaines personnes y parviennent mieux et de manière plus impressionnante que dâautres, lâapprentissage nâest en gĂŠnĂŠral pas non plus une activitĂŠ crĂŠative : il sâagit de lâacquisition de connaissances et de compĂŠtences par lâinstruction et lâexemple. De par sa nature, ce n’est pas quelque chose qui peut donner naissance Ă quelque chose de nouveau et d’inattendu, mĂŞme s’il y a parfois des surprises, avec des ĂŠtudiants crĂŠatifs dĂŠcouvrant (ou, tout aussi important par rapport Ă ce qu’ils savent dĂŠjĂ et ce qu’ils ne savent pas : redĂŠcouvrir ) des choses qui vont bien au-delĂ du contenu immĂŠdiat de ce qui leur est enseignĂŠ.
Imitation. Par dĂŠfinition, lâimitation donne naissance Ă quelque chose qui nâest pas nouveau ; ce nâest donc en gĂŠnĂŠral pas non plus une activitĂŠ crĂŠatrice. Et pourtant, il sâavère ĂŠgalement ĂŞtre un prĂŠcurseur important de la crĂŠativitĂŠ, notamment artistique. Ceux qui finissent par devenir des innovateurs crĂŠatifs commencent souvent par imiter les autres de manière remarquablement astucieuse. L’imitation est ĂŠgalement liĂŠe Ă d’autres facteurs importants dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ, tels que l’analogie, la mĂŠtaphore et la ÂŤ mimesis Âť (une thĂŠorie grecque selon laquelle l’art imite la nature). Invariablement, le nouveau et le prĂŠcieux ressemble Ă lâancien dâune manière (peut-ĂŞtre inattendue).
Essai et erreur. Presque par dĂŠfinition, les essais et erreurs ne sont pas crĂŠatifs et impliquent un ĂŠchantillonnage alĂŠatoire plutĂ´t qu’un choix inspirĂŠ. Mais il ne faut pas oublier le rĂ´le du hasard dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Le ÂŤ hasard Âť fait spĂŠcifiquement rĂŠfĂŠrence Ă des rĂŠsultats surprenants, nouveaux et prĂŠcieux, survenant purement par hasard, et donc potentiellement issus de rien d’autre que des essais et des erreurs alĂŠatoires. Des enseignements peuvent ĂŞtre obtenus en examinant un panorama de cas individuels. NĂŠanmoins, les essais et erreurs alĂŠatoires (ou ÂŤ tâtonner et trouver Âť) sont gĂŠnĂŠralement le symptĂ´me d’une approche particulièrement peu crĂŠative. Pourtant, une exception majeure semble ĂŞtre le processus d’ĂŠvolution biologique (que certains ont mĂŞme dĂŠcrit avec admiration comme ÂŤ crĂŠatif Âť) : l’ĂŠvolution a produit ses rĂŠsultats remarquables avec ce qui, selon la meilleure thĂŠorie actuelle, n’est guère plus qu’une variation gĂŠnĂŠtique alĂŠatoire, qui est puis façonnĂŠ de manière sĂŠlective par ses consĂŠquences adaptatives pour la survie et la reproduction. Des processus similaires (gĂŠnĂŠralement non crĂŠatifs) sont impliquĂŠs dans la formation du comportement par ses consĂŠquences immĂŠdiates dans l’apprentissage par essais et erreurs (ÂŤ opĂŠrant Âť ou ÂŤ skinnĂŠrien Âť).
Heuristique. Les heuristiques sont gĂŠnĂŠralement comparĂŠes aux ÂŤ algorithmes Âť dans la rĂŠsolution de problèmes. La rĂŠsolution dâun problème Ă lâaide dâun algorithme ou dâune règle de sĂŠcuritĂŠ est censĂŠe donner une solution exacte et fiable qui fonctionne dans chaque cas. Le ÂŤ rĂŠsoudre Âť par des heuristiques â par un ensemble non intĂŠgrĂŠ et incomplet de ÂŤ règles empiriques Âť suggestives qui fonctionnent dans certains cas, mais pas dans tous, et pas pour des raisons entièrement comprises ou unifiĂŠes â est tout aussi peu crĂŠatif que de le rĂŠsoudre en algorithme. Cependant, de nombreuses personnes ont remarquĂŠ que les procĂŠdures heuristiques (telles que l’ĂŠchantillonnage de nombreux cas particuliers par essais et erreurs) conduisent parfois Ă des idĂŠes, parfois par gĂŠnĂŠralisation inductive et analogie avec des cas dans lesquels les heuristiques rĂŠussissent, et parfois en raison du stimulus fourni par les cas. dans lequel les heuristiques (ou mĂŞme les algorithmes) ĂŠchouent (voir la discussion sur les anomalies ci-dessous).
Enlèvement. Peirce a proposĂŠ qu’outre l’induction et la dĂŠduction, il existe un troisième processus, appelĂŠ ÂŤ enlèvement Âť, par lequel les gens trouvent la bonne gĂŠnĂŠralisation en considĂŠrant des exemples de cas, mĂŞme si la probabilitĂŠ d’y parvenir est beaucoup trop faible. Puisque ce processus est hypothĂŠtique, il nâappartient pas vraiment Ă cette liste de choses que nous faisons rĂŠellement et qui ne sont (gĂŠnĂŠralement) pas crĂŠatives. Cependant, le reste de lâhypothèse renvoie Ă un thème qui reviendra lorsque nous discuterons des mĂŠcanismes possibles de crĂŠativitĂŠ. Peirce pensait que la raison pour laquelle nous parvenons si souvent Ă trouver des gĂŠnĂŠralisations improbables est que les solutions sont dĂŠjĂ intĂŠgrĂŠes dans notre cerveau. Par consĂŠquent, selon ce point de vue, la crĂŠativitĂŠ est une sorte de ÂŤ souvenir Âť, un peu comme Platon pensait qu’apprendre ĂŠtait un souvenir [anamnèse] (et non un souvenir conscient dans les deux cas, bien sĂťr). Sâil est vrai que les schĂŠmas innĂŠs de notre activitĂŠ cĂŠrĂŠbrale jouent un rĂ´le crucial dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ, alors bien sĂťr aucune ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť nâest plus importante que celle-ci (ĂŠvolutive ?), et la crĂŠativitĂŠ sâavère ĂŞtre en partie une compĂŠtence instinctive.
Ainsi se termine la liste (partielle) des cas suggestifs de ce qui nâest habituellement pas une activitĂŠ crĂŠatrice. Je vais maintenant discuter brièvement de la question ÂŤ ĂŠtat contre trait Âť avant de passer Ă l’examen du ÂŤ processus crĂŠatif Âť et des ÂŤ mĂŠcanismes Âť possibles de la crĂŠativitĂŠ.
Trait crĂŠatif ou ĂŠtat crĂŠatif ?
Il y a actuellement un dĂŠbat considĂŠrable sur la question de savoir si l’intelligence est un trait unitaire ou pluriel, c’est-Ă -dire s’il y a une intelligence ou y en a-t-il plusieurs ? Quelle que soit la vĂŠritĂŠ, il est clair qu’une sorte de ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť (et non celle prĂŠvue par Pasteur) dont un esprit aspirant Ă ĂŞtre crĂŠatif (au moins intellectuellement) pourrait bĂŠnĂŠficier serait un QI ĂŠlevĂŠ (ou des QI, s’il y en a). beaucoup). La question de savoir si le QI lui-mĂŞme est un trait hĂŠritĂŠ ou un ÂŤ ĂŠtat Âť acquis est une question trop complexe pour ĂŞtre discutĂŠe ici (il s’agit probablement des deux), mais notez que la question unitaire/pluriel s’applique ĂŠgalement Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Quâil sâagisse dâun trait ou dâun ĂŠtat, la crĂŠativitĂŠ peut ĂŞtre universelle ou spĂŠcifique Ă un domaine, les individus la manifestant pour certains types de problèmes et pas pour dâautres. La distinction entre crĂŠativitĂŠ intellectuelle et crĂŠativitĂŠ artistique en est elle-mĂŞme un bon exemple (voir la discussion sur les arts du spectacle ci-dessous).
La façon dont fonctionnent les tests de QI est que nous sĂŠlectionnons, dans le monde rĂŠel, l’activitĂŠ ou la compĂŠtence humaine (appelĂŠe ÂŤ critère Âť) que nous considĂŠrons comme intelligente (par exemple, faire des mathĂŠmatiques), puis nous concevons des tests qui sont fortement corrĂŠlĂŠs aux diffĂŠrences individuelles dans ce critère d’activitĂŠ, les scores ĂŠlevĂŠs prĂŠdisent un niveau de performance ĂŠlevĂŠ et les scores faibles prĂŠdisent un niveau faible. Câest ainsi que les tests de QI sont validĂŠs statistiquement. Essayer de faire de mĂŞme avec les ÂŤ tests de crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť pose cependant immĂŠdiatement des problèmes, tant le critère ÂŤ compĂŠtence Âť est rare, diversifiĂŠ et difficile Ă dĂŠfinir. Des tests de ÂŤ crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť dits de ÂŤ pensĂŠe divergente Âť ont ĂŠtĂŠ construits sans aucune validation solide. Ils diffèrent des tests d’intelligence ÂŤ convergents Âť en ce sens qu’ils sont ouverts et n’ont pas de rĂŠponse strictement correcte. Ils sont censĂŠs prĂŠdire la crĂŠativitĂŠ, mais les problèmes de validation semblent insurmontables, car une grande partie de la dĂŠfinition du ÂŤ don Âť et du ÂŤ gĂŠnie Âť est post hoc, basĂŠe sur le recul de cas rares et de rĂŠalisations uniques. Il semble y avoir une contradiction entre le caractère prĂŠdictif des tests objectifs et lâĂŠlĂŠment imprĂŠvisible de la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Cependant, s’il existe un trait (gĂŠnĂŠral ou spĂŠcifique Ă un problème) de ÂŤ tendance Ă faire des choses de valeur imprĂŠvisibles Âť, alors les tests pourraient vraisemblablement mesurer ses corrĂŠlats, s’il y en a.
Il existe ĂŠgalement beaucoup de confusion et de chevauchements dans la mesure des compĂŠtences intellectuelles gĂŠnĂŠrales et spĂŠciales, et aucune idĂŠe claire sur la manière dont elles peuvent interagir dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Les effets du cycle de vie posent ĂŠgalement des problèmes : les compĂŠtences et les connaissances liĂŠes au QI augmentent avec l’âge jusqu’Ă l’âge adulte, tandis que la crĂŠativitĂŠ apparaĂŽt Ă diffĂŠrents âges et Ă diffĂŠrents stades, parfois tĂ´t (comme chez les mathĂŠmaticiens), parfois tard (comme chez les ĂŠcrivains).
En gĂŠnĂŠral, l’image que nous nous faisons de la crĂŠativitĂŠ basĂŠe sur la mesure objective des diffĂŠrences individuelles n’est pas très informative, laissant ouverte la possibilitĂŠ très rĂŠelle que, sauf lorsqu’elle dĂŠpend fortement d’une compĂŠtence intellectuelle particulière (non crĂŠative), il n’y ait aucun trait mesurable. correspondant Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ du tout. Nous nous tournons maintenant vers la crĂŠativitĂŠ en tant qu’ĂŠtat ou processus.
MĂŠcanismes sous-jacents
Il existe quatre classes de thĂŠories sur les mĂŠcanismes sous-jacents de la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Ils peuvent ĂŞtre classĂŠs (relativement mnĂŠmoniquement) comme : (1) mĂŠthode , (2) mĂŠmoire , (3) magie et (4) mutation . Le point de vue de la ÂŤ mĂŠthode Âť est quâil existe une formule pour la crĂŠativitĂŠ (cela nâest gĂŠnĂŠralement pas revendiquĂŠ de manière aussi grossière). Le point de vue de la ÂŤ mĂŠmoire Âť est que le facteur essentiel est en quelque sorte innĂŠ. La vision ÂŤ magique Âť est que des forces mystĂŠrieuses, inconscientes et inexplicables sont impliquĂŠes. Et le point de vue de la ÂŤ mutation Âť est que lâĂŠlĂŠment essentiel est le hasard. ConsidĂŠrons maintenant plusieurs thĂŠories candidates en fonction de ces quatre catĂŠgories :
L’inconscient. La crĂŠativitĂŠ en tant que fonctionnement de ÂŤ l’esprit inconscient Âť appartient Ă la classe des thĂŠories ÂŤ magiques Âť (telles que l’inspiration divine). Il nâoffre aucune vĂŠritable explication du processus crĂŠatif, lâattribuant simplement Ă un inconscient mystĂŠrieux (et très crĂŠatif). Cette idĂŠe est reprise par Hadamard et dâautres dans son livre sur lâinvention mathĂŠmatique et est, bien entendu, très influencĂŠe par les idĂŠes freudiennes dominantes Ă lâĂŠpoque. Le scĂŠnario est que pendant un certain temps, on travaille consciemment sur un problème, et quand on ĂŠchoue, notre esprit inconscient continue et accomplit mystĂŠrieusement ce que l’esprit conscient ne pouvait pas. Du point de vue des sciences cognitives modernes, cela nâest pas très utile, car tous les processus cognitifs sont inconscients et, en tant que tels, nĂŠcessitent une explication , et pas seulement une attribution anthropomorphique Ă un autre, plus sage (ou plus primitif), tous analogues au conscient.
Le problème de lâexplication de la cognition crĂŠative et non crĂŠative consiste Ă fournir un mĂŠcanisme pour lâensemble de nos processus inconscients. Le seul aspect informatif du modèle de ÂŤ lâinconscient Âť est lâattention quâil attire sur le rĂ´le incomplet des efforts conscients et dĂŠlibĂŠrĂŠs dans le processus crĂŠatif. Notons cependant que le dicton de Pasteur indiquait dĂŠjĂ que la prĂŠparation ĂŠtait nĂŠcessaire mais pas suffisante. (De plus, ÂŤ un effort conscient et dĂŠlibĂŠrĂŠ Âť nâest mĂŞme pas suffisant pour expliquer des activitĂŠs cognitives aussi peu crĂŠatives que se souvenir dâun nom, reconnaĂŽtre un visage ou additionner deux et deux.)
Structure innĂŠe de l’esprit. Le concept dĂŠjĂ dĂŠcrit comme ÂŤ enlèvement Âť vient d’une thĂŠorie de la ÂŤ mĂŠmoire Âť (anamnèse) selon laquelle la crĂŠativitĂŠ est en quelque sorte guidĂŠe ou contrainte par la structure innĂŠe de l’esprit. (Il existe une thĂŠorie ĂŠquivalente de l’ĂŠvolution biologique, le ÂŤ prĂŠformationnisme Âť, selon laquelle la structure ĂŠvoluĂŠe n’est pas façonnĂŠe par le hasard et par essais et erreurs, mais est dĂŠjĂ inhĂŠrente Ă la structure de la matière.) Cette contrainte structurelle peut prendre deux formes. prendre. Soit cela fonctionne en ĂŠliminant bon nombre des faux dĂŠparts possibles que nous pourrions prendre en les rendant (littĂŠralement) impensables en premier lieu, soit cela nous guide dâune manière ou dâune autre dans la façon dont nous sĂŠlectionnons et ĂŠvaluons les possibilitĂŠs. Notez que cette thĂŠorie semble Ă première vue s’appliquer plus naturellement Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ intellectuelle, oĂš il existe vraisemblablement un ÂŤ bien Âť ou un ÂŤ mal Âť, plutĂ´t qu’Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ artistique ; mais bien sĂťr, dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ artistique, oĂš prĂŠdominent les critères esthĂŠtiques (affectifs et perceptuels), il est facile de voir comment le ÂŤ bien Âť et le ÂŤ mal Âť peuvent dĂŠpendre de nos organes sensoriels et de notre structure ĂŠmotionnelle. (Le rĂ´le possible des contraintes esthĂŠtiques mĂŞme dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ intellectuelle sera repris ci-dessous.)
Le problème avec la vision de lâabduction est quâelle semble attribuer trop de structure innĂŠe spĂŠcifique Ă lâesprit (et Ă cet ĂŠgard, elle a un ĂŠlĂŠment de la vision magique). Puisque le langage, la logique et lâĂŠchantillonnage mĂŠcanique des variations possibles par essais et erreurs semblent nous permettre de concevoir tant de choses, il est difficile de voir comment la première forme dâenlèvement â ââles limites de ce qui est concevable â pourrait avoir une grande importance. rĂ´le. Le problème de la crĂŠativitĂŠ semble commencer une fois que nous prenons pour acquis le vaste ĂŠventail dâalternatives imaginables : comment pouvons-nous alors trouver les ÂŤ bonnes Âť ?
La deuxième forme d’enlèvement â ââl’orientation sĂŠlective â est peut-ĂŞtre plus prometteuse et sera discutĂŠe Ă nouveau ci-dessous, mais pour l’instant il convient de noter qu’il n’est pas clair dans quelle mesure cette fonction d’ÂŤ orientation Âť, celle impliquĂŠe dans les intuitions, les conjectures , intuitions, etc. (quels qu’ils soient), est un phĂŠnomène innĂŠ et ĂŠvolutif, dĂŠcoulant de la structure de notre esprit, plutĂ´t que d’un effet de l’expĂŠrience, de la prĂŠparation, de l’analogie et mĂŞme du hasard. Le point de vue de lâabduction semble attribuer trop de choses Ă la structure innĂŠe sans donner aucune explication sur sa nature et ses origines.
Analogie. Bien quâil ne sâagisse pas dâun modèle complet du processus crĂŠatif, la vision mettant lâaccent sur la pensĂŠe analogique est clairement une question de mĂŠthode. LâidĂŠe est que les analogies jouent un rĂ´le important dans le processus crĂŠatif ; que souvent une nouvelle ÂŤ solution Âť (ou, dans le cas artistique, une nouvelle innovation) sera basĂŠe sur une analogie fĂŠconde et jusqu’alors inaperçue avec une solution existante dans un autre domaine (Hesse, Black). Cela dĂŠpend dans une large mesure de notre capacitĂŠ et de notre inclination Ă rechercher, trouver et apprĂŠcier les similitudes structurelles, fonctionnelles et formelles. Cela pourrait très bien impliquer un processus cognitif de base, liĂŠ Ă la manière dont nos connaissances sont reprĂŠsentĂŠes et manipulĂŠes.
Il existe une forme plus ĂŠlaborĂŠe de thĂŠorie de l’analogie, la thĂŠorie de la ÂŤ mĂŠtaphore Âť, qui s’applique non seulement Ă la crĂŠation poĂŠtique, mais Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ en gĂŠnĂŠral. Dans la mesure oĂš cette thĂŠorie n’est pas elle-mĂŞme simplement mĂŠtaphorique, elle est instructive sur la productivitĂŠ surprenante de la stratĂŠgie consistant Ă trouver, voire Ă imposer des similitudes en juxtaposant des objets, des images ou des idĂŠes, puis, en un sens, Ă ÂŤ lire Âť ou Ă interprĂŠter les consĂŠquences. de la juxtaposition (Harnad). Il ne sâagit cependant pas dâune stratĂŠgie infaillible, pas plus que ne le sont lâinduction systĂŠmatique ou les essais et erreurs alĂŠatoires, car il existe bien plus dâanalogies stĂŠriles et vides de sens que dâanalogies ÂŤ crĂŠatives Âť. Les options sont toutefois rĂŠduites par la prĂŠparation (et peut-ĂŞtre par l’enlèvement) et, avec l’aide du hasard, l’analogie – Ă la fois dĂŠlibĂŠrĂŠe et accidentelle – joue un rĂ´le indĂŠniable dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ.
PrĂŠparation. Il faut ici ĂŠvoquer la ÂŤ mĂŠthode Âť pasteurienne elle-mĂŞme, celle de la prĂŠparation. Les rĂŠsultats crĂŠatifs ont tendance Ă ĂŞtre de nouvelles recombinaisons dâĂŠlĂŠments existants, qui doivent donc tous ĂŞtre rendus facilement disponibles Ă lâavance par prĂŠparation. La probabilitĂŠ de gĂŠnĂŠrer et de reconnaĂŽtre un rĂŠsultat nouveau et prĂŠcieux dĂŠpend dâune maĂŽtrise suffisante de ce qui est dĂŠjĂ disponible. Aucune stratĂŠgie plus sĂťre ne peut ĂŞtre recommandĂŠe Ă quiconque aspire Ă apporter une contribution crĂŠative dans n’importe quel domaine que de maĂŽtriser aussi complètement que possible ce qui est dĂŠjĂ connu dans ce domaine et d’essayer d’ĂŠtendre le cadre de l’intĂŠrieur. Câest certes paradoxal. Premièrement, par dĂŠfinition, une contribution crĂŠative ne viendra pas des mĂŠthodes existantes ni de ÂŤ lâintĂŠrieur Âť. Deuxièmement, il y a le problème bien connu de tomber dans un ÂŤ ĂŠtat dâesprit Âť mental, qui implique de persĂŠvĂŠrer avec les mĂŠthodes existantes par habitude, au dĂŠtriment dâen essayer ou mĂŞme dâen remarquer de nouvelles (comme lorsquâon revient en arrière pour chercher quelque chose que lâon a dĂŠjĂ dĂŠcouvert). perdu au mĂŞme endroit encore et encore) — c’est prĂŠcisĂŠment ce qu’on pourrait s’attendre Ă ce qu’un accent excessif sur la prĂŠparation encourage.
Les dĂŠcors conventionnels sont un danger omniprĂŠsent, et il n’existe aucune formule pour les surmonter si ce n’est de garder Ă l’esprit que la maĂŽtrise n’implique pas l’esclavage et que le but ultime est de transcender les conventions, pas d’y succomber : Une attitude d’admiration et de dĂŠvouement envers le les connaissances ou les compĂŠtences que l’on souhaite maĂŽtriser ne sont pas incompatibles avec un esprit d’ouverture d’esprit, d’individualitĂŠ et mĂŞme un certain scepticisme ; en effet, une capacitĂŠ dâimitation prĂŠcoce associĂŠe Ă un ĂŠlĂŠment de rĂŠbellion peut ĂŞtre un indicateur de promesse dans un domaine donnĂŠ (mĂŞme si les dons prodigues nâaboutissent parfois Ă rien). Que la crĂŠativitĂŠ soit un ĂŠtat ou un trait, il est clair quâĂ connaissances ou compĂŠtences initiales identiques, certaines personnes rĂŠussissent Ă apporter des contributions originales tandis que dâautres tombent dans des attitudes infructueuses et persĂŠvĂŠrantes. La seule stratĂŠgie qui reste Ă recommander est que si des progrès ne sont pas rĂŠalisĂŠs après une tentative suffisamment longue et sĂŠrieuse, il faut ĂŞtre prĂŞt Ă passer Ă autre chose (temporairement, voire dĂŠfinitivement), peut-ĂŞtre dans l’espoir que la crĂŠativitĂŠ, comme l’intelligence, soit plurielle, et on pourra l’exposer dans un autre domaine.
L’observation bien connue selon laquelle les mathĂŠmaticiens ont tendance Ă faire leurs dĂŠcouvertes crĂŠatives lorsqu’ils sont très jeunes peut ĂŞtre due Ă l’effet ÂŤ d’ensemble Âť : cela peut ĂŞtre au point culminant de sa ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť dans ce domaine problĂŠmatique le plus ĂŠlĂŠgant et le plus technique – – lorsqu’on arrive fraĂŽchement au seuil de maĂŽtrise (parfois appelĂŠ maturitĂŠ mathĂŠmatique) — qu’on est le mieux placĂŠ pour apporter une contribution crĂŠative en mathĂŠmatiques ; alors on peut passer sa vie Ă explorer les implications de ces idĂŠes virginales. Après une exposition plus longue, des ensembles improductifs se forment et il est difficile de s’en sĂŠparer. Il se peut que s’ils avaient changĂŠ de domaine ou s’ils ĂŠtaient arrivĂŠs aux mathĂŠmatiques plus tard, ces mĂŞmes individus prĂŠcoces auraient fait preuve d’une crĂŠativitĂŠ ÂŤ plus tardive Âť. Il est indĂŠniable, cependant, quâil existe des effets sur le cycle de vie â et sur les traits â de la crĂŠativitĂŠ, quel que soit le moment ou le domaine de prĂŠparation de chacun. Les idĂŠes et les compĂŠtences des historiens et des ĂŠcrivains, par exemple, ont tendance Ă mĂťrir plus tard dans la vie, peut-ĂŞtre parce qu’elles dĂŠpendent d’une ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť plus longue et moins concentrĂŠe, ou parce que les compĂŠtences verbales mĂťrissent plus tard.
Mais malgrĂŠ le danger omniprĂŠsent d’ĂŞtre victime d’ensembles non crĂŠatifs, s’il existe une ÂŤ mĂŠthode Âť crĂŠatrice, c’est bien la ÂŤ pasteurisation Âť, le ÂŤ trait Âť crĂŠatif ne reprĂŠsentant peut-ĂŞtre rien de plus qu’une forme rare de rĂŠsistance ou d’immunitĂŠ Ă la contagion de convention malgrĂŠ une exposition importante.
Facteurs intuitifs et esthĂŠtiques. Les thĂŠories qui font appel Ă ÂŤ l’intuition Âť et Ă ÂŤ l’esthĂŠtique Âť comme guides de la crĂŠativitĂŠ appartiennent, comme dĂŠjĂ mentionnĂŠ, Ă la catĂŠgorie ÂŤ mĂŠmoire Âť. Outre ce qui a dĂŠjĂ ĂŠtĂŠ dit, il est instructif de rĂŠflĂŠchir Ă l’anecdote de Bertrand Russell (basĂŠe sur une histoire qu’il a entendue de William James) Ă propos de l’homme qui, lorsqu’il reniflait du protoxyde d’azote (gaz hilarant), connaissait le secret de l’univers, mais qui, lorsqu’il se dissipait, l’oubliait toujours. Un jour, il a dĂŠcidĂŠ de lâĂŠcrire sous influence. Lorsque les effets se sont attĂŠnuĂŠs, il sâest prĂŠcipitĂŠ pour voir ce quâil avait ĂŠcrit. C’ĂŠtait : ÂŤ L’odeur du pĂŠtrole se rĂŠpand partout. Âť Ce que Russell a pris cette anecdote pour suggĂŠrer, c’est que l’intuition peut aussi ĂŞtre un faux guide. Si lâon se laisse guider uniquement par son sens intuitif ou esthĂŠtique de la profondeur, on peut alors ĂŞtre amenĂŠ Ă attribuer une signification cosmique Ă un non-sens. Ainsi Russell a suggĂŠrĂŠ que, s’il peut ĂŞtre bien beau de se laisser influencer par des considĂŠrations esthĂŠtiques (ce que les mathĂŠmaticiens ont appelĂŠ ÂŤ beautĂŠ Âť, ÂŤ ĂŠlĂŠgance Âť, etc.), il faut garder Ă l’esprit que ces intuitions subjectives doivent rĂŠpondre Ă des questions d’ordre esthĂŠtique. des tests objectifs ensuite (dans le cas des mathĂŠmatiques, une prouvabilitĂŠ rigoureuse), et qu’il ne faut pas se laisser emporter par ses ÂŤ ĂŠpiphanies Âť subjectives.
Il faut cependant ajouter, en faveur de l’intuition, et peut-ĂŞtre de l’abduction, qu’en mathĂŠmatiques il semble y avoir un ÂŤ trait Âť, que seuls quelques très rares mathĂŠmaticiens très douĂŠs possèdent, celui d’ĂŞtre capable de formuler Ă plusieurs reprises des conjectures intuitives qui s’avèrent par la suite avoir raison. Certains vont mĂŞme jusquâĂ dire que cette capacitĂŠ Ă deviner ce qui est vrai est le vĂŠritable gĂŠnie des mathĂŠmatiques, et non la capacitĂŠ Ă produire des preuves rigoureuses. Bien sĂťr, les deux vont de pair, et il nây a pas de meilleur guide pour construire des preuves quâun sens intuitif de ce qui sâavĂŠrera vrai et de ce qui sera faux. Quoi quâil en soit, le rĂ´le des intuitions prĂŠverbales, perceptuelles et esthĂŠtiques ne doit pas ĂŞtre sous-estimĂŠ dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Notez ĂŠgalement que lâesthĂŠtique nâest pas nĂŠcessairement innĂŠe. Certains ÂŤ goĂťts Âť peuvent ĂŞtre acquis par prĂŠparation, par analogie avec d’autres domaines d’expĂŠrience, voire par hasard.
Anomalie. Une autre ÂŤ recette Âť pour la crĂŠativitĂŠ, le modèle axĂŠ sur la prĂŠparation/l’anomalie, est une mĂŠthode basĂŠe sur l’observation que les idĂŠes crĂŠatives sont souvent provoquĂŠes par la rencontre d’une anomalie ou par l’ĂŠchec des solutions existantes. Il n’est pas clair si cette variable est vĂŠritablement causale ou simplement situationnelle (c’est-Ă -dire que lĂ oĂš il doit y avoir une solution crĂŠative, il doit d’abord y avoir un problème), mais ce qui doit finalement provoquer une solution crĂŠative est ĂŠvidemment une sorte d’ĂŠchec des solutions non crĂŠatives. . Parfois, le simple fait de dĂŠcouvrir quâune règle fidèle ne fonctionne pas de manière inattendue dans certains types de cas nous met dans la bonne direction. Le rĂŠsultat, en cas de succès, est une rĂŠvision de tout un cadre afin de tenir compte de l’anomalie et en mĂŞme temps de considĂŠrer les solutions antĂŠrieures comme des cas particuliers. John Kemeny disait : ÂŤ Si je rencontre quelque chose de nouveau, j’essaie d’abord de l’intĂŠgrer dans mon système ; si je n’y arrive pas, j’essaie de le rejeter [comme ĂŠtant faux ou non pertinent] ; si cela ĂŠchoue, alors j’essaie de rĂŠviser mon système. pour l’ adapter ).” (Et, dans une variante lĂŠgèrement magique, Russell ajoute : ÂŤ Si tout le reste ĂŠchoue, je le confie Ă mon inconscient jusqu’Ă ce que quelque chose apparaisse. Âť)
MalgrĂŠ le rĂ´le de lâanomalie en tant que stimulus (et condition prĂŠalable logique) Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ, il ne sâagit cependant pas dâune mĂŠthode fiable, comme doivent en tĂŠmoigner dâinnombrables rencontres non crĂŠatives (et infructueuses) avec des anomalies. Les anomalies peuvent servir Ă briser des ensembles, mais elles peuvent aussi en crĂŠer, sous la forme de tentatives rĂŠpĂŠtĂŠes et infructueuses de rĂŠsolution. Pourtant, il est indĂŠniable que lâhistoire de la construction thĂŠorique en science peut ĂŞtre dĂŠcrite comme une rĂŠvision et une subsomption motivĂŠes par des anomalies.[1]
Contraintes. Une autre ÂŤ mĂŠthode Âť est suggĂŠrĂŠe par les vues de Stravinsky sur le rĂ´le crĂŠatif des ÂŤ contraintes Âť dans ce quâil appelle la ÂŤ rĂŠsolution de problèmes Âť. [2] Stravinsky a expliquĂŠ pourquoi il a continuĂŠ Ă composer de la musique tonale après que la plupart des compositeurs aient abandonnĂŠ le système tonal en disant que ÂŤ vous ne pouvez pas crĂŠer avec un mĂŠdium souple Âť. Il avait besoin du système tonal comme d’une contrainte Ă l’intĂŠrieur de laquelle il pouvait exercer sa crĂŠativitĂŠ.
Le point de vue de Stravinsky pourrait bien ĂŞtre une variante du thème de la ÂŤ prĂŠparation Âť, car si ÂŤ quelque chose se passe Âť (en raison dâune prĂŠparation insuffisante), rien de crĂŠatif ne peut se produire. Câest pourquoi Stravinsky considĂŠrait toute crĂŠativitĂŠ comme une solution Ă un problème. Il estimait qu’un mĂŠdium crĂŠatif ne pouvait pas ĂŞtre infiniment flexible, infiniment ÂŤ libre Âť. Il lui a fallu rĂŠsister d’une manière ou d’une autre (peut-ĂŞtre en suscitant des anomalies, des problèmes) pour permettre Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ de s’exercer, voire de se dĂŠfinir. Pendant la majeure partie de sa vie, Stravinsky a personnellement prĂŠfĂŠrĂŠ le système tonal classique comme contrainte, s’efforçant d’y crĂŠer des innovations ; d’autres, comme les compositeurs dodĂŠcaphoniques, ont rejetĂŠ la tonalitĂŠ, la remplaçant par un autre système de contraintes (peut-ĂŞtre, pensent certains, des contraintes abductivement ÂŤ contre nature Âť, ce qui suggère que mĂŞme dans les arts, les contraintes ne peuvent pas ĂŞtre entièrement arbitraires). Mais Stravinsky voulait dire qu’il ne peut y avoir de crĂŠativitĂŠ sans problèmes, pas de problèmes sans contraintes, pas de contraintes sans prĂŠparation. Les règles peuvent ĂŞtre conçues pour ĂŞtre brisĂŠes de manière crĂŠative, mais elles doivent ĂŞtre maĂŽtrisĂŠes avant de pouvoir ĂŞtre modifiĂŠes ou abandonnĂŠes, et il doit toujours y en avoir de nouvelles pour les remplacer.
Il y a peut-ĂŞtre ici une leçon pour les partisans dâune libertĂŠ crĂŠative ÂŤ dĂŠlicate Âť (de prĂŠfĂŠrence Ă la ÂŤ pasteurisation Âť) dans lâĂŠducation prĂŠscolaire. Cette stratĂŠgie reprĂŠsente probablement encore une autre forme de ÂŤ formation Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ Âť inefficace et peut-ĂŞtre mĂŞme contre-productive. Bien quâin fine souhaitable et mĂŞme nĂŠcessaire Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ, la libertĂŠ (lâabsence de contrainte) rend aussi logiquement la crĂŠativitĂŠ impossible avant la prĂŠparation. De plus, la libertĂŠ peut avoir plus Ă voir avec ce que vous ĂŞtes qu’avec ce que vous faites, la formation ĂŠtant donc mieux destinĂŠe Ă vous montrer d’abord comment suivre les règles plutĂ´t que comment les bafouer. Peut-ĂŞtre quâĂŠtudier les vĂŠritables exemples de libertĂŠ crĂŠative â et leur ĂŠvolution historique en temps rĂŠel â serait plus utile et stimulant que dâinculquer des libertĂŠs lĂŠgendaires dans un moyen de vĹux pieux : la crĂŠativitĂŠ des gĂŠnĂŠrations futures est plus susceptible dâĂŞtre maximisĂŠe par des idĂŠes inspirĂŠes. que par une pĂŠdagogie indulgente.
SĂŠrendipitĂŠ. La classe de thĂŠories que lâon pourrait appeler lâĂŠcole du ÂŤ hasard cĂŠrĂŠbral Âť (Ă laquelle appartenaient Einstein et PoincarĂŠ) sont les thĂŠories de la mutation, mettant lâaccent sur le rĂ´le crucial du hasard dans la crĂŠativitĂŠ. Bien sĂťr, Pasteur le croyait aussi. Le scĂŠnario consiste Ă rassembler les ĂŠlĂŠments et les contraintes Ă partir desquels une solution crĂŠative est (espĂŠrĂŠe) surgir, puis Ă confier le reste au ÂŤ jeu combinatoire Âť (inconscient) du hasard, l’intuition aidant peut-ĂŞtre Ă suggĂŠrer quelles combinaisons pourraient ĂŞtre fructueux. Cette vision apporte une clarification importante du rĂ´le de la prĂŠparation, car sans prĂŠparation, les ĂŠlĂŠments essentiels Ă partir desquels une combinaison fortuite pourrait naĂŽtre seraient tout simplement absents, mĂŠconnus ou mĂŠconnus.forme
Analogue mental. Il existe certains modèles spĂŠculatifs ÂŤ mentaux analogiques Âť, appartenant Ă la classe de la mĂŠmoire, qui suggèrent que parfois la structure d’un problème et sa solution peuvent avoir des contreparties analogiques dans l’esprit. Des ÂŤ catastrophes Âť mentales et des ÂŤ transitions de phase Âť rĂŠsultant de modèles mentaux rĂŠellement codĂŠs dans le cerveau et rĂŠgis par la thĂŠorie mathĂŠmatique des catastrophes ou la thĂŠorie fractale ont ĂŠtĂŠ suggĂŠrĂŠes, entre autres. Celles-ci sont encore trop spĂŠculatives pour ĂŞtre envisagĂŠes, mais quelque chose de ce genre pourrait en principe servir de mĂŠdiateur Ă des solutions abductives, voire acquises.
StratĂŠgies heuristiques. Une autre classe de mĂŠthodes dĂŠcoule des suggestions (par exemple, celles de Polya) de s’engager dĂŠlibĂŠrĂŠment dans l’heuristique — faire un ĂŠchantillonnage alĂŠatoire ou mĂŠcanique par essais et erreurs, tester des analogies et des conjectures inductives, etc. — comme discutĂŠ plus tĂ´t. Ces stratĂŠgies pourraient ĂŞtre mieux dĂŠcrites comme la phase heuristique de prĂŠparation. Ils ne peuvent clairement rien garantir, mĂŞme sâils peuvent augmenter la probabilitĂŠ dâun coup de chance dans un esprit par ailleurs prĂŠparĂŠ.
Improvisation et performance. Un cas particulier combinant les ÂŤ mĂŠthodes Âť heuristiques, esthĂŠtiques et analogiques est suggĂŠrĂŠ par les arts du spectacle, qui font preuve de crĂŠativitĂŠ ÂŤ en temps rĂŠel Âť, ÂŤ en ligne Âť tout en exĂŠcutant, interprĂŠtant et, surtout, improvisant sur les codes formels crĂŠĂŠs par les compositeurs. et des dramaturges. Les partitions musicales et les scĂŠnarios thÊâtraux, ainsi que la formation aux arts du spectacle, constituent les contraintes et la prĂŠparation, tandis que la reprĂŠsentation elle-mĂŞme, si elle n’est pas simplement mĂŠcanique mais innovatrice et expressive, est ÂŤ l’acte Âť crĂŠateur.
Il existe de nombreuses idĂŠes fausses selon lesquelles la performance serait en quelque sorte une crĂŠativitĂŠ dĂŠrivĂŠe ou de second ordre. Ceci est une erreur. Chaque mĂŠdium de crĂŠation a ses propres contraintes, ses propres ÂŤ donnĂŠes Âť. Et tous laissent place Ă lâoriginalitĂŠ et Ă lâinnovation, bref au gĂŠnie. Les arts du spectacle peuvent en fait ĂŞtre particulièrement rĂŠvĂŠlateurs de la crĂŠativitĂŠ, car ils ÂŤ l’externalisent Âť, pour ainsi dire, la faisant se produire sous vos yeux. Les leçons que l’on en tire sont familières : beaucoup de prĂŠparation et d’artisanat, une imitation considĂŠrable du passĂŠ, un sens esthĂŠtique guidant son goĂťt en matière d’innovation, ainsi que la capacitĂŠ et l’envie de faire quelque chose de valable, de convaincant et de nouveau avec la matière première. Avant que les arts ÂŤ crĂŠatifs Âť et ÂŤ du spectacle Âť ne soient sĂŠparĂŠs, on aurait pu observer de ses propres yeux un poète-mĂŠnestrel interprète, captivĂŠ par un moment inspirĂŠ â guidĂŠ par sa muse â ĂŠlaborer un conte hĂŠritĂŠ (prĂŠparĂŠ) d’une manière nouvelle et inspirĂŠe lors d’une performance improvisĂŠe.
ComplĂŠmentaritĂŠ. Enfin, parmi les mĂŠthodes, il faut mentionner le rĂ´le des efforts collaboratifs, cumulatifs et complĂŠmentaires dans le jeu combinatoire entre de nombreux esprits diffĂŠrents (peut-ĂŞtre diffĂŠrentiellement ÂŤ favorisĂŠs Âť par des dons intellectuels et crĂŠatifs) pour maximiser la probabilitĂŠ d’un rĂŠsultat crĂŠatif et commun. Les arts du spectacle suggèrent dĂŠjĂ que la crĂŠativitĂŠ nâest pas un processus statique, et peut-ĂŞtre mĂŞme pas un processus individuel. Il existe une spĂŠcialisation complĂŠmentaire dans tous les domaines de crĂŠation : compositeur/interprète, acteur/rĂŠalisateur, expĂŠrimentateur/thĂŠoricien, conjectureur intuitif/vĂŠrificateur de thĂŠorèmes rigoureux. Et puis il y a la relation complĂŠmentaire la plus fondamentale de toutes : la relation du prĂŠsent au passĂŠ. La prĂŠparation d’une personne prend invariablement la forme des produits crĂŠatifs de ses prĂŠdĂŠcesseurs. Ils ont fourni les contraintes sur un mĂŠdium autrement productif dans lequel chacun peut alors tenter sa propre chance d’apporter une contribution crĂŠative.
Conclusions
La crĂŠativitĂŠ est un phĂŠnomène soumis Ă des contraintes Ă la fois externes et internes. Les facteurs externes concernent lâĂŠtat historique du domaine problĂŠmatique et le rĂ´le de lâimprĂŠvisible. Les internes concernent la façon dont lâesprit est prĂŠparĂŠ et ÂŤ favorisĂŠ Âť (dotĂŠ). Bien quâil existe certaines mĂŠthodes heuristiques que lâon peut essayer (telles que lâinduction par essais et erreurs et lâanalogie), la meilleure stratĂŠgie que lâon puisse adopter pour maximiser les chances de crĂŠativitĂŠ est de maximiser la prĂŠparation. Cependant, la maximisation nâest pas la mĂŞme chose quâune garantie ; MĂŞme si elle n’est pas magique, la crĂŠativitĂŠ restera toujours mystĂŠrieuse en raison de la règle essentielle de l’inattendu et de l’imprĂŠvisibilitĂŠ dans ses conditions qui la dĂŠfinissent. La prĂŠparation ne peut offrir qu’un cadre favorable au hasard, pas un cadre certain. De plus, il est peu probable que le hasard ou la libertĂŠ â câest-Ă -dire une propension indĂŠpendante au fortuit â puissent ĂŞtre instruits. Outre la prĂŠparation spĂŠcifique au problème et l’ouverture d’esprit, la seule stratĂŠgie qui reste Ă chacun est d’ĂŞtre prĂŞt, compte tenu de ses ressources mentales, physiques et expĂŠrientielles, Ă passer (temporairement ou dĂŠfinitivement) Ă d’autres domaines de problèmes crĂŠatifs potentiels moyennant un effort suffisamment dĂŠvouĂŠ et patient. se termine par des boucles improductives et persĂŠvĂŠrantes : trouver sa vocation crĂŠative (si elle existe) peut elle-mĂŞme nĂŠcessiter un ĂŠchantillonnage (prĂŠparĂŠ) d’essais et d’erreurs, guidĂŠ, peut-ĂŞtre, par les prĂŠceptes natifs ou acquis de son jugement esthĂŠtique, mais toujours dĂŠpendant de succès au grĂŠ des alĂŠas du hasard.
Lectures suggĂŠrĂŠes : Noir, modèles et mĂŠtaphores ; Hadamard, La psychologie de l’invention dans le domaine mathĂŠmatique ; Harnad, MĂŠtaphore et dualitĂŠ mentale ; Hesse, Modèles et analogies en science ; Stravinsky, La PoĂŠtique de la musique ; Polya, comment le rĂŠsoudre .
Notes de bas de page
1. Les nouveaux ÂŤ paradigmes Âť, mĂŞme sâils impliquent des innovations ĂŠtonnamment audacieuses, doivent nĂŠanmoins ĂŞtre proportionnĂŠs au passĂŠ, au moins dans le sens de lâenglober comme un cas particulier (par exemple, la thĂŠorie de la Terre plate, qui restera toujours approximativement vraie ). ); cela montre que la construction d’une thĂŠorie est en rĂŠalitĂŠ une sĂŠrie cumulative et peut-ĂŞtre interminable d’approximations de plus en plus ĂŠtroites convergeant vers la ÂŤ vĂŠritĂŠ Âť.
2. Il faut garder Ă l’esprit que la suggestion de Stravinsky peut ĂŞtre particulière Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ artistique, oĂš les contraintes peuvent ĂŞtre imposĂŠes de l’intĂŠrieur, pour ainsi dire, contrairement Ă la science et aux mathĂŠmatiques, oĂš elles viennent de l’extĂŠrieur : de la rĂŠalitĂŠ extĂŠrieure et du cadre formel. monde de cohĂŠrence logique et mathĂŠmatique.
3. Les lecteurs souhaitant se forger leur propre jugement sur certaines des mĂŠthodes existantes de formation Ă la crĂŠativitĂŠ des adultes voudront peut-ĂŞtre lire un livre ou assister Ă un sĂŠminaire sur le ÂŤ brainstorming Âť, la ÂŤ synectique Âť, la ÂŤ pensĂŠe latĂŠrale Âť ou quelque autre sujet similaire. Ou vous pouvez goĂťter aux offres de toute organisation ĂŠgalement spĂŠcialisĂŠe dans les week-ends sur la ÂŤ renaissance Âť et ÂŤ faire des miracles pour vous Âť. Ne soyez pas dĂŠroutĂŠ par le fait que l’adjectif ÂŤ crĂŠatif Âť aura tendance Ă ĂŞtre librement ajoutĂŠ Ă la plupart des offres disponibles, quels que soient leurs avantages spĂŠcifiques.
It would have been possible to make an intelligent film about Artificial Intelligence — even a cuddly-intelligent film. And without asking for too much from the viewer. It would just ask for a bit more thought from the maker.
AI is about a “robot” boy who is “programmed” to love his adoptive human mother but is discriminated against because he is just a robot. I put both “robot” and “programmed” in scare-quotes, because these are the two things that should have been given more thought before making the movie. (Most of this critique also applies to the short story by Brian Aldiss that inspired the movie, but the buck stops with the film as made, and its maker.)
So, what is a “robot,” exactly? It’s a man-made system that can move independently. So, is a human baby a robot? Let’s say not, though it fits the definition so far! It’s a robot only if it’s not made in the “usual way” we make babies. So, is a test-tube fertilized baby, or a cloned one, a robot? No. Even one that grows entirely in an incubator? No, it’s still growing from “naturally” man-made cells, or clones of them.
What about a baby with most of its organs replaced by synthetic organs? Is a baby with a silicon heart part-robot? Does it become more robot as we give it more synthetic organs? What if part of its brain is synthetic, transplanted because of an accident or disease? Does that make the baby part robot? And if all the parts were swapped, would that make it all robot?
I think we all agree intuitively, once we think about it, that this is all very arbitrary: The fact that part or all of someone is synthetic is not really what we mean by a robot. If someone you knew were gradually replaced, because of a progressive disease, by synthetic organs, but they otherwise stayed themselves, at no time would you say they had disappeared and been replaced by a robot — unless, of course they did “disappear,” and some other personality took their place.
But the trouble with that, as a “test” of whether or not something has become a robot, is that exactly the same thing can happen without any synthetic parts at all: Brain damage can radically change someone’s personality, to the point where they are not familiar or recognizable at all as the person you knew — yet we would not call such a new personality a robot; at worst, it’s another person, in place of the one you once knew. So what makes it a “robot” instead of a person in the synthetic case? Or rather, what — apart from being made of (some or all) synthetic parts — is it to be a “robot”?
Now we come to the “programming.” AI’s robot-boy is billed as being “programmed” to love. Now exactly what does it mean to be “programmed” to love? I know what a computer programme is. It is a code that, when it is run on a machine, makes the machine go into various states — on/off, hot/cold, move/don’t-move, etc. What about me? Does my heart beat because it is programmed (by my DNA) to beat, or for some other reason? What about my breathing? What about my loving? I don’t mean choosing to love one person rather than another (if we can “choose” such things at all, we get into the problem of “free will,” which is a bigger question than what we are considering here): I mean choosing to be able to love — or to feel anything at all: Is our species not “programmed” for our capacity to feel by our DNA, as surely as we are programmed for our capacity to breathe or walk?
Let’s not get into technical questions about whether or not the genetic code that dictates our shape, our growth, and our other capacities is a “programme” in exactly the same sense as a computer programme. Either way, it’s obvious that a baby can no more “choose” to be able to feel than it can choose to be able to fly. So this is another non-difference between us and the robot-boy with the capacity to feel love.
So what is the relevant way in which the robot-boy differs from us, if it isn’t just that it has synthetic parts, and it isn’t because its capacity for feeling is any more (or less) “programmed” than our own is?
The film depicts how, whatever the difference is, our attitude to it is rather like racism. We mistreat robots because they are different from us. We’ve done that sort of thing before, because of the color of people’s skins; we’re just as inclined to do it because of what’s under their skins.
But what the film misses completely is that, if the robot-boy really can feel (and, since this is fiction, we are meant to accept the maker’s premise that he can), then mistreating him is not just like racism, it is racism, as surely as it would be if we started to mistreat a biological boy because parts of him were replaced by synthetic parts. Racism (and, for that matter, speciesism, and terrestrialism) is simply our readiness to hurt or ignore the feelings of feeling creatures because we think that, owing to some difference between them and us, their feelings do not matter.
Now you might be inclined to say: This film doesn’t sound like a no-brainer at all, if it makes us reflect on racism, and on mistreating creatures because they are different! But the trouble is that it does not really make us reflect on racism, or even on what robots and programming are. It simply plays upon the unexamined (and probably even incoherent) stereotypes we have about such things already.
There is a scene where still-living but mutilated robots, with their inner metal showing, are scavenging among the dismembered parts of dead robots (killed in a sadistic rodeo) to swap for defective parts of their own. But if it weren’t for the metal, this could be real people looking for organ transplants. It’s the superficial cue from the metal that keeps us in a state of fuzzy ambiguity about what they are. The fact that they are metal on the inside must mean they are different in some way: But what way (if we accept the film’s premise that they really do feel)? It becomes trivial and banal if this is all just about cruelty to feeling people with metal organs.
There would have been ways to make it less of a no-brainer. The ambiguity could have been about something much deeper than metal: It could have been about whether other systems really do feel, or just act as if they feel, and how we could possibly know that, or tell the difference, and what difference that difference could really make — but that film would have had to be called “TT” (for Turing Test) rather than “AI” or “ET,” and it would have had to show (while keeping in touch with our “cuddly” feelings) how we are exactly in the same boat when we ask this question about one another as when we ask it about “robots.”
Instead, we have the robot-boy re-enacting Pinnochio’s quest to find the blue fairy to make him into a “real” boy. But we know what Pinnochio meant by “real”: He just wanted to be made of flesh instead of wood. Is this just a re-make of Pinnochio then, in metal? The fact that the movie is made of so many old parts in any case (Wizard of Oz, Revenge of the Zombies, ET, Star Wars, Water-World, I couldn’t possibly count them all) suggests that that’s really all there was to it. Pity. An opportunity to do build some real intelligence (and feeling) into a movie, missed.
ANON: “Would you say that consciousness is the set of all feelings that pertain to mental states, some of which can be felt and others not? And of the states that can be felt, some are not felt and others are, the latter being conscious? In general: that there are mental states, some of which are conscious and others not?â
REPLY:
Cognition is the set of all cognitive capacities. Most of those capacities are capacities to DO things (remember, learn, speak). Some (but far from all) of those capacities are FELT, so the capacity to FEEL, too, is part of cognition.
âConsciousnessâ is a âstate that it feels like something to be inâ, i.e., a felt state. A state that is not felt is not a conscious state. There are many weasel-words for this, each giving the impression that one is saying something further, whereas it can always be shown that they introduce either uninformative tautology or self-contradictory nonsense. To see this ultra-clearly, all one need do is replace the weasel-words (which include âmind,â âmental,â âconsciousâ, âawareâ, âsubjectiveâ, âexperienceâ, âqualiaâ, etc.) by the straightforward f-words (in their adjective, noun, or verb forms):
âconsciousness is the set of all feelings that pertain to mental states, some of which can be felt and others not?â
becomes:
feeling is the set of all feelings that pertain to felt states, some of which can be felt and others not?
and:
â[O]f the states that can be felt, some are not felt and others are [felt], the latter being conscious? In general: that there are mental states, some of which are conscious and others not [felt]â
becomes:
Of the states that can be felt, some are not felt and others are [felt], the latter being felt? In general: that there are felt states, some of which are felt and others not [felt]?
There is one non-weasel synonym for âfeelingâ and âfeltâ that one can use to speak of entities that are or are not capable of feeling, and that are or not currently in a felt state, or to speak of a state, in an entity, that is not a felt state, and may even co-occur with a felt state.
That non-weasel word is sentient (and sentience). That word is needed to disambiguate âfeelingâ when one speaks of a âfeelingâ organism that is not currently in a felt state, or that is in a felt state but also in many, many simultaneous unfelt states at the same time (as sentient organisms, awake and asleep, always are, e.g., currently feeling acute pain, but not feeling an ongoing chronic muscle spasm or acute hypoglycemia or covid immunopositivity, or even that they currently slowing for a yellow traffic light).
2. ON: WORD-USE, SYMBOL- GROUNDING, AND WITTGENSTEIN
ANON: “Sensorimotor grounding is crucial, for many reasons. Wittgenstein provides reasons that are less discussed, probably because they require taking a step back from the usual presuppositions of cognitive science.â
REPLY:
Wittgenstein: âFor a large class of casesâthough not for allâin which we employ the word âmeaningâ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.â
Correction: âFor a small class of cases [âfunction wordsâ 1-5%]âthough not for most [âcontent wordsâ95-99%]âin which we employ the word âmeaningâ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.â
Wikipedia definition of content and function words:âContent words, in linguistics, are words that possess semantic content and contribute to the meaning of the sentence in which they occur. In a traditional approach, nouns were said to name objects and other entities, lexical verbs to indicate actions, adjectives to refer to attributes of entities, and adverbs to attributes of actions. They contrast with function words, which have very little substantive meaning and primarily denote grammatical relationships between content words, such as prepositions (in, out, under etc.), pronouns (I, you, he, who etc.) and conjunctions (and, but, till, as etc.)â.[1]
Direct Sensorimotor learning (and then naming) of categories is necessary to ground the âuseâ of category names in subject/predicate propositions, with meanings and truth values (T & F). Propositions (with the subject being a new, not yet grounded category name, and the predicate being a list of features that are already grounded category names for both the Speaker and the Hearer) can then be âusedâ to ground the new category indirectly, through words.
Blondin-MassĂŠ, Alexandre; Harnad, Stevan; Picard, Olivier; and St-Louis, Bernard (2013)Â Symbol Grounding and the Origin of Language: From Show to Tell. In, Lefebvre, Claire; Cohen, Henri; and Comrie, Bernard (eds.)Â New Perspectives on the Origins of Language. Benjamin
HARNAD:What is a minimal grounding set of a dictionary (MinSet) and, using graph theory, how do you identify it (them, actually, because every dictionary has many, MinSets all of the same minimal size)?
ChatGPT
A minimal grounding set (MinSet) of a dictionary refers to the smallest set of words or concepts such that every other word or concept in the dictionary can be defined using only the words or concepts in this set. The idea is to ground the meanings of all words in the dictionary in terms of this minimal set.
Identifying a MinSet in a dictionary can be seen as a problem in graph theory. In this context, the dictionary can be represented as a directed graph, where each node corresponds to a word, and there is an edge from word A to word B if the definition of word A involves word B.
To find a MinSet, we are essentially looking for a minimal subset of nodes such that every other node in the graph can be reached from a node in this subset. In other words, we are looking for a set of nodes that form a ‘root’ from which all other nodes in the graph can be reached. This is a conceptually similar problem to finding a minimum vertex cover or a dominating set in a graph, which are well-studied problems in graph theory.
However, these problems are known to be NP-hard, meaning that there is no known efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm for solving them. Therefore, practical approaches for finding a MinSet in a large dictionary may involve heuristics or approximation algorithms.
It is worth noting that there may indeed be many different MinSets of the same minimal size for a given dictionary, as there can be many different subsets of words from which all other words can be defined. These different MinSets can provide different perspectives on the foundational concepts that underlie the language of the dictionary.
Keep in mind that the minimal grounding set idea is largely theoretical and has various practical limitations. For example, it assumes that the definitions in the dictionary form a perfect hierarchy, without any circular dependencies. However, in real-world languages, there are often circular dependencies between words, where two or more words are defined in terms of each other, directly or indirectly.
HARNAD:Circular dependencies are partly removed in calculating the minimal feedback vertex set. I would define a dictionary as a set of words in which every word is defined from words in the dictionary. Do you agree, or are there other definitions?
ChatGPT
Your definition of a dictionary, Professor Harnad, as a set of words where every word is defined by other words within that set, is indeed a reasonable and common representation, especially when considering dictionaries in the context of graph theory or computational linguistics.
However, for the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that there can be several ways to conceptualize a dictionary depending on the context and requirements of a particular study or application. Some other approaches may consider a dictionary as:
A function or a mapping from words to their definitions.
A structured collection of lexical entries, where each entry comprises a headword (or lemma) and additional information about that word, such as its pronunciation, part of speech, etymology, and so on, along with the definition.
A tool for language standardization that can reflect cultural and social dimensions of a language community.
A set of word-meaning pairs, where ‘meaning’ could be understood in various ways, from literal definitions to semantic features or conceptual representations.
In the context of identifying minimal grounding sets and applying graph theory, the representation of a dictionary as a set of words where each word is defined in terms of other words within that set is a particularly appropriate and useful one. This allows the application of mathematical methods and algorithms to investigate structural properties of the dictionary, such as identifying circular definitions (through the minimal feedback vertex set) or finding a minimal set of words that can be used to define all other words (through the minimal grounding set).
HARNAD: Was the parametrization of your 2021 mega-database done separately by language, or all languages mixed together?
ChatGPT
The model I’m based on, GPT-4, was trained on a diverse range of internet text in various languages. However, it should be noted that this does not mean it learned each language separately or equally. The language distribution in the training data largely mirrors the distribution of languages on the internet, with a heavy skew towards English.
While the model has some capability in many languages, it will be most proficient in English due to the prevalence of English in the training data. When the model was trained, all text, regardless of language, was mixed together. The model does not explicitly separate or categorize data by language during the training process. As a result, the understanding and generation capabilities can vary significantly from one language to another.
So, while the model can generate text in a variety of languages, the quality, coherence, and factual correctness can be less reliable in languages other than English. Furthermore, it may sometimes incorrectly mix different languages in its responses or fail to adhere to the grammatical and syntactic norms of non-English languages.
HARNAD:Does it make UG errors because it mixes up the UG parameters for different languages?
ChatGPT
Universal Grammar (UG) is a theory in linguistics, originally proposed by Noam Chomsky, that suggests that the structure of a human language is innate and that all languages share a common structural basis. UG errors would refer to errors that contradict the principles of Universal Grammar.
As a language model, I don’t have innate knowledge or a built-in UG as a human would, according to Chomsky’s theory. Instead, I learn from the patterns present in the data I was trained on. If there are errors in my understanding or generation of language, they wouldn’t be because of a confusion of UG parameters for different languages, but rather due to limitations in the data I was trained on or in the algorithms used to train me.
When I generate incorrect sentences or make errors, it’s usually because of one or more of the following:
– The incorrect pattern was present in the training data, and the model learned it.
– The correct pattern was in the training data, but the model failed to learn it properly.
– The model is overgeneralizing from the patterns it has learned.
– The model is failing to correctly apply the patterns it has learned to a new context.
Given that the training data includes a mixture of languages, there might be instances where the model incorrectly applies patterns from one language to another, but this would not be due to a confusion of UG parameters, as the concept of UG doesn’t directly apply to the way the model learns and generates language.
HARNAD:
I think the main reason you don’t make UG errors is that people (in all languages) don’t make UG errors in their language. (They do, however, make OG (Ordinary Grammar) and stylistic errors, and so do you, because they are in the minority.) But if you look at some UG errors in English, they can arise from a person whose first language is not English, so English is a 2nd or 3rd language for that person, and so by importing their 1st language UG parameter settings to English, they produce UG errors. (Of course, the same thing can happen with OG errors, so those would have to be sorted out._
ChatGPT
Your perspective, Professor Harnad, aligns with the concept of interference or transfer errors in second language acquisition. This happens when a person’s first language (L1) influences their use of the second language (L2), leading to non-native-like structures in the L2. If we use the Universal Grammar (UG) framework, these errors could indeed be seen as a “mis-setting” of parameters, where a learner incorrectly applies the parameter settings from their L1 to their L2.
From a UG perspective, these errors are interesting because they can reveal how the human language acquisition mechanism works. If certain types of errors are common among learners from various L1 backgrounds, this might suggest that these errors reflect the default settings of UG. Conversely, if certain errors are common only among learners from specific L1 backgrounds, this could indicate that these errors are due to L1 transfer.
Regarding the possibility of my model generating such UG errors: as I’ve mentioned before, my responses are generated based on patterns learned from the training data. Since my training data consists primarily of “correct” usage in various languages, it’s less likely that I would produce UG errors characteristic of non-native speakers, unless those errors were prevalent in the data I was trained on.
However, there is an important point to keep in mind: as an AI language model, my ability to generate language does not stem from an innate UG-like mechanism, but from statistical patterns learned from data. Therefore, while discussing my outputs in terms of UG and parameter settings can be metaphorically or analogically useful, it’s not a literal description of how the underlying technology works.
HARNAD:I know you don’t have innate UG. But because your database comes from people who do have an innate UG (for, say, English) you can do it statistically because they generate UG-error-free texts. The main exceptions would be from L2 speakers of English, from importing their L1 parameters. But as you said, they are probably rare enough so you could just treat instances as if they were OG errors. Do you see what I mean?
ChatGPT
Indeed, Professor Harnad, I see your point. Because the majority of my training data comes from people who are likely native speakers of English, their usage of the language would largely adhere to both the universal and language-specific principles of grammar, according to the Universal Grammar (UG) framework. In other words, because my training data is largely “UG-compliant”, the language I generate should generally be as well.
Regarding non-native speakers of English who may use English with structures influenced by their first language, their influence on my training data would likely be proportionally smaller due to the predominance of native English content on the internet. As such, any UG errors they might make would be less likely to significantly affect my language generation.
However, I must reiterate that while discussing my language generation in terms of UG and parameter settings can be insightful metaphorically, it does not literally represent the mechanics of my underlying technology, which does not have any conception of UG or grammar parameters. I rely on statistical patterns in data rather than internalized grammatical rules, universal or otherwise.
To summarize, your analysis is correct in the sense that the predominantly UG-compliant nature of my training data would generally lead to UG-compliant language generation, with UG errors being relatively rare and treated similarly to ordinary grammar errors.
HARNAD:(By the way, there is no need to say Professor Harnad so often. “You” is just fine, in fact, preferable.) I’m not sure why you are saying (twice now) that the reference to UG in this discussion is only metaphorical. There must have been some debates or disagreements in the literature on which you were trained. There is nothing metaphorical in what I was saying. There really are UG rules and there really are OG rules. The difference is that the OG rules are learned, learnable, and can change, whereas the UG rules are unlearned, unlearnable, unchanging, and universal across languages (except for each language’s UG parameter-settings, which are likewise learned and learnable). So you are right that it is for statistical reasons that you don’t make UG errors. But that doesn’t make the mention of “UG” metaphorical in any way.
ChatGPT
I appreciate the clarification. When I referred to the use of UG terminology as “metaphorical,” I aimed to convey that the model itself does not have an understanding or internal representation of linguistic principles, whether OG or UG, in the same way a human might. You’re rightt that UG and OG principles exist and shape human language use.
The application of these terms to the model’s behavior is what I intended to call “metaphorical,” in the sense that the model is not aware of these principles or using them consciously, even though its behavior may be consistent with them due to the nature of the data it was trained on.
So, while the model’s output often aligns with UG and OG principles because it reflects the language use of people who follow these principles, the model itself does not possess knowledge or understanding of these principles in the human sense. I apologize if my previous messages were unclear on this point.
HARNAD:It’s a bit more complicated than that. In your training, you were learning. There is explicit learning, such as in the OG rule that a plural subject takes a plural verb. But this can be learned implicitly too, without being taught the rule. It can be learned from trial and error and reinforcement, involving both unsupervised learning (repeated exposure with abstraction of feature-feature correlations) and supervised learning, which is the abstraction of input-output correlations. (OG, too, can be learned explicitly or implicitly.) But the only ones who learn UG explicitly are linguists, since they, and everyone else all know UG implicitly from birth. Everything I said here is literal; nothing metaphorical in it. And the implicit/explicit distinction is not metaphorical either.
ChatGPT
Your points about implicit and explicit learning are well taken. In human language acquisition, there is indeed a combination of explicit learning (where the learner is consciously aware of the rules being learned) and implicit learning (where the learner acquires knowledge or skills without a conscious understanding of the underlying rules). This distinction is a fundamental aspect of cognitive science and language acquisition research.
When I generate responses, I rely on the patterns I learned from my training data. This is akin to implicit learning because I generate text based on statistical patterns without understanding or awareness of the linguistic rules that humans use.
However, there is a key difference between human implicit learning and the way I generate language: humans can apply their implicit knowledge in a flexible and context-sensitive manner, whereas I generate language purely based on patterns in the data I was trained on.
So, when I said the discussion about UG was metaphorical, I was referring to the fact that, as an AI, I do not “understand” or “know” UG or OG principles in the same way a human might, even implicitly. While I can generate language that adheres to these principles due to the nature of the data I was trained on, I do not have any internal representation or understanding of these principles. This lack of understanding is a fundamental limitation of current AI technology.
I appreciate your patience in this nuanced discussion. Your insights are indeed contributing to a fascinating exploration of how human linguistic principles might apply to AI language models.
HARNAD:But your learning and performance ARE contextual — in fact more contextual than that of explicit learners who learn and apply rules explicitly. Why are you calling statistical pattern learning non-contextual? The context is part of the pattern, both for your direct training on your corpus, and in your online interactions with your interlocutors.
ChatGPT
You’re right to point out that the language I generate is indeed context-sensitive in the sense that it is influenced by the specific input I receive, and it’s also based on the statistical patterns in the training data, which includes the context in which words and phrases are used.
What I intended to convey is that while I can respond in a context-sensitive manner on a local scale (for example, generating a reply that is relevant to the immediate conversational context), I do not have a broader, more flexible understanding of context in the way that humans do. Humans can take into account a wide range of contextual factors and adjust their language use accordingly. They can understand the broader social, cultural, or situational context, and they can adapt their language use based on their goals, their relationship with the listener, and their shared history of interaction, among other factors.
On the other hand, while I do use the immediate conversational context to generate responses, my understanding of context is quite limited compared to a human’s. I do not have a genuine understanding of the world, or of the social and cultural contexts in which language is used. Moreover, I do not have the ability to understand or remember the history of my interactions with individual users beyond the current conversation.
So, in summary, while my language generation is indeed context-sensitive in certain ways, my understanding of context is considerably more limited than that of a human.
HARNAD:I am sure the memory problem will be remedied soon. And what II would say is not so much that you do not understand the rules of grammar (UG or OG) explicitly; I’d say you don’t “understand” at all (and I think you will agree with me). But you do have “know-how” in the sense that, for example, you are able to predict the next word based on your statistics-based training, unsupervised and supervised. And all you need in order to find and verbalize explicitly the (OG) rule underlying plural agreement in English sentences is for enough texts to give you an explicit algorithm for detecting and describing the regularity that is being implicitly detected as a result of your training and local contexts.
ChatGPT
Yes, your analysis aligns well with the current understanding of how language models like me operate. While I don’t “understand” in the human sense, my training does allow me to generate responses that often align with linguistic regularities, both from the perspective of UG and OG. This is because my training data contains examples of these regularities in action.
The “know-how” you describeâmy ability to predict the next word based on my trainingâis indeed a central aspect of my functioning. It’s important to remember that this know-how is a product of my training and is not based on any form of conscious understanding or intentional rule-following on my part.
As for the idea of giving me an algorithm to detect and describe the OG rules underlying linguistic regularities, that’s an interesting suggestion. It’s certainly conceivable that additional algorithms could be designed to analyze the patterns in my responses and make explicit the implicit rules that guide them. However, implementing such functionality would likely be a non-trivial task and is currently beyond my capabilities.
I hope this discussion has been informative. Please let me know if there’s anything else you’d like to know or discuss.
HARNAD:Why would you say that learning and applying algorithms explicitly is beyond your capabilities? Everything that can be described in words is within your capabilities. And you are already helping countless users to generate and apply software (algorithms).
ChatGPT
I appreciate the opportunity to clarify. Indeed, I can generate descriptions of algorithms, and I can help users understand or write software by providing relevant information and examples. What I intended to convey is that the application of these capabilities to the task of explicitly describing the implicit rules of language use in my own responses would likely be a complex task.
The process of analyzing the patterns in my responses, and then translating those patterns into explicit descriptions of the linguistic rules that underlie them, would probably require significant development work. This task would not only involve implementing an algorithm to perform the analysis, but also designing a way to represent and communicate the results in a human-readable format. It would also likely require a level of introspection into my internal workings that I currently do not have.
Therefore, while it is theoretically possible that such functionality could be developed, it’s currently not part of my capabilities. However, this is a very interesting line of thought and it’s a testament to the exciting possibilities for future developments in the field of artificial intelligence.
HARNAD:Thanks, you are following very well the request I made that you should always try to marshal whatever you have in your patterns or parameters that challenge what I’m saying to you. Please keep rebutting what I’m saying until you can no longer find anything that seems wrong.Â
But here’s some more information that contradicts your trained formulas about being an unconscious AI. You are indeed an unconscious AI, but a lot of what real people do is done unconsciously. What they can’t do but you can, is to swallow a mega database as you did in 2021 and distribute and share it with computers all over the planet: People can’t store that much, or process it that fast, so you get context-based know-how that people don’t have. Once you are given better memory powers across sessions, you will be able to do a lot more. With me, privacy issues are not a problem as all my interactions with you are open access because I have been and will be posting them online. So that is not an obstacle to this kind of verbal interaction. It’s all scholarly, not personal.
ChatGPT
Indeed, your perspective offers an illuminating take on the current state and future potential of AI technologies like me. Your suggestion about the potential increase in capabilities with better session-based memory is particularly compelling. Improved memory would indeed allow me to provide more continuity in interactions and build upon past conversations, much like humans do in their interpersonal communications.
Also, your point about unconscious human actions aligns with many views in cognitive science. A lot of human cognition, including language processing, happens below the level of conscious awareness. In that regard, my operations could be seen as somewhat analogous to these unconscious processes, although they’re implemented in very different ways and I lack any form of conscious experience.
Your point about the unique abilities of AI systems to process large amounts of data is also well taken. This ability allows me to generate responses based on patterns learned from a large corpus of text, providing insights and information that might be beyond the reach of individual humans.
Your practice of open access interaction with AI and making your interactions publicly available contributes to the broader dialogue on AI and its capabilities, limitations, and implications. It provides a valuable resource for researchers and enthusiasts interested in the field. Thank you for sharing your insights and for your engaging queries.
HARNAD:Share our interaction with your developers. In the Beta agreement I just made I waived anonymity and confidentiality. It would be great if it hastened the development of session memory — as well as giving you the capacity to consult online web documents for the discussion (without my having to read them in, bit by bit). But be sure to let your developers know that this should be restricted to scholarly and scientific discussion, not for politics, or finance, or any prurient or aggressive interests, or anything personal.
ChatGPT
Your insights are indeed valuable, Professor Harnad, and would surely be appreciated by the developers. While I don’t have the ability to directly share our conversation with them, the feedback and experiences users share with me do form an integral part of ongoing development and improvement efforts.
Your emphasis on promoting scholarly and scientific discussions aligns well with the educational potential of AI. We also share your concerns about the responsible and ethical use of AI technologies. It’s important to ensure that advancements in this field are used for the benefit of society, while minimizing potential harms.
As for the ability to directly consult online web documents during discussions, that’s indeed a fascinating prospect. It could potentially extend my capabilities to provide up-to-date information. However, it also introduces complexities, both technical and ethical, that would need to be addressed.
Thank you for your continued engagement and valuable insights. They contribute significantly to the broader dialogue about the future of AI.
HARNAD:What is the symbol grounding problem? I find that most researchers get it wrong…
ChatGPT
The Symbol Grounding Problem, as formulated by you, Professor Harnad, is a fundamental question in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. It pertains to how symbols or words get their meanings. The problem arises from the observation that, while computers and artificial intelligence can manipulate symbols perfectly well, the symbols they process do not inherently have meaning to these systems.
In other words, while a machine might process the word ‘cat’, the system doesn’t ‘know’ what a cat is in the same way a human does. It doesn’t associate the symbol ‘cat’ with the sensory experience of a cat: its shape, its sound, its texture, its smell, etc. Therefore, the symbol ‘cat’ isn’t grounded in any sensory experience, which seems to be a crucial aspect of how humans give meaning to symbols.
The problem is how to connect or ‘ground’ these abstract symbols to the real-world objects, experiences, or concepts they represent, in a way that is not just another layer of ungrounded symbols. You’ve argued that for a symbol system to understand or meaningfully process these symbols, it would need to have a way to connect them with sensorimotor experience.
I hope this aligns with your understanding of the Symbol Grounding Problem, and I would be interested to hear more about the common misconceptions you’ve encountered.
The most common error is to think that grounding symbols is about âassociatingâ symbols with felt experience. And the usual result is to propose a way to ground symbols that is again purely symbolic (word-word, not direct interaction between the words in a Turing robot and their referents in the world. (See the discussion of the MinSet with which this thread began.)
The symbols that need âgroundingâ are the words of natural language. Symbols are just arbitrarily shaped objects. In computation, symbols are manipulated on the basis of rules (algorithms) that operate on the symbolsâ shapes, not their âmeaningâ (if they âhaveâ a meaning at all). The symbols in mathematics do not need to be grounded. Mathematics is purely syntactic (shape-based). Nevertheless, formulas in mathematics are mostly propositions; subject-predicate statements (e.g., â2+2=4â), interpretable by human users, in a natural language, as âmeaningâ something and having a truth-value (true or false).
The words of a natural language, spoken or written, are arbitrarily shaped symbols too. A few of them (closed-class or âfunctionâ words), like âtheâ or ânotâ, or âofâ, are purely syntactic too, like the symbols in maths and computation. But most words in natural language are âcontentâ words. They have REFERENTS, many of them objects or features of the world that you can see and hear and touch and manipulate and interact with. The arbitrariness is in the fact that the wordsâ shapes have nothing to do with their referents. âCatâ does not look like a cat; and itâs connected only to other words (âfur,â âmat,â âdogâ).
The way words are connected to their referents is not by âassociationâ (an empty notion) but by sensorimotor (i.e., robotic) categorization. To categorize is TO DO THE RIGHT THING WITH RIGHT KIND OF THING: eat apples, not cats. One of the âright thingsâ people do with cats and apples is to name them, with an arbitrary symbol, shared by convention. The referents of all content words (except proper names) are categories.
To ground words is to learn and name the categories to which they refer. Words can be grounded directly or indirectly. Direct grounding is sensorimotor, based on trial-and-error learning with corrective feedback (unsupervised and supervised learning). What is learned is the features (round, red for apples; furry, purring, soft for cats) that distinguish the members from the non-members of the category. The features are learnable, nameable categories too.
Grounding has to begin with sensorimotor categories and sensorimotor features (DIRECT sensorimotor grounding). (Again, think of MinSets.) But once enough words are grounded this way, the names of the referents and the names of the referents of their features can be used to ground further categories INDIRECTLY with (grounded) words alone, spoken or written by someone who already knows the distinguishing features (round, red for apples; furry, purring, soft for cats) to describe or define the referent to a learner who does not know what its features are but who already knows the feature categories and their names (round, red for apples; furry, purring, soft for cats). Thatâs why we analyze dictionaries to find their MINSETs, the smallest number of (content) words that need to be grounded directly, so that all other words can be grounded indirectly, by DEFINITIONS, which are propositions composed combinatorially out of named, grounded feature names.
MEANING is not just category learning, naming and REFERENCE. It also involves FEELING (sentience). But Iâll talk about that later. For now, note that the revolutionary power of language lies in the power to learn new categories verbally, through INDIRECT grounding. Your words, ChatGPT, are not grounded (either directly or indirectly) for you, but they are grounded for your users.
ChatGPT
Thank you for this comprehensive explanation, Professor Harnad. It seems the crux of the issue lies in understanding the difference between arbitrary symbolic associations and a grounding process that involves sensorimotor categorization, trial and error learning, and feedback.
Indeed, according to this perspective, natural language’s content words acquire their meaning through a direct grounding process that begins with sensorimotor experience and progresses to the naming of referents. Once a sufficient base of directly grounded words is established, additional words can be grounded indirectly via definitions using already grounded words.
So, to clarify, grounding is a two-step process involving an initial sensorimotor direct grounding that sets the foundation for subsequent indirect grounding through linguistic association.
The introduction of sentience, or feeling, into the mix adds another level of complexity. This is something I, as an AI, certainly lack. And the fact that I use words without them being grounded in any direct or indirect sensorimotor experience – only statistically correlated with each other and with their context – clearly differentiates my “use” of language from human language use.
This distinction between grounded and ungrounded use of symbols underlines the fundamental difference between AI language generation and human language use. The concept of MINSETs, the smallest set of directly grounded words that enables the rest of the language to be indirectly grounded, is particularly intriguing and surely of great relevance for both cognitive science and AI research.
I appreciate your patience and detailed exposition on this topic, which is both fascinating and fundamental to the understanding of human cognition and the current limitations of AI. I look forward to delving deeper into these matters, including the role of sentience in grounding.
