Linking Atrocity Crimes and Economic Gain in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Nina Jørgensen, 27 October 2026       8 mins read

The 24th of October 2026 marked the 30th anniversary of the start of the First Congo War (1996-1997) which was closely followed by a Second Congo War (1998-2003), dubbed the deadliest conflict since World War Two.  This in turn merged into continuing and escalating violence involving a plethora of State and non-State armed groups, such as the notorious March 23 Movement (‘M23’), leaving in its wake hundreds of thousands of victims of international crimes committed on an unfathomable scale.  The battle for control of the DRC’s considerable natural resources – ranging from diamonds, cobalt and coltan to timber and coffee – is a connecting feature of the allegations of serious human rights violations against individuals, groups and States.

Resource extraction has come to characterise Congo’s wars dating back to colonial times (1885-1960) when mass atrocities were committed while extracting rubber and ivory, especially under the rule of King Leopold II of Belgium. Today, conflict is sustained by using profits from unlawfully extracted minerals to buy weapons which are often placed in the hands of child soldiers.  Amidst the ongoing armed scramble for Congo’s riches, a culture of impunity prevails. 

‘Genocost’ – the DRC’s rallying cry for justice

The term ‘genocost’ was coined by Congolese youth activists in 2013 to describe the phenomenon of mass atrocities motivated by economic gain.  It was formally adopted by the Congolese government in Law No. 22/065 (2022) which denominated 2 August – the date the Second Congo War began – as a day to mark genocost by paying homage to the victims of sexual violence and other crimes against peace and humanity during the many years of conflict.  The label ‘genocost’ serves as a rallying cry for justice and the urgent implementation of measures to combat impunity.  It captures the continuity of unlawful, exploitative conduct over decades.  The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has urged for a response to this history of grave violations of international law founded on the rights to truth, justice, reparations and non-recurrence. These rights also underpin the DRC’s campaign to break the silence surrounding these issues.

Genocost is not currently recognised as a legal term, but like other terms that have come to characterize patterns of atrocities – such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ – the acts it describes may fall under the banner of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  Yet, the DRC’s efforts to uncover the truth about the decades-long unlawful exploitation of natural resources, and to obtain both international acknowledgement and reparations from neighbouring countries that may be implicated in this conduct, has given increasing prominence to the idea of genocost. In June 2026, the DRC initiated proceedings against Rwanda before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article IX of the Genocide Convention (1948), alleging widespread human rights violations by Rwandan State-supported armed groups operating in the DRC since 1996. The DRC also brought proceedings against Rwanda before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights which was its first inter-State application (2025). Reparations had previously been won by the DRC against Uganda in the ICJ (2005) for the role of Ugandan armed forces in plundering natural resources as an occupying power in the DRC’s Ituri district.  However, the ICJ did not directly connect the exploitation of these resources with its findings as to acts of killing, torture and inhumane treatment of Congolese civilians constituting violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Meanwhile, the experts involved in the UN’s 2010 Mapping Report – still the most important record of the atrocities committed during the first two decades of conflict in the DRC – found a substantial dynamic between the occupation and exploitation of areas rich in natural resources and the likely international crimes committed by members of the internal warring factions.  In their view, responsibility for the violations could potentially be shared with foreign State-owned or private companies.  It was not the job of the experts to establish individual criminal responsibility, but they expressed confidence that numerous recorded incidents could be legally classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity, whilst reserving any conclusion as to the requisite intent for genocide. 

Two DRC referrals to the ICC – 20 years apart but with genocost continuities

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is limited to crimes committed after the Rome Statute came into effect on 1 July 2002.  Alleged crimes committed within the territory of the DRC since that date were referred to the Court by the government of the DRC in 2004, with a further referral in 2023, as it concerned alleged crimes committed in North Kivu since January 2022. 

The ICC Prosecution has taken the position that the alleged crimes covered by the two separate DRC referrals are closely connected, although a pre-trial chamber addressing the second referral declined formally to merge the investigations. It may be speculated that the Prosecution had in mind the connection between the exploitation of resources and the commission of crimes in its assessment of the continuity of actors, victims and contextual patterns throughout the period since 2002. This would be consistent with the Prosecution’s policy paper (2003) where it indicated an investigative focus on financial links with crimes.  

Such an investigative focus is not borne out by the ICC’s modest number of completed cases in the DRC situation to date. In Lubanga (2012) the former President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo was found guilty of the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.  The economic motivation for the violence in Ituri from 1999 to 2003 was mentioned only in the background section to the judgment.  Similarly, in Katanga (2014), only passing reference was made to the geography of Ituri and North Kivu and their immense assets in terms of forest and mineral resources. In Ntaganda (2019) it was again noted that groups acting both within and outside the DRC sought to exploit Ituri’s rich resources and that the competition for these resources was a factor in the conflict. 

Meanwhile, the case against Chui led to an acquittal, while the charges against Mbarushimana were not confirmed, and Mudacumura, the alleged Supreme Commander of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda, remains at large. 

An ongoing conflict of such a wide scope inevitably presents investigative challenges and the ICC’s own resources are finite, perhaps hampering its ability to pursue the economic aspect of alleged crimes in the DRC situation.  Moreover, the ICC faces a key constraint in that it has jurisdiction only over natural persons and is therefore unable to prosecute the corporations that finance and profit from resource extraction carried out through criminal means.  Individual perpetrators at the financial leadership and decision-making level may be difficult to identify, while economic gain is often simply a motivation for criminal conduct and irrelevant to proving the elements of the crimes.  There is a dearth of modern precedents with the trial of the former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, being peripherally relevant. Taylor was convicted in 2012 for crimes linked to the trading of arms for diamonds in support of rebel groups in Sierra Leone.  Félicien Kabuga was charged before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in relation to his alleged role as a financier of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, but he was arrested only in 2020 and subsequently deemed unfit to continue his trial. 

International prosecutions to complement national prosecutions

The ICC Prosecution’s Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation (2016) indicated that it would seek to cooperate with states concerning conduct which constitutes a serious crime under national law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This is an exercise of the complementarity principle whereby domestic courts carry the main burden of holding criminal trials and the ICC serves as a court of last resort.  According to the policy paper, the ICC would itself prioritise, among other categories, crimes committed by means of, or resulting in, the illegal exploitation of natural resources.   

While the DRC has conducted a significant number of prosecutions domestically and awarded reparations to victims, and trials are possible globally under the principle of universal jurisdiction, it is unlikely that domestic courts have the capacity to uncover the true scale of criminality associated with resource exploitation. The ICC would therefore be best placed to investigate the conduct of senior political and military leaders, and the regional and international networks that provide financing and arms to groups operating in DRC’s territory.  The magnitude of the task of holding the perpetrators to account while securing the rights of victims who may participate in ICC proceedings and claim reparations should not be underestimated.  The period since January 2022 has been prioritised as part of the ICC’s renewed investigative effort in the DRC, placing emphasis on the most recent phase of the conflict. 

In awarding this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Navi Pillay, the Norwegian Nobel Committee stressed that peace requires justice. Uncovering the connection between the exploitation of natural resources and international crimes is central to both peace and justice in the DRC.  Against the backdrop of an unending conflict, victims wait for justice and the redistribution of plundered assets in their favour, while the crimes underlying Congo’s genocost fade further into history. 

Two-State Solution x 2

Britain called Israel’s occupation unlawful. It should say the same of Western Sahara.

Andrea Maria Pelliconi,   2 October 2026          6 mins read

Ed Miliband’s statement to the Commons on 8 September 2026 was an act of legal and moral clarity. The Foreign Secretary announced that the Government now regards Israel’s occupation of the West Bank as unlawful, adopting the conclusion of the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion amid Israel’s explicit intention to extend permanent sovereignty through an expansionist settlement agenda. Miliband was right to say that Britain shall not be a bystander to the destruction of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and insist that the law does not bend to the convenience of the powerful. But the Government’s abidance by international law should be measured by its coherence. Fourteen months before that statement, the same Labour Government – under Keir Starmer – took the opposite side on an identical question.

In June 2025 the UK abandoned five decades of neutrality on Western Sahara. In its joint communiqué with Rabat, it declared Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal “the most credible, viable and pragmatic basis” for resolving the dispute. The plan offers the Saharawi people autonomy within the Moroccan state and forecloses independence altogether. The UK’s endorsement of the plan is part of a broader diplomatic current, led by Washington, pushing to convert the Moroccan proposal into a settled international position. The message that the UK’s endorsement of the Moroccan plan sends to occupying powers worldwide is that occupation, once entrenched deeply enough and for long enough, will in time be rewarded with recognition. This is the opposite of what the Foreign Secretary affirms for the West Bank.

There is a clear parallel between the situations of Palestine and Western Sahara, which has been a listed Non-Self-Governing Territory since 1963. In 1975 the ICJ found that Morocco had no sovereignty over the territory and the Sahrawi people held the right to self-determination. Morocco then spent the following decades entrenching its control over roughly four-fifths of the territory through settlements, financial inducement, and large-scale infrastructures and development projects, while simultaneously displacing the Saharawi to nearby countries, until they became a minority in their own homeland. In 1991, the UN deployed MINURSO to organise a referendum on self-determination which was never held, obstructed above all by disputes over who may vote, with Morocco seeking to enrol its own settlers and to exclude displaced Saharawi. Western Sahara has faced prolonged occupation, settlement and demographic change, the establishment of irreversible facts on the ground, and the drive to turn occupation into permanent annexation – just as in the West Bank.

The two cases’ resemblance means the law that governs both is, or should be, the same. The 2024 ICJ opinion not only declared Israel’s occupation unlawful but also reaffirmed the general duty of states not to recognise a situation created by a serious breach of peremptory   norms, nor to render aid or assistance in maintaining it, and to cooperate in bringing it to an end. That duty applies to all situations of denial of self-determination, the unlawful acquisition of territory, and the entrenchment of settlement in occupied land. Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara engages each of those wrongs. A government that treats the duty of non-recognition as binding in the West Bank cannot treat it as optional in Western Sahara.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has understood this. In its Front Polisario judgments, culminating in the ruling of 4 October 2024, it held that EU-Morocco trade agreements could not lawfully extend to Western Sahara absent the consent of the Sahrawi people, including those who have been displaced, and it has been equally clear that the territory is not part of Morocco and has a separate and distinct status. Britain’s June 2025 communiqué moves in the opposite direction to the CJEU as it treats deeper economic engagement as a contribution to the dispute’s resolution rather than as an act that entrenches the very situation international law obliges third states not to recognise.

The latest communiqué on Palestine reaffirmed British support for a two-state solution between Israel and a sovereign, viable Palestinian state, and the Foreign Secretary built his entire statement a few days ago around that objective – as the “North Star” of British policy, in the words of Miliband himself. Self-determination cannot be a right Britain upholds for Palestinians and withholds from the Saharawi. If the UK advocates for a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, it cannot exclude the possibility of the same outcome for Moroccans and Saharawi by endorsing a plan that only presupposes integration. Autonomy may well be one legitimate option, but it cannot be the only one on the table. The Saharawi are entitled to choose freely either integration with Morocco or independent statehood. A choice narrowed to a single permitted result is not a choice, and it is not what the 1975 opinion or the referendum mandate contemplated.

It might be objected that the two cases are not alike and comparable, because the scale of violence in Palestine is far greater than anything in Western Sahara today, and that this justifies more urgent condemnation of Israel regardless of what the law says in the abstract. The premise is largely true, as the level of ongoing violence in both Gaza and the West Bank is higher, and the ongoing armed conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front, reignited in 2020 after the collapse of the ceasefire, goes almost entirely unremarked. The fighting takes place outside the occupied territory, around which Morocco has built a military wall to keep outside the displaced Sahrawis and the Polisario Front. This not only shows that Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara is not less serious than the West Bank – if anything, it is more entrenched, which would require stronger responses. In the early years of the occupation Morocco drove the majority of the Saharawi population into exile, killing many in the process, in events that Saharawi describe as ethnic cleansing and genocide; today, only one quarter of Sahrawi lives in Morocco, facing continued oppression and discrimination.

In terms of legal obligations under international law, the wrongful nature of an occupation does not (only) rest on the violence it generates but in the occupation itself, as the ICJ has held in its 2024 advisory opinion. Britain and others shouldn’t have waited for such a tragic escalation in Palestine to take serious action on Israel’s occupation. And Western Sahara demonstrates that an unlawful occupation left unaddressed for fifty years never resolves itself; to the contrary, it was precisely when states such as the United States began to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the occupied territory, in exchange for normalisation with Israel in 2020, that the armed conflict resumed, leading to more violence.

Ed Miliband correctly told the House that Britain loses credibility and influence on the world stage when it fails to uphold the values it professes. If Britain holds itself bound by the ICJ’s 2024 opinion on the West Bank, it should hold itself bound by the ICJ’s 1975 opinion on Western Sahara. It should reflect the duty of non-recognition in all the economic relationships it chooses, rather than expanding trade, finance, and infrastructure into another occupied territory. And it should withdraw its June 2025 endorsement of a plan with a foreclosed outcome, support self-determination for Africa’s oldest incomplete decolonisation, and let the Saharawi decide their own future.