Author: Miriam Cullen. In a recent blogpost on another site, I wrote about how the resurgence of the language of property ownership to refer to Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland undermined decades of development in human rights and international law, including about self-determination. The piece illustrates both the impetus and the incapability of law to recognize and value home and its relationalities in moments of crisis, and why that is dangerous. Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland is not simply an object of sovereignty, but a lived legal, physical, and spiritual space, the normative contours of which are shaped by the rights of the people who call it home. An extract of that blog is reproduced below, followed by a link to the full text.
When President Trump restated his goal to ‘acquire’, ‘buy’, ‘own’, or somehow annex Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland in January 2026, journalists were abrim with questions. Could the US buy Greenland? And could Denmark sell it? Would Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland have to consent? Could sovereignty simply be transferred? These questions set the tone for much of the legal commentary that ensued and revealed more than curiosity alone. It exposed the persistence of older legal imaginings in which territory remains a transactional object of international law, and the people inhabiting it are left to endure the consequences of decisions taken by states.
The repeated response that Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland ‘is not for sale’ was politically effective but legally incomplete because it implicitly accepted the premise that it could be for sale at all. Sovereignty over populated territory cannot be understood as an object of interstate disposition, divorced from the people affected. Human rights law has altered the legal parameters of territorial change not only through the doctrinal refinement of avenues for so-called ‘external’ self-determination (broadly, the right of a people to freely determine their political status and establish their own sovereign state) but also through contemporary understandings of individuals and Indigenous Peoples as rights holders under its auspices.
The adoption of a sales discourse, even if only hypothetical, makes invisible the legal rights and personhood of the people whom such decisions affect most. Lands and territories are not merely an object of sovereignty, but a lived legal (as well as physical and spiritual) space structured by the rights of those who inhabit it. In Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland, where approximately 88 percent of the population are Inuit, this distinction is not abstract.
Any attempt to maintain a hard line between internal self-determination (a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state) and external self-determination is a conceptual and legal oversimplification that could be misleading. To hold a rigid divide between the two is ‘inherently incapable of capturing the complexities of self-determination’ (Sparks, p. 39). That is not to suggest there is no need for each category, but rather to assert that they are relational, and a thorough assessment of the applicable law ought to evaluate both, including their connection with each other.
Read the remainder of the blog here: Cambridge International Law Journal — Why ‘Not for Sale’ Is a Problematic Premise: Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland and the Human Rights Dimensions of Territorial Sovereignty