<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/a><\/b> “Stevan, I think that may be the key to our disagreement. The evidence (and scientific consensus) regarding unconscious knowledge is simply overwhelming.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>It may well be (part of) the key to our disagreement, but not at all because I question the evidence concerning unconscious “knowledge”!<\/p>\n
Unconscious knowledge is the unconscious possession of information (data, capacity, propensity). I have no problem at all with unconscious information, nor with any unconscious function.<\/p>\n
My problem (the “hard” problem) is with conscious<\/i> function, including conscious information (data, capacity, propensity).<\/p>\n
If all “knowledge” were unconscious, there would be no hard problem, and we would not be discussing consciousness here (just perhaps the “easy” functional matter of voluntary versus involuntary behavior and accessible versus inaccessible internal information).<\/p>\n
And it is precisely for that reason that I keep harping on the fact that it is only because we allow ourselves to keep invoking weasel-words for consciousness (“awareness, subjectivity, intentionality, mentality, 1st-personality, qualia,” etc. etc.) — which are really just vague and hopeful synonyms — that we keep fooling ourselves that we are making some headway on the hard one.<\/p>\n
To keep ourselves honest and grounded, we should ditch all the other locutions and stand-ins for “conscious” and just resort to “felt” vs. “unfelt”: That would make the question-begging (and even the incoherence) transparent whenever we inadvertently fall into it.<\/p>\n
And the question-begging and incoherence here was precisely the notion of an “unconscious headache” — which, when stated transparently, without equivocation, would be an “unfelt ache,” which amounts to an “unfelt feeling”: a contradiction in terms (like an uncurved curve or a colorless color).<\/p>\n
Feeling (not “intentionality”) is the “mark of the mental.” What is not felt is not conscious. And the hard problem is to explain how and why anything at all<\/i> is felt (hence mental), anywhere, ever.<\/p>\n
Information accessibility is not what it’s about. There would be accessible as well as inaccessible information inside an insentient (= unconscious) robot (as well as inside a hypothetical “zombie,” for those who are fond of those sci-fi fantasies of speculative metaphysicians).<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “Autobiographical memories are unconscious (until recalled).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>And the problem is not with the fact that the stored information is there, nor the fact that it is used and plays a causal role in adaptive function, nor even with the fact that it can be made explicit and verbalized. The problem is with the fact that recall is conscious recall — i.e., felt recall — rather than just recall!<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “So are unaccessed ambiguities in language, vision, and other functions.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>Right. And the problem is not with access, but with conscious (felt<\/i>) access. <\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “The cerebellum is unconscious; so are basal ganglia functions.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>Indeed. And the problem is not with cerebellar and basal ganglion functions, but with conscious (felt) functions.<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “The corticothalamic system (under the proper conditions) is not.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>Translation: Corticothalamic functions (some, sometimes) are felt rather than unfelt. <\/p>\n
The Problem: How and Why?<\/p>\n
(Otherwise, all you have is an unexplained correlation, not a causal explanation of how and why some functions are felt functions.)<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “Habituated input is unconscious. Automatisms are unconscious. Implicit motivation, implicit learning, incubation, preconscious perception, long-term ego functions, and yes, demonstrated cases of suppressed thoughts are unconscious.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>All just fine. And no problem. <\/p>\n
And if all functions were like that (unfelt) there would be no problem at all.<\/p>\n
But they’re not.<\/p>\n
And that’s the (hard) problem.<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “The evidence is simply enormous. You can be a radical subjectivist on those matters, but you will be in a small and diminishing minority. And what\u2019s worse, you lose a ton of explanatory power.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>I have no idea what a “radical subjectivist” is!<\/p>\n
I am just pointing out (each time) that it is indeed a problem<\/i> to explain how and why all<\/i> functions are not unfelt: to explain how and why we are not<\/i> zombies, if you like. (We certainly aren’t: how and why not? What’s the functional advantage? What’s the causal difference?)<\/p>\n
The absence of an answer (or the failure even to face the problem) is the absence<\/i> of explanatory power.<\/p>\n
Bernie Baars:<\/b> “I think this may be the key to our mutual incomprehension. (Decontextualized comprehension is also unconscious).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/i>I agree that there is indeed misunderstanding here, but I am not sure it is mutual! I think I understand completely what you are saying, Bernie, but I am not sure you are understanding — or appreciating the implications of — what I am saying (about the failure and indeed the vacuity of all attempts at causal explanation of consciousness).<\/p>\n
(I have no idea what “decontextualized comprehension” means, but the problem, as usual, is conscious<\/i> [i.e., felt] comprehension, not comprehension simpliciter, which is simply the possession of information and the capacity to act accordingly — including, if necessary, to verbalize it!)<\/p>\n
\nHarnad, S. (1992) There is only one mind body problem<\/a>. International Journal of Psychology<\/i> 27(3-4) p. 521 <\/p>\n
Harnad, Stevan (1995) Why and How We Are Not Zombies<\/a>. Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/i> 1:164-167. <\/p>\n
Harnad, S. (2000) Correlation vs. Causality: How\/Why the Mind\/Body Problem Is Hard<\/a>. Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/i> 7(4): 54-61. <\/p>\n
Harnad, S. & Scherzer, P. (2008) First, Scale Up to the Robotic Turing Test, Then Worry About Feeling<\/a>. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine<\/i> 44(2): 83-89 <\/p>\n
Harnad, S. (2011) Doing, Feeling, Meaning And Explaining<\/a>. In: On the Human<\/a><\/i>.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bernie Baars: “Stevan, I think that may be the key to our disagreement. The evidence (and scientific consensus) regarding unconscious knowledge is simply overwhelming.” It may well be (part of) the key to our disagreement, but not at all because I question the evidence concerning unconscious “knowledge”! Unconscious knowledge is the unconscious possession of information … <\/p>\n