{"id":570,"date":"2018-12-31T20:16:31","date_gmt":"2018-12-31T20:16:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/?p=570"},"modified":"2018-12-31T20:16:31","modified_gmt":"2018-12-31T20:16:31","slug":"the-ever-elusive-causal-status-of-feeling-reply-to-john-campbell-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/2018\/12\/31\/the-ever-elusive-causal-status-of-feeling-reply-to-john-campbell-3\/","title":{"rendered":"The Ever-Elusive Causal Status of Feeling: Reply to John Campbell-3"},"content":{"rendered":"

(Reply to John Campbell-3<\/a>)<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “(1) Characterizing the epistemic role of consciousness. In particular, there’s explaining the work that sensory experience does in (a) our having propositional knowledge of our surroundings, knowing that things are thus-and-so around us, and (b) having concepts of the objects and properties in our surroundings, knowing which objects and properties those are<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The trouble is that each of the mental states you mention has an easy aspect (doing and ability to do) and a hard aspect (feeling). So unless you specify which of the two you are referring to, it is difficult to know what you really mean:<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “(1) Characterizing the epistemic role of consciousness<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

“Epistemic” is equivocal: it could refer to what can be known in the sense of unfelt knowing (doing, and ability to do: easy) or felt knowing (hard). <\/p>\n

And until\/unless there are further arguments to show that the distinction is coherent, a “conscious” state is a state that it feels like something to be in, hence a felt state. <\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “In particular, there’s explaining the work that sensory experience does<\/em>” <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Unfelt sensory system activity (doing, and ability to do: easy) or felt sensory experience (hard)?<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “in (a) our having propositional knowledge of our surroundings<\/em>” <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Unfelt propositional knowledge (doing and saying, and ability to do and say: easy) or felt knowledge (hard)?<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “knowing that things are thus-and-so around us<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Unfelt knowing (doing, and ability to do: easy) or felt knowing (hard)?<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “and (b) having concepts of the objects and properties in our surroundings<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I have no idea what “having concepts” means! Does it mean being able to do\/say certain things (easy) or does it also feel like something to have a concept (hard)?<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “knowing which objects and properties those are<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Unfelt knowing (doing, and ability to do: easy) or felt knowing (hard)?<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “(2) Explaining how conscious experience can be realized by a physical system.It seems to me that (1) is not well understood, and that arguably it’s prior to (2)<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I agree.<\/p>\n

JC:<\/strong> “ I don’t think there’s much hope for a successful assault on (2) unless we have firmly in place a clear conception of exactly what explanatory work the notion of consciousness in general, and of sensory experience in particular, is doing for us<\/em>“<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I agree. And the hard part is that on the face of it the answer is: none!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

(Reply to John Campbell-3) JC: “(1) Characterizing the epistemic role of consciousness. In particular, there’s explaining the work that sensory experience does in (a) our having propositional knowledge of our surroundings, knowing that things are thus-and-so around us, and (b) having concepts of the objects and properties in our surroundings, knowing which objects and properties … <\/p>\n

Continue reading “The Ever-Elusive Causal Status of Feeling: Reply to John Campbell-3”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3074,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-570","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorised"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3074"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=570"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":571,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570\/revisions\/571"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=570"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=570"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=570"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}