{"id":1205,"date":"2019-01-21T16:17:46","date_gmt":"2019-01-21T16:17:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/?p=1205"},"modified":"2019-01-21T16:17:46","modified_gmt":"2019-01-21T16:17:46","slug":"explaining-feeling","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/2019\/01\/21\/explaining-feeling\/","title":{"rendered":"Explaining Feeling"},"content":{"rendered":"<blockquote><p><i>All we have to do&#8230; is to define \u2018consciousness\u2019 explicitly to mean what you call \u2018feeling\u2019 (I usually use the word \u2018experience\u2019 to avoid \u2018conscious\u2019, and define \u2018experience\u2019 accordingly). We know what we mean!<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>A conscious\/mental\/experiential\/phenomenological\/subjective state is a state that <i>it feels like something to be in<\/i>. Hence I prefer to stick to feeling: its much the simplest, most direct and face-valid descriptor.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i> I think [stones] may be constituted of experientiality. <\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It feels like something to be a stone? (Or a part of a stone?)<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>I can even accept \u2018decorative\u2019. I understand this to mean that classical zombies are logically possible even though Kirk zombies aren\u2019t.<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I think leptons, stones, toasters &#8212; and probably also microbes and plants &#8212; are zombies.  But I can\u2019t explain how and why we (sometimes) aren&#8217;t. (It never feels like anything to be them, but it [sometimes] feels like something to be us.) (\u201cDecorative\u201d because we cannot explain feeling\u2019s function.)<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>Mistake to think [feeling] is a theoretical \u2018cost\u2019, for [1]  radical emergence is a greater theoretical cost, [2] non-feeling reality is already a cost, because it\u2019s a unwarranted theoretical posit.<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I have no problem with molecules and stones and toasters and microbes and plants being zombies. Nothing to explain. Their states are unfelt. I have enormous problems explaining how or why other organisms are not zombies too. But they\u2019re not. Having (genetically coded) traits is surely more costly than not having them.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>the biologist doesn\u2019t need an explanation for the very existence of feeling, and has an excellent explanation for the existence of feeling tuned to serve adaptive purposes.<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I have yet to hear that adaptive explanation; if (as I believe) feeling is a biological trait, it does need a causal (adaptive) explanation.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>One useful terminological option here is to define \u2018mind\u2019 in such a way that feeling doesn\u2019t entail mind (see e.g. Russell, perhaps also Damasio) \u2026 feeling is v low-level, mind is essentially useful in some way<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Hi or lo, I see no causal explanation of this \u201cusefulness.\u201d It\u2019s doings, and the capacity for doing them, that are useful.  And if a state is not felt, I have no idea what is meant by calling it mental (and vice versa).<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>[feeling is physicists\u2019] problem insofar as they propose to offer a general theory of concrete reality<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It seems to me feeling&#8217;s just biologists\u2019 problem, just as, say, digestion or photosynthesis is. No new physics there.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>[functing, ordinary causal explanation, whether in physics or in biology] doesn\u2019t explain the existence of non-feeling matter \u2026 to explain that, one would need to answer the question \u2018Why is there something rather than nothing\u2019? <\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Here I show my non-metaphysicians\u2019 pedestrianism: Try as I might, I can\u2019t help but feel that that sort of onticism is otiose.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><i>the view that consciousness is everywhere but isn\u2019t all there is) is [1] independently motivated and [2] explains this for free. Biological evolution sometimes produces an organism O that is not simply made of feeling stuff, in such a way that it (O) isn\u2019t itself a subject of experience, but is also itself a subject of experience, be it is adaptive.<\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Unfortunately, to my naive realists\u2019 ears this sounds more speculative (and complicated) than explicative. Shouldn&#8217;t the <i>explanans<\/i> be simpler than the <i>explanandum<\/i>? All I wanted was to know how and why (some) organisms (sometimes) feel rather than just funct!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>All we have to do&#8230; is to define \u2018consciousness\u2019 explicitly to mean what you call \u2018feeling\u2019 (I usually use the word \u2018experience\u2019 to avoid \u2018conscious\u2019, and define \u2018experience\u2019 accordingly). We know what we mean! A conscious\/mental\/experiential\/phenomenological\/subjective state is a state that it feels like something to be in. Hence I prefer to stick to feeling: &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/2019\/01\/21\/explaining-feeling\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Explaining Feeling&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3074,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1205","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorised"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1205","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3074"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1205"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1205\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1206,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1205\/revisions\/1206"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1205"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1205"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/generic.wordpress.soton.ac.uk\/skywritings\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1205"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}