Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Events

Podcasts from the workshops and conference are available on the site.

 

 

Past events

Workshop 1 Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Substantive Connections

13th June 2014

Programme (click on titles for podcasts of the talks)

09:30 Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri) – ‘McGrath – Avoiding Pragmatic Encroachment: Not so Easy for the Fallibilist

Response: Alex Worsnip (Yale University)

11:15 Maria Alvarez (Kings College London) – ‘Alvarez – Reasons for Action as Reasons for Belief

Response: Kurt Sylvan (University of Southampton)

12:45 Lunch

14:30 Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting (University of Southampton) – ‘Way and Whiting – The Infallibility of Justified Deontic Beliefs

Response: Amy Flowerree (Northwestern University)

16:15 Baron Reed (Northwestern University) – ‘Reed – Practical Interests and Reasons to Believe

Response: Robin McKenna (University of Geneva)

 

Workshop 2 Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Explanatory Connections

16th January 2015

Programme (click on titles for podcasts of talks)

9.30-11.00 Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Aarhus University), ‘Epistemic Consequentialism and the Separateness of Propositions’.

Response: Ema Sullivan-Bissett (Birmingham)

11.15-12.45 Daniel Star (Boston University), ‘Star – Reasoning with Reasons’.

Response: Daniel Fogal (NYU)

14.30-16.00 Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons’.

Response: Chris Howard (Arizona)

16.15-17.45 Kurt Sylvan (University of Southampton), ‘Sylvan – Why and How to Be an Epistemic Non-Consequentialist’.

Response: Victor Verdejo (UCL)

 

Workshop 3 Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Meta-Normative Problems and Proposals

12th June 2015

Programme (click on titles for podcasts of talks)

Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont) – ‘Cuneo – Destabilizing the Error Theory

Respondent: Christopher Cowie (University of Cambridge)

Michael Ridge (University of Edinburgh) – ‘Ridge – Reliability without Relativism

Respondent: Charles Côté-Bouchard (Kings College London)

Anne Meylan (University of Fribourg) – ‘Meylan – Reasons-Responsiveness and the Basing Relation

Respondent: Luke Elson (University of Reading)

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (University of Kent) – ‘The Costs of Epistemic Realism’

Respondent: Genia Schönbaumsfeld (University of Southampton)

 

Conference Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

8th-10th September 2015

Invited speakers

  • Mikkel Gerken (Edinburgh), ‘Recommendations: Where Epistemic Norms of Action and Assertion Meet’
  • Elizabeth Harman (Princeton), ‘Ethics is Hard! So What?’
  • Benjamin Kiesewetter (Humboldt University of Berlin), ‘An Evidence-Relative Account of Reasons’
  • Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way (Southampton), ‘Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought’
  • David Owens (Reading),  ‘Value and Epistemic Normativity’
  • Debbie Roberts (Edinburgh), ‘Supervenience in Ethics and Epistemology’
  • Mark Schroeder (USC), ‘Perceptual Reasons and Defeat’

Open sessions

  • Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (Johns Hopkins), ‘The Aim of Belief and the Aim of Reasoning’
  • Hagit Benbaji (Ben Gurion), ‘Intending and Believing at Will’
  • Chris Howard (Arizona), ‘The Fundamentality of Fit’
  • Stephen Ingram (Sheffield), ‘Epistemology Shmepistemology’
  • Antti Kauppinen (Academy of Finland), ‘Diagnosing Epistemic Norms’
  • Justin Snedegar (St. Andrews), ‘Reasons For and Reasons Against’
  • Jan Willem Wieland (Amsterdam), ‘Norms and Responsibility for Strategic Ignorance’
  • Daniel Wodak (Princeton), ‘An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons’

 

Study Day Thinking Well, Living Well

12th December 2015

How should I live? What should I do? Such questions are inescapable and of fundamental importance. For as long as there has been philosophy, there has been ethics, which seeks to understand and answer such questions. In addition, we might also ask: How should I conduct my intellectual life? What should I think? Such questions seem no less urgent or important. Indeed, they seem bound up with those with which we began. To use a humdrum example, whether Smith should believe that Jones is diabetic looks relevant to whether Smith should give Jones sweets. To use a more high flown example, we seem to prize virtues such as integrity or bravery, and to condemn vices such a dishonesty and spinelessness, in intellectual pursuits just as we do in practical pursuits.
The focus of this study day was how thinking well relates to living well. It explored some of the issues concerning how the standards we try to follow in inquiry relate to the those we try to follow in acting.

Programme
Sophie Keeling: ‘Thinking Well and Knowing What One Thinks’
Dr Conor McHugh: ‘Responsibility in Action and Thought’
Dr Jonathan Way: ‘Does Virtue Require Thinking Well?’
Dr Daniel Whiting: ‘Is it Good to Believe the Truth?’