

Strategic Abilities of Asynchronous Agents: Semantic Side Effects



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
Previous Work: Partial Order Reduction for ATL

- ▶ Formalism: Asynchronous Multi-agent Systems (AMAS)
- ▶ Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL*
- ▶ Main result: POR algorithm for LTL adapted to ATL, the subset of ATL* without nested strategic operators
- ▶ “Free lunch”: applying existing methods and tools for a new purpose (and using a more expressive logic!)

Semantic Problems with Strategic Ability in AMAS

- ▶ AMAS semantics follows the classical modeling tradition inherited from distributed systems
- ▶ However, adding the concept of **strategic ability** results in several problematic phenomena
- ▶ Side-effects: unexpected or **counterintuitive formal interpretations** of some strategic formulae

Example 1: Conference in Times of COVID-19



- ▶ **Left:** an AMAS with General, Organizing Committee and Steering Committee chairs **gc**, **oc**, and **sc**
- ▶ **Right:** its interleaved interpreted system (model) M
- ▶ **Highlighted:** joint strategy of coalition $\langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle$ and the transitions it enables in model M


Semantic Problems: Deadlocks and Finite Paths

- ▶ **Example 1:** the whole model M has no **deadlock states**, as typically expected from automata networks
- ▶ However, some **strategies** still might lead to deadlocks
- ▶ The joint strategy of $\langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle$ produces only one **infinite path**: $000 \text{ giveup } 002 \text{ giveup } \dots$
- ▶ AMAS semantics disregards **finite paths** though!
- ▶ Counterintuitively, we get $M, 000 \models \langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle G \neg \text{open}$

Semantic Problems: Asymmetric Interaction

- ▶ **Example 1:** $M, 101 \models \langle\langle gc \rangle\rangle G \neg \text{epid}$, since **gc** can pick **online** at its local state 1 to ensure low epidemic risk
- ▶ Then, **oc** has to synchronize with **gc** on event **online**
- ▶ On the other hand, we also have $M, 101 \models \langle\langle oc \rangle\rangle F \text{epid}$, obtained by **oc**'s strategy selecting **onsite** at state 0
- ▶ Agents' **repertoire functions** in AMAS are based on the assumption that any single event can be chosen
- ▶ No natural specification of the opposite situation (transition determined by another agent)

Example 2: Conference, Slightly Modified



- ▶ **Highlighted:** joint strategy of coalition $\langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle$ and the transitions it enables in model M'

Semantic Problems: Empty Strategy Outcomes

- ▶ **Example 2:** M' has no deadlock states, yet all the joint strategies of $\langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle$ produce only finite runs
- ▶ Finite paths are not included in the outcome sets, and semantics rules out strategies with **empty outcomes**
- ▶ Consequently, $\neg \langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle F \top$, which is definitely wrong!
- ▶ Removing non-emptiness clause on outcomes does not help: in this case, $\langle\langle gc, oc \rangle\rangle G \perp$ can be demonstrated

Summary

- ▶ We identified several **problematic side-effects** in the original AMAS semantics that manifest when reasoning about **strategic ability** using the logic ATL
- ▶ AMAS is too restricted to model all strategic aspects of asymmetric synchronization (e.g. coalition agents being forced by their opponents' choices)

References

- W. Jamroga, W. Penczek, and T. Sidoruk. Strategic Abilities of Asynchronous Agents: Semantic Paradoxes and How to Tame Them. *CoRR*, abs/2003.03867.
- W. Jamroga, W. Penczek, T. Sidoruk, P. Dembiński, and A. W. Mazurkiewicz. Towards Partial Order Reductions for Strategic Ability. *J. Artif. Intell. Res.*, 68:817–850, 2020.